The country’s supreme legal document was ratified some 20 years ago. Almost as memorable as the article itself is the display of extreme jubilation by one elderly member of the Constituent Assembly. He rose from his seat in delight and exhilaration pacing his way across the auditorium clapping and joyfully jumping. He would always be remembered in conjunction with one of the major milestones in modern Ethiopian history – the ratification of the FDRE Constitution. Two decades down the road, Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia have been on both the losing and receiving end, writes Solomon Goshu.
It is interesting to note that the ruling party, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), celebrated the 120th Anniversary of the Battle of Adwa in a colorful way in the past few days. To say the least, it is ironic to see the ruling party, which is accused by its opponents as anti-unity, presenting the Adwa victory as a symbol of the ever present common destiny of the people of Ethiopia.
The ethnic federalism at work since 1995 was feared to destabilize the unity of the country as it gives too much power to members of the federation in the form of the right to self-determination up to secession. While the ruling party refers to the pre-1991 Ethiopia as a ‘prison house to nations, nationalities, and peoples’, it characterizes the federation created under its guidance as a federal state based on the voluntary unity of the many ethnic groups. In 1991, the then President Meles Zenawi declared the government’s aim to be “a united Ethiopia, built not on the basis of oppression but on that of voluntary union.”
In similar vein, Getachew Reda, head of the Government Communications Affairs Office, while briefing on the successes and challenges of the Ethiopian federalism on FANA FM Mogach program said, “we won the Battle of Adwa while preserving our diversity. Oppressed Oromos, Wolaitas and other peoples participated to this common project having grievances on the system.”
Studies show that the country is suffering from lack of consensus on major issues. On top of this problem one can also mention lack of consensus with regards to the history of past oppression, marginalization and discriminations. For some, ethnic federalism is the creation of EPRDF to be used as an instrument of power. For the ruling and others in favor of ethnic federalism, the system only recognizes the preexisting ethno-nationalist mobilizations.
Federalism experts mainly categorize federation as ‘coming together’ and ‘holding together’ federations. In the ‘coming together’ federations, such as the US and Switzerland, the units that desire to unite all had a previous existence, and awareness of being a separate territorial community preceding the federation. The boundary of the units is also an established and settled one, though that does not rule out new claims and adjustments. On the other hand, in ‘holding together’ federations, the states are, by and large, new creations of the federal bargain or even a unilateral decision of the center at later stages, rather than entities with prior existence. A consequence of this fact is that the regional states are often weak – at least during the early phase of the federation – in terms of asserting their powers. Furthermore, as the regional state boundaries are reorganized afresh to address various demands of ethno-nationalist groups, the boundary of the units is less stable and often faces frequent claims for adjustment or even claims for establishing new regional states or local governments.
In the great majority of the literatures, the Ethiopian case is referred to as the ‘holding together’ federation even though the ruling party and some other believe otherwise. One thing is clear: demands of the nations, nationalities and peoples (NNPs) for boundary adjustments and recognition for new identity are still increasing in Ethiopia. Moreover, reports indicate that the response mechanisms to identity questions in Ethiopia have brought new challenges in terms of identity-based conflicts. Even though gaps in the legal framework are occasionally mentioned as a triggering factor to the identity-based questions and exacerbate the consequences of the response mechanism, mainly political calculations are listed as the main causes.
In fact, many give credit to the Ethiopian federalism for recognizing and empowering the NNPs at federal and sub-state levels. Assefa Fiseha, the leading federalism expert in the country, in his piece “Ethiopia’s Experiment in Accommodating Diversity: 20 Years’ Balance Sheet” states that the ethnic federalism model has played a positive role as it has opened up a political space for the ethno-nationalist forces, hitherto marginalized groups, particularly in the area of language, culture, local self-government, including the promotion of one’s history.
