Peace constitutes the hidden infrastructure of the Blue Nile and indeed of all rivers worldwide whose long-term sustainability is inseparable from the ecological integrity of their watersheds.

For centuries, Egypt’s approach to the Nile has been shaped by a mindset of dominance rather than cooperation. Successive Egyptian governments have regarded the river as an exclusive lifeline and pursued strategies that sought to weaken Ethiopia the very source of roughly 85 percent of the Nile’s waters. Instead of embracing basin wide cooperation to strengthen upstream stewardship, Cairo has often invested in destabilizing Ethiopia politically, economically, and diplomatically. The result was a tragic miscalculation. An unstable Ethiopia is not a reliable guardian of the Nile’s headwaters. When Ethiopia is weakened, the Blue Nile itself becomes ecologically insecure.

Destabilization has hydrological consequences. The erosion of peace in Ethiopia’s highlands translates directly into the erosion of soil. When communities are displaced or preoccupied by conflict, environmental stewardship collapses. The research stations monitoring water and soil are abandoned; afforestation campaigns stop; watershed rehabilitation structures crumble. Forests are cut to sustain conflict economies, while overgrazing and unregulated cultivation spread across fragile slopes. Every moment of unrest adds more sediment to the Blue Nile, filling reservoirs downstream and diminishing the life span of multi-billion-dollar infrastructures, including Egypt’s own Aswan High Dam.

In this sense, the Blue Nile is a barometer of Ethiopia’s peace. Lake Tana’s tributaries Megech, Gumara, Rib, and Gilgel Abay once supported vibrant ecosystems and predictable flows. But when peace falters, these watersheds suffer from unchecked erosion and declining water retention capacity. Sediment builds at the lake’s outlet, the very birthplace of the Blue Nile, making its flow increasingly erratic. Seasonal floods intensify, dry season flows weaken, and the delicate balance that once sustained agriculture and biodiversity deteriorates. The health of Lake Tana is thus inseparable from the peace of the communities that surround it.

Peace is also the enabling condition for science and innovation. Hydrology and watershed management depend on long-term, consistent observation a process impossible amid violence and instability. Without peace, researchers cannot collect data, environmental institutions lose continuity, and local knowledge networks disintegrate. The consequence is a generation of reactive, short-term responses to environmental crises instead of the planned, evidence-based management that sustainable development requires.

Conversely, when Ethiopia enjoys stability, its watersheds become engines of resilience. Peace allows afforestation projects to thrive, soil conservation to be maintained, and communities to invest in their shared ecological future. The government and academic institutions can carry out long-term watershed studies, refine hydrological models, and implement coordinated management programs across the Blue Nile Basin. In peaceful conditions, the landscape heals gullies close, vegetation returns, infiltration improves, and the hydrological regime stabilizes. The river becomes cleaner, slower, and more predictable.

Egypt, Sudan, and the wider Nile Basin stand to benefit more from a peaceful and prosperous Ethiopia than from an unstable one. Hydrological security cannot be achieved through dominance, coercion, or external manipulation. It can only be built upon mutual respect, shared development, and environmental cooperation. Egypt’s century-long fixation on controlling the Nile has ignored this basic ecological truth. By undermining the peace and progress of the Ethiopian highlands, Cairo has indirectly endangered the very river it seeks to protect.

Peace, therefore, is the most powerful form of watershed management. It is the silent infrastructure upon which all dams, canals, and irrigation systems depend. A single decade of peace can accomplish more for the Nile’s sustainability than decades of engineering alone. The GERD, remarkable as it is, cannot fulfill its full potential if the highlands that feed it continue to erode through neglect born of instability.

The lesson is clear: to secure the future of the Blue Nile, Ethiopia must secure its peace and Egypt must support, not sabotage, that peace. Hydro politics must evolve beyond zero-sum thinking and embrace ecological interdependence as the foundation of cooperation. The Blue Nile’s flow begins not in its channel but in the calm of its watersheds. Peace is, and will always remain, the headwater of the Nile.

Sisay Alemayehu is a water engineer by profession.

Contributed by Sisay Alemayehu (Eng.)

With most students unable to pass the national exams, Ethiopia faces the danger of losing a generation’s potential. Establishing job centres could provide the crucial link between schooling and the labour market.

The release of the latest Ethiopian national secondary school leaving examination results sent shockwaves across the nation. Once again, more than 90 percent of students failed to achieve a passing grade. For families, this was heartbreaking. For the nation, the consequences are profound. At stake is the fate of a generation and the prospects of Ethiopia’s economic transformation.

This crisis is not simply about education standards. It reflects a deeper disconnect between the output of schools, the capacity of universities, and the limited absorption power of the labour market. Unless addressed, this gap will undermine our growth ambitions and risk turning our youth bulge into a liability rather than an asset.

A Nation of Youth, but Few Pathways

Ethiopia is one of Africa’s youngest nations, with more than 70 percent of its population under the age of 30. Every year, hundreds of thousands of students complete secondary school. Yet universities cannot absorb them all. Those who fail the national exam are effectively shut out of higher education, with few alternative options.

The result is a growing pool of young people who are neither continuing in school nor employed. For them, a single exam failure becomes a life-defining barrier. The economic cost is immense: a generation left idle instead of contributing to national productivity. The social cost is just as grave, as frustration, disillusionment, and migration pressures mount.

Job Centres: A Practical Bridge

Ethiopia urgently needs a new institutional bridge between education and employment. One such mechanism is the establishment of job centres—accessible hubs that connect young people to real labour market opportunities.

Job centres would provide career guidance and profiling to help young people identify realistic pathways, offer real-time job-matching services with employers in both the private and public sectors, and deliver short, demand-driven training tied to growing industries such as construction, ICT, logistics, tourism, and agribusiness.

They would also facilitate apprenticeships and internships to give practical, on-the-job experience while supporting entrepreneurship through mentoring, business training, and links to finance. Instead of letting exam “failures” drift into unemployment, job centres would ensure every young Ethiopian has a second chance.

Instead of letting exam “failures” drift into unemployment, job centres would ensure every young Ethiopian has a second chance.

