The Ethiopian Construction Works Corporation (ECWC), one of the state-owned enterprises under Ethiopian Investment Holdings (EIH), has overhauled its leadership and board structure, with the reshuffle marking the latest in a series of corporate reforms across government-owned firms.

The decision includes the replacement of the corporation’s Chief Executive Officer and all board members; a move that officials say follows a comprehensive review of the company’s governance and financial standing.

Yonas Ayalew, who led the Corporation for seven years, has been relieved of his position and appointed as a state minister under the Office of the Prime Minister.

According to documents reviewed by The Reporter, the changes were made under the direction of EIH, which oversees the performance and management of state-owned commercial entities.

The board overhaul also removed former chair Aisha Mohammed, minister of Defense, and her deputy Alemu Sime (PhD), minister of Transport and Logistics.

Other outgoing board members include Abdissa Yadeta, head of Secretariat at the Transport Ministry; Abreha Adugna (PhD), a state minister of Water and Energy; Lemma Gudissa (PhD), deputy director for academic affairs at the Ethiopian Civil Service University; Afework Nigussie, deputy manager at the Information Technology Park Corporation; and Muluneh Aboye, vice president for risk and compliance at the state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia.

Their replacements include Yetmgeta Asrat, a state minister at the Ministry of Urban and Infrastructure Development, who now chairs the board; Berhanu Tesfaye from the Prime Minister’s Office; Helina Belachew, CEO of the Ethiopian Railway Corporation; and Wubshet Jekale, a professor at Addis Ababa University.

Additional appointments have been made from the audit, finance, and investment sectors, including five members drawn from EIH and independent institutions. One-third of the new board now represents independent bodies, according to officials.

Robel Tsegaye, former deputy CEO of the Ethiopian Engineering Corporation, has been appointed as ECWC’s new chief.

Brook Taye (PhD), Chief Executive Officer of EIH, confirmed the board and management reshuffle was carried out as part of a broader reform plan. Speaking to The Reporter, he said the change reflects the end of a major institutional restructuring phase led by outgoing CEO Yonas.

“Yonas has been serving for about seven years. He has now completed that assignment and has been transferred to another post,” Brook said. “We are very, very grateful to him.”

Brook recalled that when Yonas assumed the leadership of ECWC, the institution was in financial and administrative distress.

“When Yonas came in, the Corporation was in a very difficult state. It had serious corporate governance problems, was burdened with huge debts, and was entangled in unresolved and outstanding issues,” he told The Reporter. “He managed to correct those issues, set the institution on the right path, and now the company is profitable.”

The EIH head explained that despite its improved profitability, ECWC’s previous debt exposure had depleted its capital base. As a result, the Corporation received government approval for recapitalization, allowing it to begin paying dividends to both the holding company and the government by end of current fiscal year.

ECWC is one of the state-owned developers involved in large public construction projects. Most recently, it signed contracts valued at 67 billion Birr as part of the Chaka Housing Development Project, a 72-billion-Birr public-private partnership set to construct more than 4,100 housing units in Addis Ababa.

The project, initiated in July 2025, includes multiple private and public developers, such as Ovid Real Estate, ICE Housing Development Consortium, and ECWC. It is implemented through a 70/30 financing structure, with ECWC handling a portion of the civil works on 24 hectares of land.

According to the Ministry of Finance, ECWC was selected for the project due to its prior experience completing eight residential buildings valued at more than 800 million Birr.

“It was selected for this project because of its experience and partnership with private housing developers,” Abebe Gebrehiwot, head of the PPP department at the Ministry of Finance, said at the time.

However, ECWC has also faced criticism for project delays. In January 2025, The Reporter cited correspondence from the Ethiopian Engineering Corporation (EEC) noting that ECWC had finalized less than a fifth of a 65-kilometer road project linking Alaba and Wato despite taking more than double the contractual period. EEC attributed the delays to management inefficiencies, while ECWC representatives cited right-of-way issues and denied resource shortages.

Despite such challenges, EIH now lists ECWC among its profit-making subsidiaries. The corporation is expected to make its first dividend payment to the holding company and the federal government by the end of the current fiscal year, according to Brook.

“The Corporation will begin paying dividends—that is the tangible measure of reform,” he said. “When a state enterprise pays back into the system, it demonstrates sustainability, accountability, and operational maturity.”

EIH executives say oversight mechanisms have been strengthened, and a third of the Corporation’s new board members now come from independent bodies.

EIH expects the new CEO, Robel Tsegaye, to continue down the reform path. Robel, who previously served as deputy CEO of the Ethiopian Engineering Corporation, is credited with building its construction division from scratch.