However, others are of the view that the ethnic federalism that intensified demands to statehood and separate units of administration, which sometimes result in the establishment of additional zones, weredas and special weredas, is creating political instability and impeding development. Studies on identity questions reveal that the government is well aware of these dangers and it is quashing such questions as much as possible in the last decade. Since 2005, the focus seems to be building one political and economic community in the country. As a result, the portrayal of grand projects like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as a symbol of the country, celebrations of Flag Day, nationalities day and cities day are considered manifestations of such intent. Celebrating Adwa by state apparatus in an unprecedented manner seems to be an addition to such a trend.
In the Russian federation, even though at first the questions of nationalities were promoted, later on Joseph Stalin declared that as the ‘nationality question’ is resolved once and for all, Russia no more entertains such questions. One wonders if such thought is on the minds of the current Ethiopian leaders.
Identity-based questions are increasing
After 21 years of federal experimentation solely based on ethnicity, identity questions are still coming from all corners both for regional and federal governments. Kimant, Welene, Zay, Konso, Raya, Menja, Wolkait, are just instances of such cases. Some of them have not exhausted local remedies at the regional level. Others like Kimant and Menja have reached the House of Federation (HoF) on appeal. In the past, similar question did come from Sidama, Gamo and Gofa ethnic groups. For some commentators, how the Ethiopian federation responds to these questions is worrisome.
“During the Transitional Period government, there were 63 NNPs. They gave recognition to themselves. Soon their number reached 67 when the FDRE Constitution was ratified. In 1995, the number of ethnic groups in the South was 46. Now it is 56. However, detailed information on how the additional groups secured new recognition is unavailable,” Woubishet Mulat, a constitutional expert who recently published a book on self-determination, told the Reporter.
In the majority of instances, identity-based questions are related to recognition of new identity, a demand for local government, fair representation or power- and resource-sharing at various levels, and the like. For Woubishet identity questions are mainly about recognition. “Without recognition, one cannot have rights. So, recognition is the precondition,” he says.
The legal framework seems to be extremely generous and goes much further than recognition when it comes to the rights of the NNPs. Article 8 proclaims that all sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia. According to Article 39, among other things, every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession; the right to speak, to write and to develop its own language; to express, to develop and to promote its culture; and to preserve its history; the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and federal governments.
The demand for identity recognition is broadly interpreted as part of the claim for self-determination and as part of the essence of Art 39. For Debebe Barud, head of HoF secretariat, the increasing identity questions are signs for the emergence of better understanding of the Constitution in general and self-determination in particular.
As per Article 62 (3) of the Constitution, it is the HoF which decides on issues relating to the rights of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples to self-determination, including the right to
secession. Furthermore, Proclamation 251/2001 and the 2007 House of Federation Procedure and Members’ Code of Conduct Regulation provide the detailed ways of discharging this responsibility.
The HoF is dubbed as the house of NNPs as all nations, nationalities and peoples which the system recognizes are represented in the HoF. Even though, it is expected to promote the interests of NNPs, commentators argue that it is under the influences of regional states. In fact, as of 2005, state governors have been among the key members sent to represent the states and nationalities in the HoF and to decide crucial issues, such as the federal subsidy to each state. Furthermore, the institutional competence of the HoF in terms of experts and regularity of sessions is criticized. However, it is the assessment of Assefa that the performance of the HoF in adjudicating constitutional issues reveals that it has played an important role, particularly in cases of high political significance like that of the Silte case.
The Silte case was the first major case dealing with identity question. The Silte people demanded to have a right of self-rule in local government within the Southern Regional State. The issue of the Silte was about the question of Silte’s distinct identity, based on language and unity of faith, Islam. Alleging that they are distinct from the Gurages, they effectively challenged the regional and federal authorities. The case resulted in a complex process of finding out who the ‘self’ is that is entitled to administer itself, the respective role of federal and state institutions in the process, and the procedures to be followed. The HoF, after a long process of consultation with the regional state, concluded that determining the identity issue is part of its mandate. The HoF – after a long process of consultation with the Southern Regional State and the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI) – then decided that a referendum be held in the Southern Regional State. The referendum was held in March 2001. Only the Silte community participated, and the referendum resulted in the establishment of a separate zonal structure for the Silte after seceding from the Guraghe.