I speak from personal experience. After finishing college in the United Kingdom, I found myself uncertain about the next step. The Jobcentre Plus became a lifeline: it offered guidance on how to present my skills, connected me to employers, and pointed me towards short training opportunities that boosted my employability. That early support helped me transition from education into the world of work with confidence. It showed me that when well designed, job centres can give young people not only access to jobs but also a sense of direction and dignity.

Learning from Europe

Other nations have faced similar challenges and responded with structured solutions, and Europe offers some of the most relevant models.

In the United Kingdom, Jobcentre Plus goes beyond listing vacancies by actively engaging employers, running work trials, and connecting youth to apprenticeships with a focus on getting young people into work quickly. France, through its 2024 creation of France Travail, consolidated fragmented agencies into a unified “one-stop” system integrating employment, training, and social services so that no one—whether a university graduate or a school dropout—is left behind.

Denmark’s municipal job centres embody the “flexicurity” approach, combining flexible labour markets with strong social support and active measures, profiling youth early and guiding them swiftly into jobs or training. Sweden contracts NGOs and private firms to deliver job-placement services, paying them based on successful outcomes to ensure efficiency and innovation, particularly for harder-to-reach groups.

And at the EU level, the Youth Guarantee pioneered a bold commitment that every young person under 30 should be offered a job, apprenticeship, or training within four months of leaving school—an approach that has significantly reduced youth unemployment in countries like Ireland and Spain.

These lessons show that job centres, when designed well, are not mere bureaucracies but vital public institutions that shape national development.

Why Ethiopia Must Act Now

The government’s Homegrown Economic Reform Agenda (HGER) aims to modernize the economy, attract investment, and create millions of jobs, but these reforms will stall unless Ethiopia develops clear human-capital pathways for its youth. Job centres can absorb the shock of exam failures by offering structured alternatives, align skills with market demand to ensure training leads to real employment, support industrialization by producing job-ready workers for priority sectors, and reduce instability by giving frustrated young people a sense of direction and opportunity.

Imagine an Ethiopia where, within four months of leaving school, every young person is guaranteed either a job, an apprenticeship, or a training opportunity. Such a commitment would turn failure into resilience, and despair into hope.

Building the Ethiopian Model

To succeed, Ethiopia’s job centres must reflect local realities. This means integrating and co-locating them with existing TVET colleges, municipal service centres, or industrial parks to minimize costs; adopting a digital-first approach by building a multilingual portal in Amharic, Afaan Oromoo, Tigrigna and English for job matching, applications and training offers; and forging employer compacts in high-growth sectors to guarantee pipelines of vacancies linked to tailored training. It also calls for a youth employment guarantee that no young person remains idle for more than four months after leaving school, while engaging NGOs, training providers and development partners through outcome-based public–private partnerships to deliver specialized services. Finally, robust data systems must track job-placement rates, employer satisfaction and retention to ensure public resources are used effectively.

A Call to Action

The exam crisis is a warning bell. Ethiopia cannot allow a single test to condemn an entire generation to unemployment. The choice is stark: either waste the potential of millions of young people or create new institutions that unlock their contributions.

Establishing a national network of job centres, rooted in Ethiopian realities but inspired by international best practice, is one of the most practical and urgent steps the country can take. If designed with ambition and backed by political will, job centres could transform Ethiopia’s youth bulge into a demographic dividend.

The national exam results have laid bare the cost of inaction. Now is the time for bold, decisive leadership. Ethiopia’s future depends on whether we turn today’s failures into tomorrow’s opportunities.

Assefa Sumoro is a : (The opinions expressed in this article do not reflect the views or positions of the institution with which I am affiliated.)

Contributed by Assefa Sumoro

It has been more than two weeks since leaders gathered in Tianjin for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. At first glance, it might have seemed like another diplomatic ritual. Yet the outcomes and debates it generated are still reverberating across global trade and geopolitics. The timing was not accidental. Renewed U.S. tariffs have unsettled exporters, supply chains remain fragile, and great power rivalry is hardening. Against this backdrop, the SCO’s deliberations revealed not unity, but a struggle to navigate an unpredictable world.

India’s Tactical Calculations

For India, the urgency was evident. New U.S. tariffs on pharmaceuticals, textiles and machinery exposed the danger of depending too heavily on Western markets. Prime Minister Narendra Modi seized the opportunity to show that India has options. By engaging SCO partners, New Delhi is seeking alternative corridors, new investment partnerships and a larger role in a multipolar system.

But contradictions abound. India’s border disputes with China remain unresolved. Its rivalry with Beijing for regional influence continues to sharpen. The SCO may offer India tactical breathing space, but it cannot resolve strategic mistrust. What Tianjin revealed is that India is not building new alliances so much as hedging its vulnerabilities.

China’s Institutional Engineering

China, meanwhile, entered Tianjin under strain. The return of Trump to the White House has reignited tariff wars, revived technology restrictions, and accelerated the rhetoric of decoupling. Beijing knows that its export-driven economy is deeply exposed to U.S. pressure. Its response was to build institutional hedges that reduce dependence on Western systems.

At the summit, China proposed the establishment of an SCO development bank, advanced shared energy platforms, and expanded access to the BeiDou satellite system. More than 1.4 billion dollars in loans were pledged to SCO partners. These moves signal Beijing’s determination to cultivate resilience, export its own institutional influence, and create alternative trade and financial frameworks.

Yet ambition collides with reality. SCO members are a heterogeneous mix with diverging interests. Historical mistrust and uneven levels of development mean that China’s institutional blueprints may not automatically translate into durable cooperation. The summit showed Beijing’s intent, but it also revealed the structural limits of regional leadership.

Russia’s Dual-Track Strategy

Russia’s presence in Tianjin added weight and nuance. Only days earlier, President Vladimir Putin met Trump in Alaska for discussions that hinted at cautious progress on Ukraine. In Tianjin, he used this momentum to project Moscow as both mediator and power broker.

Russia is pursuing a dual-track strategy. On one hand, it engages directly with Washington to reduce its isolation. On the other, it deepens its role in Eurasian institutions like the SCO to dilute American dominance. This balancing act reflects Moscow’s determination to remain relevant in spite of sanctions and conflict. It also underscores how bilateral diplomacy and multilateral positioning increasingly reinforce one another.