Data obtained from EIH indicates that under Robel’s watch, EEC reported 8.9 billion Birr in revenue for the 2024/25 fiscal year, exceeding its annual target by 17 percent and the previous year’s figure by 81 percent.

It reportedly completed 111 design projects, 272 supervision and contract administration assignments, and 53 construction projects during the reporting period.

The monthly publication indicates that the government raised 53.35 billion Birr from two auctions during the month, while the bulk of debt holdings remained concentrated among the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE), and pension funds.

The bulletin, issued on October 28, 2025, provides a detailed snapshot of market activity up to the end of September and outlines the issuance plan for the second quarter of the 2025/26 fiscal year.

It reveals a domestic debt market that is both expanding and adjusting to investor sentiment favoring short-term instruments.

Two T-bill auctions held on September 3 and 17 generated total bids worth 56.46 billion Birr—almost six percent more than the 53.35 billion Birr offered, according to the report.

“Demand continued to favor short-term securities, with the 28 and 91-day bills oversubscribed due to stronger investor appetite for short maturities,” it reads.

On the other hand, the 364-day bill was significantly undersubscribed at only 36 percent, confirming a persistently weak appetite for longer tenures amid expectations of stable short term yields.

The Ministry document outlines that between July and mid-September 2025, T- bill yields displayed mixed movements across maturities, attributing the pattern to expectations of stable short-term yields and caution over longer-term commitments.

The 28-day rate fell from 15.8 percent to 12.6 percent, the 91-day rate saw a similar three-percentage-point decline to 15.3 percent, the 182-day rate dropped from 19 percent to 15.4 percent and in contrast, the 364-day rate rose from 15 percent to 20 percent.

The Ministry’s Debt Management Division observed that the bid-to-cover ratio for longer maturities has shown gradual improvement over the quarter, suggesting better alignment between issuance strategy and market preferences.

The report notes that net issuance reached 19.7 billion in the first quarter of the budget year. The government raised a total of 164.4 billion Birr through T-bill auctions over the three-month period. After deducting 126.1 billion Birr in refinanced maturities and 18.6 billion in rollovers, the net issuance amounted to 19.7 billion Birr.

The cumulative net issuance figure represents 11.4 percent of the annual net-issuance target of 172.9 billion, indicating the amount required to finance the funding gap by treasury is slightly below expectations.

Officials view the quarter’s performance as evidence of a “positive market response” and a “gradual improvement” in investor participation across maturities.

As of September 30, 2025, Ethiopia’s total domestic debt stock stood at 2.56 trillion Birr, marking another milestone in the country’s evolving debt landscape.

Treasury bonds dominated the composition, accounting for 79 percent of the total, while T-bills represented 11.3 percent. The remainder consisted of medium-term Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) instruments and other obligations, according to the Ministry.

The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) held the largest share with about 43 percent of total domestic debt. It is followed by the NBE (26.3 percent) and pension funds (19.3 percent). Other financial institutions and insurers held the remainder.

Within the T-bill segment alone, 182-day and 364-day maturities made up 38 percent and 37 percent, respectively, of outstanding bills.  Pension funds and CBE each accounted for about 38.5 percent of total holdings, reinforcing their dominance as the primary buyers of government securities.

Other financial institutions accounted for 15.9 percent, insurance companies held 5.5 percent, and other institutions, including Ethiopian Investment Holdings, represented 1.7 percent, according to the report.

Looking ahead, the Ministry of Finance plans to issue 243.05 billion Birr in Treasury bills during the second quarter of the 2025/26 fiscal year—lasting from October 1 to December 24, 2025.

The planned volume is designed to refinance maturing obligations, meet domestic borrowing needs, and manage market liquidity, according to the Ministry. Auctions will continue on a biweekly basis, offering maturities of 28, 91, 182, and 364 days, maintaining the structure established in the first quarter.

The bulletin emphasizes predictability and transparency as guiding principles for issuance, aiming for “smooth refinancing of maturing obligations and consistent market operations.”

An investigation by the Commission of Inquiry on Tigray Genocide (CITG) has revealed the extent of the catastrophic damage to Tigray’s education system, describing a near-total collapse of learning infrastructure and human capital following the two-year war and blockade.

The report estimates that the education sector alone sustained USD 5.38 billion in damages and losses—the largest toll among all social sectors assessed.

“Education faced a near-complete breakdown with over 1.2 million children out of school, enrollment declined by more than 80 percent, and 14,000 teachers and education leaders did not return to school,” the report states.

According to the findings, schools across the region were “systematically targeted, looted, or repurposed” during the conflict that began in November 2020.

The assessment, based on data from 1,926 education institutions and 659,675 households, paints a grim picture of a once-thriving system dismantled by warfare and siege conditions.