According to Woldu Merne, Constitutional Interpretation and Identity Questions Directorate Director at the HoF, the Silte case specifically raised two fundamental issues. The first issue was related with who should first entertain the case. The second issue was deciding on who is entitled to determine the ‘self’ to exercise the rights generally accorded to ethnic groups. “In relation to the first issue, the HoF decided that the regions should first see identity questions interpreting that it is part of their self-determination rights on political, economic and social affairs that concern the regions. Deciding on identity question is a political issue of the regions. When it comes to deciding the ‘self’, the HoF decided that if there are signs that the constitutional criteria for distinct identity are fulfilled, it should be the group with the question that confirms its identity. That is why the Silte case was decided by referendum,” Woldu explains.
The various identity questions presented to the regional and federal authorities are not similar. Like that of the Silte, most of these cases are from the Southern Regional State. Taking the Silte case as precedent, identity issues are first required to exhaust regional remedies. In the case of Menja, first the identity question was entertained at the region. The Council of Nationalities of the region decided that Menja has no distinct identity. The decision of the HoF is similar as it upholds the region’s verdict when it reviewed the case through appeal.
The Kimant case as well was first decided by the regional council after many years of wrangling. Even if the Kimant community’s demand to be recognized as a distinct group from the Amhara was decided in their favor, conflicts ensued when the number of kebele administrations they claimed were partially accepted. They appealed the decision to the HoF. “The HoF is not mandated to decide the number of Kebeles one ethnic group deserves. It is up to the regional states to decide that,” Woldu states.
Woubishet highlights that certain aspects of the Kimant case are unique when compared with the previous identity questions. “The Kimants do not live in a predominantly contiguous territory which is one of the constitutional criteria for distinct identity. May be, from now on, it could be used as a precedent that sharing the same territory is not a prerequisite. The Kimants also do not meet the mutual intelligibility of language criteria as they are currently not communicating in Kimantney language. Of course, they used to have their own language. Moreover, unlike the Silte the identity of the Kimant was decided by the unilateral decision of the Amhara Council, not by referendum,” he says.
The HoF decided against new identity for some cases. Debebe indicates that the decision was made partly because some of the questions had another agenda, and partly some of the cases were just issues of bad governance, not identity questions. For Woldu, the Menja case is an instance where sometimes the mistreatment of minorities at regional state level wrongly perceived as a question of identity. “The HoF reaches to a decision after thoroughly investigating the cases. Relevant committees and experts teams conduct researchs, which include a field visit. The decision against the distinct identity of Menja and Kontoma were made this way,” he elaborates. However, Woldu expresses that the decision to reject the demand for new identity need to be seen separately from the issue of discrimination. “The Menjas are victims of discrimination and bad attitudes. That is why the decision demands the regional state to respect these rights,” he adds.
By the same token, the Konso question is not an identity question. It is a question of restructuring the administration zone. Woubishet sheds some new perspective to the issue. He says,“Konso is now part of Segen Zone with other ethnic groups. They want an independent administration zone for Konso. Somehow it is related with aspects of identity. Having your own administration will promote your identity better, than sharing it with others.” As per Art 50 (4) and 52 (2) (a) Regional States are empowered to devise the organization of their respective administrative units as they please only limited to give adequate answers the democratic rights of the peoples either in terms of autonomy or local governance.
For some, the ongoing conflict in Oromia is related with the identity question of the Oromo nation as it has developed to be discussed in the context of fair representation. “There seems to be a tendency amongst members of the ruling party that identity questions are adequately responded just like Stalin’s Russia. Recognizing and empowering Oromos to have their own region does not mean their quest to further their identity is over. The current Oromo question cannot be ignored by externalizing to the unholy marriage of narrow-minded chauvinists or lack of good governance. The question is also about representation, economy and political power sharing,” Woubishet explains.