The Tianjin Declaration: Symbolism and Substance

The summit concluded with the Tianjin Declaration. It pledged cooperation against terrorism, endorsed India’s “One Earth, One Family, One Future” vision, and floated proposals for joint bonds and shared investment platforms. Its language was ambitious, but the deeper message was pragmatic.

The declaration symbolized a collective effort to reduce exposure to U.S. unilateralism. For SCO members, tariffs, sanctions and political shocks are no longer episodic disruptions. They have become the normal condition of global trade. By sketching institutional buffers, the declaration was less about immediate solutions and more about shaping a future where resilience matters as much as growth.

Global Trade in Transition

For the global economy, the implications are far-reaching. Supply chains that once prioritized speed and efficiency now require resilience and redundancy. Indian exporters are rethinking their dependence on the U.S. market. Chinese firms are relocating production to friendlier jurisdictions. Russian commodity suppliers are searching for financial networks that bypass Western sanctions.

Multinational corporations must now pay close attention to alternative financial infrastructures that are gaining traction. Local currency settlements, regional payment systems and new investment frameworks may still be experimental, but they are no longer peripheral. The SCO has become a laboratory for these alternatives, however imperfect its mechanisms may be.

Africa’s Position in a Fragmenting World

The Tianjin summit also matters for Africa. Ethiopia’s accession to BRICS already places it in the orbit of multipolar financial debates. Tianjin made clear that the global economy is fragmenting into blocs that are building their own trade corridors and financial safety nets.

For Ethiopia, this is both an opportunity and a challenge. With foreign exchange shortages, heavy debt burdens and an undiversified export base, the country cannot afford to rely solely on traditional partners. At the same time, overcommitting to one camp could be risky. Strategic diversification is not a luxury but a necessity. Ethiopia must learn to engage with both Western institutions and emerging frameworks led by China, India and Russia.

The experiments tested at Tianjin offer practical lessons. If SCO members develop viable joint financial mechanisms or alternative payment systems, these could influence how Ethiopia negotiates loans, manages currency risks and pursues regional integration. The question is whether Ethiopian policymakers are ready to draw insights from these evolving architectures.

A World of Navigation, Not Harmony

Ultimately, Tianjin was less about harmony than about navigation. India cooperated with China for tactical reasons even as rivalry persisted. Russia projected influence through both bilateral and multilateral channels. China experimented with institutional engineering while struggling against mistrust. Each player was improvising, seeking to manage volatility rather than eliminate it.

The lesson two weeks on is clear. Multipolarity is no longer a future prospect but a present condition. Volatility is structural. Alliances are transactional. Resilience has overtaken efficiency as the new measure of success.

For Ethiopia and other African economies, adapting to this fractured order is not optional. The challenge is how quickly they can recognize that survival in today’s global economy requires agility, foresight and the courage to learn from shifting alignments.

Contributed by Mikiyas Mulugeta (PhD) 

On September 7, 2025, history will be made in Addis Ababa as Ethiopia hosts the first in-person Africa-CARICOM Summit, a meeting that not only represents a diplomatic milestone but a profound historical convergence. With the theme, “Transcontinental Partnership in Pursuit of Reparatory Justice for Africans and People of African Descent through Reparations,” the Second Africa-CARICOM Summit signals a renewed urgency for African and Caribbean nations to move from shared memory to shared mission.

For the Caribbean, Ethiopia is not just another African country. It is the eternal symbol of African resilience and sovereignty. The memory of Ethiopia’s triumph over colonialism at the Battle of Adwa in 1896 echoed far beyond Africa’s borders, igniting a spark of pride in communities of African descent across the world and especially in the Caribbean. That spark would later find voice in the Pan-Africanism of Marcus Garvey, who pointed to Ethiopia as a land of dignity and hope.

Ethiopia became a revered figure in the Caribbean, not only in Rastafarian spiritual traditions but also in broader cultural, political, and philosophical circles. Ethiopia thus became a spiritual homeland not through conquest or migration, but through the powerful idea of shared African identity, struggle, and redemption.

Today, that emotional and cultural connection is evolving into something more structured a formal, multi-dimensional partnership. As leaders from the African Union and CARICOM converge in Addis Ababa, they are set to expand cooperation in areas that include reparative justice, trade, climate resilience, cultural exchange, digital innovation, and public health. This is no longer a symbolic bond, it is a strategic alliance, being built deliberately and ambitiously.

The Summit is expected to be co-chaired by Jamaica and Angolan as Chairs of the CARICOM community and African Union respectively. Hosted by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the event builds on prior commitments made during high-level African Union meetings and follows significant diplomatic momentum over the last four years, including growing interactions between CARICOM heads and African leaders, and key visits across both regions.

A major emphasis of the Summit is on reparatory justice a shared call from both regions for redress for the transatlantic slave trade and colonialism. The alignment of the African Union’s 2025 theme on reparations with CARICOM’s long-standing Ten-Point Plan for Reparatory Justice offers a powerful platform for global advocacy. The leaders are expected to push for the restitution of cultural heritage, the return of stolen artifacts, and educational and development programs that address the enduring legacies of slavery and systemic racism.

But the Summit will also be forward looking. There is recognition that despite cultural closeness, trade between Africa and CARICOM has remained underdeveloped, less than 3% of total exports between the regions. That is set to change. Leaders will explore frameworks for investment, improve transportation links including direct air routes, and promote agreements on taxation and business facilitation. Technological innovation, artificial intelligence, and knowledge-sharing will also be prioritized, particularly in agriculture, food security, and health research.

Ethiopia, as host, is well-positioned to lead this transformation. With its dynamic diplomatic tradition, it is the home of the African Union, and increasingly a nucleus of multilateral engagement across the continent. Ethiopia’s symbolic value to the Caribbean is now matched by its strategic importance in shaping the Africa-Diaspora relationship for the 21st century.

This Summit is also about healing, not only in terms of historical justice, but in real-world solutions to challenges such as climate change, pandemics, and persistent inequality. The Caribbean and African regions share vulnerability to global shocks, but they also share a growing confidence that, through unity, they can be architects of their own futures.

As this gathering unfolds in the land of Adwa in the city of Addis Ababa, where the first Pan- African resolutions were forged the message is clear: this is not just a diplomatic meeting. It is a reconnection of family, a realignment of history, and the renewal of a long-interrupted journey toward dignity, prosperity, and global influence for all people of African descent.