While appreciating the fact that – both in principle and practice – there is every attempt to reflect the country’s diversity in the establishment of the executive, Assefa indicates that the same cannot be said about the other branches of the federal government, such as the legislature, judiciary, civil service and the army. He argues that federal institutions should reflect existing diversity on the ground. “The logic is simple but vital: the more the ethno-nationalist forces see their image at the federal level, the more they think they are part of it and the less they want to move away from it. It will be naive to expect that various ethno-nationalist forces will remain loyal to the system unless the major contenders for power are, in some manner, absorbed into the political process,” Assefa states.
According to the HoF authorities, the constitutional principles, the institutions, and policies are used to resolve identity-based questions. “I don’t think that the government is responding to the identity questions based on already set principles,” Woubishet argues otherwise. He opines that similar cases are not having uniform decisions. “We are talking about a country with limited resources and elites manipulating identity to benefit themselves at the expense of the public. Unless we devise a mechanism that is predictable, the current trend will create instability and waste the scare resources,” he says.
Is ethnic federalism breeding ground for conflicts?
Federalism experts argue that as conflicts in pluralistic societies are unavoidable, effective policy and institutional mechanisms need to be used to prevent and resolve them. To accommodate the diverse interests inherent in these societies which sometimes would lead into conflicts, a successful federation devises constitutional, legal and institutional means other than force.
On the one hand, from the outset there were some fear that the Ethiopian federation established through ethnic lines would end up with conflicts and fragmentation. Now, taking the recent conflicts in the country, which allegedly occurred as a result of identity-based confrontations, some commentators contend that the ethnic-based federalism is a breeding ground for conflicts and urge the government to revisit its policy and the Constitution.
On the other hand, the Ethiopian authorities contend that had it not been for the relevant institutions and polices to address such issues, the situation would have been worse. In this context, Assefa argues that the federation has diffused the various conflicts out into local arenas, making them less a threat to the center, when compared, for example, with the political situation in 1991.
In the majority of instances, resistance to claims for new political administration within regional states resulted in conflicts. For instance, in recent times, reports show that the case of Welene, Kimant and Konso created serious conflicts and confrontations. For Assefa, ‘the elusive task of matching ethnic groups with specific boundaries’ is the source of these conflicts.
Several studies point out that not all conflicts amongst the NNPs are identity based. However, Assefa concedes that most of these conflicts have been portrayed in the media and even some studies as if they are ‘inter-ethnic conflicts’. For instance, he indicates that although some of the conflicts over grazing land, water and resources between communities had a long history that predated the new federal system, they are reported as ‘identity-based conflicts’.
Nevertheless, Assefa admits that the post-1991 political development seems to have changed the dimension of the conflict. “The fact that the disputed areas coincided with the boundaries between regional governments seems to have transformed the conflict between local communities to conflicts between regional states. Instances include the claim of ownership over Babile and Moyale—towns between Oromia and Somali regional states; the Borona and Gari conflict, again between the same regional states; the Afar and Issa—between the Afar regional state and Somali regional states; between the Gedeo in the Southern Regional State and the Guji Oromo in Oromia and the Guji Oromo in Oromia and the Sidama of Southern Regional State around the Wondogenet area. In addition to the competition over resources between the Afar and Issa, which is more or less the same case as with the Borona and the Gari, the tension between the Afar and Issa becomes more complex because it is very much interlinked with the geopolitics of the Horn,” he elaborates.
For Woldu, identity questions cannot be causes of conflict. “What if we fail to give recognition like old times,” he says. Similarly, Debebe is of the view that the country’s overall development is the result of identity recognition. “Every group is contributing for the development of the country by working hard because their identity is duly recognized,” he contends.