The time has come, and Ethiopia proudly stands at the heart of it.

Ambassador Nebiyu Tedla Negash is the Director General of the Public Diplomacy Directorate
General at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

For years, the GERD has been a flashpoint, with Ethiopia viewing it as a symbol of national development and a crucial step towards electrifying its vast population, while Egypt considers it an existential threat to its water security, heavily reliant as it is on the Nile’s waters. Now, with the dam physically complete, the abstract concerns have materialized, raising the specter of direct confrontation.

One of the underlying forces exacerbating this tension is the growing normalization of preemptive action in global affairs. Increasingly, states have justified military interventions on the grounds of perceived threats or national interest, often bypassing international norms and legal frameworks. In such a climate, Egypt—long vocal about its “existential” concerns—may feel emboldened to contemplate actions it once considered beyond the pale.

This drift toward confrontation is further intensified by a securitization and survival narrative. Both Egypt and Ethiopia frame the GERD as a matter of national survival. For Addis Ababa, the project is more than a dam—it symbolizes sovereignty, economic emancipation, and the right to harness natural resources. For Cairo, any disruption in Nile flow threatens the very foundation of its agricultural and industrial life. When both sides equate compromise with existential risk, the space for diplomatic solutions narrows dramatically.

Adding to the volatility is a growing sense of distraction and fatigue among global powers. With the world’s attention fragmented by wars, inflation, climate crises, and ideological polarization, the bandwidth to monitor, mediate, or de-escalate regional disputes has shrunk. This erosion of international oversight—what might be called “global fatigue”—creates a dangerous vacuum. In such an environment, the risk of miscalculation or escalation by Nile Basin states increases significantly.

Paradoxically, this is compounded by a kind of regional war fatigue. Years of conflict across the Horn of Africa and the broader Middle East may have numbed decision-makers to the dangers of yet another confrontation. Worse, it may foster the belief that one more flash of violence will not provoke serious international backlash. If policymakers perceive a muted global reaction as likely, the threshold for initiating hostilities could lower.

Lastly, there is a psychological dimension to consider—one rooted in the symbolism of the GERD itself. Ethiopia has invested not just resources but national pride in the dam. Egypt might calculate that a limited military strike, timed to disrupt or damage the GERD now that it is operational, could deliver a psychological blow. Such an act could be intended less to disable the dam than to send a chilling message: large projects on the Nile will be met with force. In essence, it would be a bid to break morale and discourage similar ambitions in the future.

International Law and the Red Line

It is crucial to remember that attacking dams is heavily restricted under international humanitarian law. Article 56 of the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions classifies dams as “installations containing dangerous forces” and prohibits attacks on them if such actions “may cause the release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.” Any such attack would constitute a grave breach of international law, inviting severe condemnation and potential repercussions.

The Path Forward

Despite the completion of the GERD, diplomatic channels remain essential. Ethiopia has extended an invitation to Egypt and Sudan for the inauguration, reiterating that the dam is a “shared opportunity” and not a threat. Egypt, however, has expressed strong rejection of what it deems “unilateral” moves by Ethiopia. The current impasse, coupled with the aforementioned regional and international dynamics, demands urgent and sincere engagement.

The coming months will test the resolve and wisdom of leaders in Cairo and Addis Ababa. The choice is stark. Continuing on a path of escalation that risks catastrophic conflict, or finding a mutually agreeable framework for cooperation that respects the developmental aspirations of all Nile Basin countries while safeguarding the water security needs of downstream nations. The world watches anxiously.

Kassahun Addis  is a long-time observer of Horn of Africa and Northeast African politics, geopolitics, and society.

Contributed by Kassahun Addis

Through this book, Kebede advocated for Ethiopia to draw lessons from Japan’s experience, emphasizing the need to modernize without compromising national  identity and cultural heritage.

Despite the pivotal role Kebede played in bridging Ethiopia and Japan academically and culturally, there remains a notable lack of comprehensive research on his contributions and the broader implications of his work. While Ethiopian scholars have occasionally highlighted Kebede’s intellectual legacy, much of the existing literature focuses narrowly on his contributions to Ethiopian nationalism and literary achievements, without exploring the depth of his international influence. Similarly, in Japanese academic circles, the emphasis on Ethio-Japan relations often centers on contemporary economic and diplomatic partnerships, with little attention paid to historical figures like Kebede who were instrumental in shaping these ties.

Kebede perceived Japan’s ability to modernize rapidly while maintaining its cultural heritage as a model that Ethiopia could emulate. His work not only celebrated Japan’s achievements but also critiqued the socio-economic and political stagnation in Ethiopia, urging his compatriots to learn from Japan’s experience. The book became a cornerstone of Ethiopia’s intellectual discourse on modernization, influencing prominent figures in politics and academia.

Concurrently, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was promoting the indigenous concept of medemer, an Amharic term signifying a philosophy of compromise and reconciliation. This concept, closely aligned with Japanese political traditions, presents a valuable framework for Ethiopia, and potentially other nations, during periods of instability.

Ethiopia is currently facing multiple interconnected crises. A significant humanitarian crisis persists in the Tigray region, marked by ongoing conflict and displacement, with the potential for further escalation due to unresolved political tensions and the involvement of neighboring Eritrea. Simultaneously, the Amhara region is grappling with an ongoing civil war between federal forces and the Fano militia, leading to displacement and human rights violations. These conflicts, along with drought, floods, and disease outbreaks, are exacerbating food insecurity and hindering humanitarian access.

Based on Japan’s conflict resolution strategies, several key insights can be gleaned to facilitate Ethiopia’s return to stability. To ensure the efficacy of these strategies, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed must leverage his “medemer” philosophy and implement immediate measures to de-escalate the situation.

First, in Japan, politics is not seen as a zero-sum game within the country’s dominant Liberal Democratic Party. It is based on the belief that an effective politician is one who can successfully compromise in the face of conflicting positions. The best way to do so is to ensure that today’s loser can be tomorrow’s winner. There is no need to try to usurp power by all means, or cling to it until removed by force.

 Within the Ethiopian political landscape, an unwritten convention dictates that defeat in a political competition, frequently characterized by violence and potential fatalities, typically signifies the termination of the individual’s political trajectory, and potentially their life. In the context of Ethiopian political contests, the prevailing options are essentially binary: achieve victory and eliminate the adversary, or experience defeat and face elimination.

Another point of divergence pertains to what I term “political recycling,” a practice prevalent among Japanese officials. This involves re-engaging senior politicians in public service following the conclusion of their terms. The underlying principle suggests that a change in leadership does not necessitate a complete overhaul of the existing system; rather, any transition should be gradual, frequently incorporating elements of continuity between the outgoing and incoming administrations.

In Japan, the political practice of recycling has demonstrably fostered a positive-sum political environment, encouraging political actors to exhibit sportsmanship in both victory and defeat, and ultimately promoting cooperation. Conversely, political recycling is largely absent in Ethiopia. Those who attain political power in Ethiopia often perceive it as their sole opportunity and are inclined to maintain it by any means necessary. The pertinent inquiry now is whether Ethiopia’s leaders are evolving into a conventional Ethiopian political figure.

Furthermore, the Japanese concept of a “victor without vanquished” is noteworthy. During the 1990s, Japan experienced nine changes in prime ministers. Despite this frequent turnover, the political transitions remained peaceful, largely due to the understanding that both the winning and losing parties could continue to coexist. It is significant that Japan currently has eleven former prime ministers, who are aging gracefully, while remaining available for future service.

The win-win approach to politics in Japan is rooted in the nation’s history. In 1877, a regional lord named Saigo Takamori rose up against the Meiji reformers in a rebellion that ultimately claimed thousands of Japanese lives. The rebellion itself grew out of the disaffection of those members of the elite samurai class whose influence was declining as the result of the reforms. After the conflict ended, Takamori came to be described by the victorious reformers as a “misguided patriot,” and years later became a popular hero.

The reformers did not doubt the genuineness of Takamori’s concerns for the welfare of his fellow samurai, even though his vision of how it was to be achieved differed from theirs. In fact, a statue was subsequently erected in 1898 depicting Takamori, which stands to this day in Tokyo’s Ueno Park. In a sense, Takamori may be more remembered in Japan today than the Meiji reformers themselves. He was also the inspiration behind the 2003 popular American film, The Last Samurai.

While significant political differences are present in modern Japan, they do not result in irreconcilable conflict. The Japanese have demonstrated an ability to adapt and compromise, adjusting their stances as necessary.

In the Meiji period, the Japanese leaders first defined their goal as the building of a rich country and strong army and went on to pursue it, under a slogan that bears a striking resemblance to medemer, which likewise pulls divergent systems or values to create a synthesis, like what the Kenyan scholar Ali Mazrui called Africa’s triple heritage: Islam, Christianity, and indigenous values.

The establishment of a peaceful political culture is recognized as a gradual process. Despite this, the current situation in Ethiopia, where the nation could potentially leverage its “medemer” philosophy to navigate political transitions akin to Japan’s approach, is concerning. This raises the question of whether the architect of “medemer” is receiving suboptimal counsel or has altered their perspective on the matter.

The principles of medemer demonstrate a clear alignment with the Japanese approach to conflict resolution. Should Abiy genuinely embrace these principles, it could potentially pave the way for ending the ongoing violence in Ethiopia and guide the nation towards a federal and democratic framework that embraces its diverse ethnic composition.

It is conceivable that a path toward national recovery could be charted, contingent upon a return to the principles of medemer, a sincere apology to the Ethiopian populace for any unforeseen outcomes stemming from past decisions, and a reconciliation with international partners whose support has been diminished. Furthermore, a strategic shift away from the current trajectory is essential.

Should Prime Minister Abiy shift his focus toward implementing the principles of “medemer” through tangible actions, he is likely to garner significant support and empathy for the challenges he faces in navigating the complexities of the Ethiopian landscape. Critically, this shift would represent a significant stride toward resolving the civil conflict, which is currently straining alliances and contributing to national fragmentation.

(Ameha  Hailemairam holds a Master of Arts in Economics from Indira Ghandi National Open University, with a vast experience in the banking sector and as a financial analyst. He previously held the position of Deputy General Manager within the Ethiopian office of a Japanese conglomerate.)

Contributed by Ameha Hailemairam

These links have helped foster a closer relationship between BRICS+ members and African countries over the last two decades. For the past 15 years, China has been Africa’s largest trading partner, with annual turnover now estimated at $295 billion. The continent’s trade with other BRICS+ members has also increased, reaching $83 billion with India in 2024, and more than $21 billion with Brazil in 2023.

These relationships have pushed many African countries toward industrialization. But only South Africa, Egypt, and Morocco have developed any significant amount of industrial power. For the rest of the continent, three major obstacles stand in the way: a huge energy gap, unsustainable debt burdens, and worsening climate change. To overcome these barriers, Africa must develop a strategic partnership with the BRICS+. This partnership would yield other mutually beneficial results, including economic growth and shared prosperity.

The timing is right. More than ever before, Africa is facing growth pressures as evidenced by its exploding working-age population. The BRICS+ bloc is also at a crucial point as it seeks to assert itself on the world stage, develop a new form of multilateralism based on mutualism, expand the New Development Bank, and admit more members. The group is attempting to do all this while navigating delicate relations with the United States.

A strategic partnership with Africa would allow the BRICS+ bloc to advance its vision for a world where all countries are respected and work together to solve common problems and pursue green development. But to drive growth, its members will need to become co-investors, rather than merely creditors. They must also help African countries address the obstacles to their development, particularly the energy and debt crises.

To that end, China, one of the most powerful BRICS+ members and the world’s clean-energy leader, could help Africa harness its abundant renewable-energy potential. The continent is home to 60% of the best solar resources globally, but only 1% of installed solar capacity. By contrast, 64% of all renewable-energy capacity added last year was installed in China, which accounts for 60% of the world’s production capacity in green-tech sectors and dominates solar supply chains. As part of a strategic partnership with Africa, China and other BRICS+ countries could co-establish clean-tech manufacturing and assembly plants on the continent. This would create new markets for renewables while also lowering energy costs for Africans.