The FDRE Constitution envisages the adjudication of identity-based disputes by the HoF. Moreover, the Ministry of Federal and Pastoralist Development Affairs (MoFPDA) is also entrusted to promote the federal system and engage in the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The activities of MoFPDA are more visible in the less developed regional states where the unhealthy competitions of fragmented and sectarian political elites create instability, and the geopolitics pose real external threat. Assefa states, “As some of these lowland regions are also located on the borders with neighboring states, local politics is very much interlinked with regional politics (the Somali region being the classic case) and thus subject to manipulation and maneuvering by internal and external forces. These and other factors facilitated governmental and party interference from the center. The low level of political development in these regions means that the national ruling party plays a greater role in local administration than in other constituent states.”
However, as can be inferred from the conflicts in Gambella, Benishangul-Gumuz, and South, the role of the ministry is limited to conducting public discussion forums and meetings with stakeholders after the conflict. After announcing that the problems are resolved in a sustainable manner, they continue to occur in a short period of time. For instance, conflicts between Nuer and Annuak, and Habesha or Highlanders and the indigenous peoples of Gambella, the Sheko and Sheka in the South are reoccurring this way.
Instruments of power for the elites
For one group of federalism experts, identity is primordial which exists naturally. For others, identity is an artificial construction and deconstruction. The ruling party seems to favor the primordial approach. However, Getachew offers the instrumental approach. He said, “Identity is a psychological make-up. It is a historical socio-economic construct. If I raised my child in Bahir Dar, he will have an Amhara identity. It is not something primordial that you can relate with race and ancestors,” he explains. However, Woubishet contends that the Ethiopian experience reveals the existence of both approaches. “Mainly, the primordial approach better characterizes Ethiopia. The great majority of the NNPs of Ethiopia existed for centuries. This does not mean that some of the identities were not constructed or deconstructed. I believe that the Kimant and the Zay were assimilated to the Amharas and the Oromos respectively. They are now seeking a distinct identity as they realize that it is more advantageous,” he asserts. According to Woldu, both Oromia and the Southern regional states have notified the HoF that the cases of Zay and Welene are in the process of being investigated.
Studies by independent observers of Ethiopian politics reveal that local political elites have always manipulated identity-based difference to their advantage. While accepting the fact that not all identity questions are genuine, Woldu argues that both the legal framework and practical implementations have tried to filter those who tried to manipulate identity questions to advance their own selfish agendas. “The law requires the signature of five percent of the population to initiate identity question. We also require power of representation to authenticate whether the question is the people centered or elite-motivated,” he says.
Sara Sarah Vaughan in her research entitled Response to Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia’s Southern Region argues that the conflicts in the South are not ‘ethnic conflicts’ rather they are artificial constructions and deconstructions by local political elites. She states, “Their dynamics have, however, been seminally influenced by shifts in the salience of ethnicity under current political arrangements. Under ethnic federalism, ethnic zones have enjoyed relatively high inputs of capital and recurrent government expenditure, and this is a fact that is widely known by those local elites who have masterminded claims for separate recognition.”
The conflicts at the Semen Omo zone is mentioned as an instance where identity is used as instrumental value for power. The conflict was mainly triggered by the Wolayita where the regional government decided ‘Wogagoda’ as the language to be thought in schools after merging the languages of the four ethnic groups; Wolayita, Gamo, Gofa, and Dawro, respectively. It is claimed that the main cause of the conflict was not the merger of the four languages as Wogagoda is really considered as danger to the original languages, rather there is an argument which says the new language would have the potential to be the dominant language in the region which would obviously result better socio-economic and political opportunity to the four ethnic groups. However, Wolayita elites taking the situation as a pretext exploit it to ensure their desire of having a separate administration status at zonal level there by being better beneficiaries of the resource allocation of the region. While the Wolayta ethnic group demanded for a separate zonal administration failed to be addressed what followed was violent reactions despite the fact that the causes were claimed to have been attributed with other factors including the issues of language policy among others.