There is also the question of debt relief. Sovereign-debt restructurings have been inefficient and ineffective because powerful bilateral and multilateral creditors can’t agree on how to handle them. Improving these processes requires political goodwill. China has shown that this is possible by forgiving $3.4 billion in African debt, as well as 23 interest-free loans for 17 African countries.

Moreover, BRICS+ countries could oversee the creation of a multilateral framework, tailored to low-income countries, that would aim to convene all creditor classes, including private bondholders and multilateral development banks. This would also facilitate market creation and foster geopolitical ties between the bloc’s members and African countries – the foundations of a prosperous future for all.

With the right strategic partners, Africa could become very wealthy in a short period of time. The BRICS+ bloc must begin laying the groundwork for this geopolitical and economic alliance with the continent at its upcoming summit in Rio de Janeiro. Brazil, as the current president, and South Africa, as the group’s first African member, must ensure that an African partnership is at the top of the agenda.

From a practical point of view, deepening cooperation with African countries would create future economic benefits for BRICS+ members. But perhaps more importantly, it would signal the group’s willingness to provide equitable opportunities to the broader Global South.

(Ameenah Gurib-Fakim, the first female president of Mauritius, is a member of the African Leaders Debt Relief Initiative.)

Contributed by Ameenah Gurib-Fakim

For China, it represents an opportunity to project power 6,000 kilometres from its borders and test the People’s Liberation Army Air Force in a new operational environment.

For Egypt, the exercise offers a chance to benchmark its air force against a rising global power and enhance its strategic autonomy by diversifying its defence partnerships beyond the US. The exercises included mission planning, air combat simulations, and training in areas like aerial refuelling and battlefield search and rescue. These activities not only fostered interoperability but also allowed both nations to exchange tactical expertise.

Challenging US military prestige

The US has long viewed Egypt as a cornerstone of its Middle East and North African strategy. This was cemented by the 1979 Camp David Accords and sustained through approximately £1 billion in annual military aid. This money has equipped Egypt with F-16 fighters, Apache helicopters, and M1 Abrams tanks, reinforcing US military prestige in the region by showcasing its ability to supply cutting-edge technology to key allies. However, restrictions on advanced weaponry, such as the AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles for Egypt’s F-16s or the MBDA Meteor missiles for its Rafales fighter jets, have frustrated Cairo.

These restrictions stem from the US foreign policy and legal commitments, which prioritise Israel’s security by ensuring its technological and military superiority over neighbouring states. This has annoyed Cairo. “Civilization Eagle 2025” capitalises on this discontent, positioning China as a viable alternative partner.

The exercise sends a clear message to Washington: Egypt is diversifying its alliances and is not beholden to US patronage. As one op-ed in Daily News Egypt stated, the drills were “a declaration of sovereignty,” signalling Cairo’s refusal to remain a “second-tier ally.” By hosting Chinese warplanes near the Israeli border, approximately 100 kilometres west of the Gulf of Suez, Egypt underscores its strategic flexibility.

China’s approach contrasts sharply with US policy. Unlike Washington, which often ties arms sales to human rights or political reforms, Beijing offers advanced systems at lower costs with fewer conditions. This “soft military power” resonates with Egypt, which is seeking to modernise its air force while navigating regional instability in Sudan, Libya, and the Red Sea.

The exercise also highlights China’s growing ability to operate in North Africa, a region where the US has scaled back its presence. There are ongoing discussions to subordinate the US Africa Command to the US European Command under the Trump administration.

Geopolitical implications

“Civilization Eagle 2025” is emblematic of a shifting geopolitical landscape in North Africa. China’s expanding military footprint, bolstered by its Belt and Road Initiative and a naval base in Djibouti, positions it as a counterweight to US influence. Egypt’s strategic location, with access to the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Suez Canal, makes it an ideal partner for Beijing to secure maritime routes critical to its energy imports. This hot on the heels of  Chinese President Xi Jinping’s pledge in September 2024 to increase China’s military support for the African continent with funding amounting to approximately £38 billion over the next three years.

For the US, the exercise raises concerns about eroding influence among traditional allies. Egypt’s frustration with US restrictions, coupled with Washington’s inward focus under President Trump, creates a vacuum that China is eager to fill. The presence of Chinese jets buzzing the pyramids, as noted in social media posts, is a potent symbol of Beijing’s inroads into a US-aligned nation.

Limitations and risks

Despite its significance, “Civilization Eagle 2025” has limitations. China’s military technology, while advanced, remains unproven in combat, unlike US systems that have been tested in conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan. Egyptian pilots, accustomed to Western platforms, may find integration with Chinese systems challenging, particularly given differences in training and maintenance protocols. Egypt is unlikely to abandon its US partnership entirely, given the scale of American military aid per year and the strategic importance of the Camp David framework.

The exercise also carries risks for both nations. For Egypt, deepening ties with China could strain relations with the US, potentially jeopardising military aid. For China, overextending its military presence in a volatile region risks entanglement in local conflicts, a departure from its traditionally cautious Middle East policy. The opacity surrounding the exercise, typical of Chinese military engagements, may also fuel speculation and mistrust among regional actors like Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Going forward

The “Civilization Eagle 2025” exercise sets a precedent for deeper China-Egypt military cooperation and signals a long-term challenge to US dominance in North Africa. For China, the successful execution of the drills validates its ability to project air power globally, likely encouraging further joint exercises with other African and Middle Eastern nations. This could lead to an expansion of China’s defence exports. Beijing’s condition-free approach to arms sales and military partnerships will continue to appeal to nations frustrated by US restrictions, potentially reshaping defence markets in the region.

For Egypt, the exercise strengthens its leverage in negotiations with the US, signalling that Cairo has alternatives if Washington continues to impose limits on advanced weaponry. This could pressure the US to relax restrictions or offer more advanced systems, such as fifth-generation fighters, to maintain its influence.

Regionally, the exercise may prompt other North African states to explore similar partnerships with China, particularly those with strained US ties, such as Algeria. This could lead to a broader Chinese military presence, potentially including joint exercises or basing rights, challenging NATO and US operations in the Mediterranean and Red Sea.

Globally, “Civilization Eagle 2025” underscores the emergence of a multipolar security order. As China expands its military diplomacy, it will increasingly compete with the US for influence in strategic regions like North Africa. The US may respond by reinforcing its commitments to allies like Egypt through increased aid or fewer restrictions, but its inward focus under President Trump and budget constraints could limit its ability to counter China’s agile diplomacy. Ultimately, the exercise marks a shift toward a more contested North Africa, where China’s pragmatic partnerships challenge the US’s traditional hegemony, setting the stage for a complex and dynamic geopolitical rivalry.

(This article first appeared on Africa at LSE)

Paa Kwesi Wolseley Prah is a Postdoctoral Fellow, Dublin City University, Ireland. Christian Kaunert is Professor of International Security, Dublin City University and Professor of Policing and Security, University of South Wales

Contributed by Paa Kwesi Wolseley & Christian Kaunert

The AYuTe NextGen 2025 competition, held this year in Kampala, Uganda, offered more than just a glimpse into that future. It spotlighted exactly who is driving it. Organized by Heifer International, AYuTe NextGen is rapidly becoming the continent’s most influential platform for youth-led agricultural technology. Under the theme “AgTech Generation Rising,” the 2025 edition attracted over 100 applications from 10 African countries, culminating in 11 finalists pitching transformative solutions to a panel of investors, policymakers, and sector leaders.

What stood out with the innovations on display wasn’t just the ingenuity – it was the relevance. These entrepreneurs are not working in distant labs or corporate boardrooms. They are addressing the day-to-day realities of smallholder farmers with scalable, data-driven, and locally contextual solutions.

Kenya’s Carolyn Mwangi, crowned the overall winner in the Climate-Smart Agriculture category, exemplifies this new wave of innovators. Through her company, Kimplanter Seedlings and Nurseries, Mwangi provides climate-resilient seedlings designed with precision data and tailored support for farmers navigating erratic weather and soil degradation.

Fellow Kenyan, Maryanne Gichanga of Agritechs Analytics, was a worthy runner-up with her mobile-based, solar-powered sensor system that detects pests and monitors soil health in real time.

In the Access to Finance and Markets category, digital tools offered powerful solutions to systemic barriers. Ghana’s Nana Opoku, winner in this category, created Grow for Me, a platform that enables everyday Africans to invest directly in crops managed by vetted farmers. This model not only democratizes agriculture investment, but also delivers critical financing that traditional lenders have long denied to small-scale producers.

Runner-up, Nigeria’s Riches Attai, founder of Winich Farms, impressed with a comprehensive tech platform connecting farmers to factories, while offering bundled credit and insurance services – an essential step toward building resilient agri-value chains. These stories are not just success stories. They are signals of a deeper movement.

The AYuTe NextGen 2025 conference presented a much larger narrative: a rising generation committed to building sustainable, scalable, and equitable food systems. Event sessions bore titles like “Growing a Unicorn in Agriculture,” “Same Soil, Many Paths,” and “Youth as Architects of the Agri-Future” – discussions that revealed a profound shift. Young Africans are not waiting for permission or inclusion; they are actively designing the future of agriculture.

This should surprise no one paying attention. Across the continent, more than 2,000 agritech start-ups are in operation, many founded by people under 35. These youth-led ventures are merging indigenous knowledge with technology, using digital platforms, blockchain, AI, and off-grid power to convert subsistence plots into productive agribusinesses.

Yet despite their ingenuity, the enabling environment remains weak. Innovation needs more than inspiration, it needs intentional support. It needs policy that keeps pace. To truly unlock the potential of these innovations, Africa needs a continental strategy that empowers youth-led agritech:

Catalytic Capital: Early-stage agritech enterprises require risk-tolerant financing to validate, iterate, and scale. Public finance mechanisms and sovereign wealth funds must allocate funding for AgriTech incubators, accelerators, and R&D hubs.

Regulatory Support: Governments must modernize outdated agricultural and business regulations to reflect today’s climate-smart and digital realities. Licensing, taxation, data sharing, and investment policies must be optimized to support youth innovators.

Infrastructure Investment: No innovation thrives in isolation. Reliable rural broadband, decentralized energy access, and improved transportation networks must become national priorities, not wish lists.

Mentorship and Knowledge Transfer: Youth shouldn’t have to navigate this transformation alone. Policymakers should institutionalize innovation mentorship within agricultural extension programs, fostering cross-generational collaboration.

AYuTe NextGen 2025 did not simply elevate individual winners, it elevated the urgency for systems alignment. As Adesuwa Ifedi, Senior Vice President for Africa Programs at Heifer International, eloquently stated: “These young agripreneurs are unlocking opportunities at every stage of the agricultural value chain… When youth and technology come together, they become catalysts for change.”

That change is already underway. The conversations in Kampala made it clear: Africa has the demographic advantage and the innovation drive to lead the next agricultural revolution. But it can only happen if decision-makers act boldly, not passively.

In a world increasingly shaped by climate disruption, volatile markets, and demographic shifts, investing in youth-led agritech is no longer a niche proposal, it is a strategic imperative. The innovators are here. The ideas are strong. What remains is for policy to open the doors they are already pushing against.

Chinedu Ozordi has an extensive background in journalism and has led newsrooms  across West Africa. He is currently a senior consultant at Lantern Comitas, a UK-based communication agency.

 Contributed by Chinedu Ozordi

Ethiopia’s position on Eritrean troops in Tigray has hardened. On June 4, 2025, Dina Mufti (Amb.), a former spokesperson for Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry and current member of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Standing Committee, issued a statement demanding the immediate withdrawal of Eritrean forces. This marked a shift from Ethiopia’s earlier defense of Eritrea’s presence, which was based on claims that Eritrean troops occupied territories awarded to Eritrea by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) following the 1998–2000 border war. Dina Mufti’s statement, widely regarded as reflecting the official position of the Ethiopian federal government, warned that “continued violation of the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and unity of the state cannot be tolerated indefinitely.”

This change in rhetoric coincides with Ethiopia’s broader geopolitical ambitions, particularly Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s push for Red Sea access.

In January 2024, Ethiopia signed a controversial Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia, to secure a port on the Gulf of Aden, where this agreement was killed by the successful diplomatic maneuverings of the Somalia and then through the mediation of the Turkey. Eritrea, which views Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions as a threat to its territorial integrity, responded by signing a security agreement with Egypt and Somalia, further escalating tensions.

Reports confirm that Eritrea is engaging with Debretsion Gebremichael’s faction of the “defunct” TPLF, raising serious concerns that Asmara intends to use Tigray as a strategic buffer zone or proxy battlefield against Ethiopia.

In a speech commemorating Eritrea’s independence, Presidet Isaias Afewerki expressed no remorse for past deliberate atrocities committed against the people of Tigray, a stance that has sparked outrage among Tigrayan elites, who criticize the TPLF leadership’s dismissive response as morally indefensible and its cadres as complicit. When questioned about Eritrea’s readiness in response to Ethiopia’s military buildup and potential declaration of war, Eritrean intelligence chief Abraha Kassa reportedly stated that he would leverage the “useful idiots in the south,” referring to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and its military wing, the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF), to counter Ethiopia. This provocative remark underscores Eritrea’s intent to exploit the TPLF’s military capabilities as a proxy, heightening fears of a destabilizing conflict in the region. This provocative remark has intensified fears of a proxy war. Despite denials from Debretsion’s faction, reported meetings between TPLF leaders and Eritrean officials in Asmara since late 2024 lend credibility to suspicions of collaboration, heightening concerns about regional instability. Eritrea’s military mobilization in February 2025, including reservist call-ups and directives to citizens under 60, signals its readiness for conflict. In response, Ethiopia has deployed troops to the Eritrean border, raising the risk of direct confrontation.

Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea are rising, with growing concerns that Eritrea is manipulating the willful ignorant of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)—derisively labeled as “useful idiots” by Eritrean officials—to act as a proxy in a potential conflict. Ironically, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, despite his historical hostility toward Tigray, once relied on its unwavering support during Eritrea’s independence struggle—even as Western powers, particularly the United States, opposed secession.

Recently, Ethiopia’s National Election Board (NEBE) decertified the TPLF, yet its leadership continues to assert autonomy by seeking normalized relations with Eritrea and the Amhara Fano militia, (allegedly) without justifying how such moves benefit Tigray’s people. Legally, neither the Defuct TPLF nor Tigray has an authority to conduct foreign relations, a power purview exclusively for Ethiopia’s federal government. The TPLF’s unilateral actions constitute a direct challenge to national sovereignty, risking severe consequences for Tigray’s population.

Most alarmingly, young Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) soldiers must not be sacrificed as pawns for Eritrea’s interests or the TPLF’s reckless ambitions. Falling into this loyalty trap, akin to Stockholm syndrome, would only lead to further devastation. The people of Tigray deserve leadership that prioritizes their survival and future, not one that drags them into another cycle of conflict.

The people of Tigray now stand at a historic crossroads—facing both the burden of a painful past and the opportunity to reclaim their future. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), long associated with destruction and conflict, has irrevocably lost its legitimacy. Its decertification by Ethiopia’s National Election Board merely formalized what the people of Tigray had already rejected.

For too long, the TPLF sustained itself through military coercion rather than genuine popular support.Its reliance on the TDF created an illusion of strength, but like a fish out of water, the movement cannot survive once separated from the weapons and force that artificially propped it up. Without armed intimidation, the TPLF’s hollow political agenda holds no appeal for a people weary of war and hungry for peace, stability, and self-determination.

This is Tigray’s moment of reckoning. The path forward lies not in clinging to a discredited and defunct organization, but in building new institutions that truly represent Tigray’s interests—free from the cycle of violence and failed leadership.  A promising alternative has emerged with the formation of a new political party The SOLIDARITY, alongside other opposition groups, offering a viable replacement for the TPLF. To safeguard their future, the people of Tigray must strip the TPLF of its military power, rendering it obsolete and powerless. Political, civic, and military leaders must unite to reject the TPLF’s manipulative influence and prioritize the region’s stability. Failure to do so risks reigniting the fires of war – fueled by Eritrea’s strategic interests and the TPLF’s reckless ambitions–ultimately jeopardizing the very existence of Tigray’s people.

Ethiopia’s pursuit of direct access to the Red Sea is a matter of vital national interest, grounded in historical legitimacy and legal precedent. A declassified U.S. memorandum from March 25, 1949, confirms that Dean Rusk, then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, and Italian Ambassador Tarchiani recognized Ethiopia’s rightful claim to a sea outlet. At the time, Italy explicitly supported ceding the port of Assab and parts of southern Eritrea to Ethiopia—a justifiable demand reflecting Ethiopia’s historical and geopolitical realities.

However, this legitimate claim was undermined in 1993 when Eritrea seceded under the orchestration of the TPLF, which dominated Ethiopia’s transitional government. This decision, made without a genuine democratic mandate, had devastating consequences for Ethiopia’s sovereignty, economic security, and regional influence.

Today, the TPLF leadership remains deeply fragmented and strategically incoherent, failing to advance the interests of the Tigrayan people or recognize the shifting regional dynamics. Instead of securing Tigray’s future, the TPLF has repeatedly aligned with Eritrea’s oppressive regime, sacrificing Tigray’s well-being in favor of short-term political maneuvering. No rational observer within the TPLF’s ranks can deny that its leadership is in complete disarray, making decisions that only serve the interests of Eritrea’s belligerent government at Tigray’s expense.

Ethiopia’s demand for Red Sea access is not merely a historical grievance—it is an economic and strategic necessity. The international community must recognize Ethiopia’s legitimate claim and support a resolution that ensures regional stability, mutual prosperity, and justice for all affected parties. Meanwhile, the “useful idiot in the South’s” reckless leadership threatens to drag Tigray’s people into a devastating proxy war, risking catastrophic consequences for their survival as a nation. The people of Tigray must reject this path to avert such an existential threat.

Mulat Gebreslassie is a seasoned legal professional with extensive experience in both the public and private sectors. He holds an LLB from Mekelle University and an LLM in International Economic Law from the University of South Africa, where he is currently completing his thesis. His has previously served as an Assistant Judge at the Federal Courts, a Lecturer in Law at Oromia State University, and a decade-long tenure as Head of the Legal Department at Share Ethiopia Flower Farm, a Dutch-owned company in Ziway. Currently, he works independently as a consultant and attorney at law.

Contributed by Mulat Gebreslassie