CITG contends that learning was lost on a generational scale.

According to the document, before the war, Tigray’s education system was nearing universal coverage, with high enrollment, gender parity, and strong teacher retention. But the report documents that more than 80 percent of schools were rendered nonfunctional, with thousands of classrooms destroyed and vital teaching materials lost.

Across primary, secondary, and higher education institutions, destruction ranged from burning and looting to deliberate repurposing of classrooms for military use.

“Across all sectors, the level of damage is dominated by complete destruction, followed by high-level damage, where most losses were catastrophic and largely unrecoverable,” notes the Commission.

The report attributes 56.3percent of the educational damage to the Eritrean Defense Forces (EDF), followed by 24.6 percent to the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) and smaller shares to Amhara forces and other groups.

While rural schools were disproportionately hit, even higher education institutions including Mekelle, Axum, and Adigrat universities suffered crippling losses of laboratories, libraries, and dormitories.

CITG also noted that teacher training colleges were not spared. These institutions suffered an estimated USD 91 million in damages, with entire campuses burned or looted.

The Commission contends that the destruction was neither incidental nor contained. It draws parallels between assaults on education and the broader pattern of attacks on civilian infrastructure.

The Commission maintains that the methodology, based on the UN-ECLAC Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLA) and UNESCO’s Damage and Risk Assessment Framework, underscores that the impacts were measured in both physical destruction and long-term service loss.

“Losses far exceed visible damage,” the report reads. “The prolonged siege and blockade lasting more than two years, led to widespread service disruptions and lasting setbacks in health, education, and cultural continuity”.

Even schools that survived the fighting faced severe constraints during the blockade: no salaries, no textbooks, no food for school programs.

Many teachers fled or were displaced. Without electricity or internet, students missed years of instruction. The Commission warns of “intergenerational setbacks” in literacy, learning outcomes, and social mobility.

“Nearly half a million households (496,030) reported not having a functional access education service in their areas, and 4.2 percent had access during siege and blockage. From the results of the study, more than three quarter of the households (78.6 percent) with at least one school-aged child (7-18) were not attending formal education in their respective areas during the time of siege and blockage,” reads the report.

The document stated that after nearly three years of protracted war, millions of children were/are now estimated to no longer be attending schools and are left without access to learning spaces.

The breakdown in education was also followed by assessments of the wider humanitarian collapse. The report’s health chapter details an almost total system failure. It noted that maternal mortality soared from 186 to 840 per 100,000 live births, immunization coverage dropped from 100 percent to 20 percent, and less than 30 percent of hospitals and clinics remained functional.

The war also erased decades of community health progress, according to CTIG.

“Only 30 percent of hospitals, 17 percent of health centers, 11.5 percent of ambulances, and none of the 712 health posts were functional,” reads the report.

With more than 5.2 million people in need of emergency food and medical assistance, children bear the brunt of malnutrition, trauma, and preventable disease compounding the educational crisis. Many students, unable to access school feeding programs, dropped out permanently, notes the Commission.

The war’s effects reached far beyond classrooms and clinics. Tigray’s cultural heritage, from ancient monasteries to archaeological museums, also suffered devastating losses. The CITG estimates USD 1.6 billion in damage to cultural and religious sites.

“Heritage sites aged centuries were destroyed, erasing cultural identity and disrupting intergenerational links,” reads the report.

The EDF was again identified as the principal perpetrator, responsible for 38 to 40 percent of the damage to churches, mosques, and historical buildings.

Social welfare institutions, too, were targeted. The report documents USD 278 million in damage to cooperatives and community-based associations such as Edir and Equb — traditional systems of mutual support that once anchored Tigray’s resilience.

Their destruction, the Commission warns, “weakened long-established social and cultural fabric… eroding trust and collective capacity for recovery”.

The Commission’s findings frame the destruction of education not merely as collateral damage, but as part of a systematic undoing of society.

It calls for international recognition of the educational collapse as a human rights issue and urges “substantial investment and capacity-building to ensure sustainable recovery and resilience across Tigray’s social system”.

Despite massive reconstruction needs, the report also identifies resilience at the community level — teachers reopening makeshift schools, parents pooling scarce resources, and local organizations documenting losses for restitution.

“Bridging this gap will require more than reconstruction, it demands justice, institutional rehabilitation, and the restoration of social trust as prerequisites for recovery and reconciliation,” the Commission concludes.

Ethiopia watched in incredulity last week as the European Union and Egypt launched the second phase of a seven-year cooperation program in what that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has described as a “deeply disappointing and problematic” move by Brussels to deepen its involvement in the long-running dispute over the use of Nile Waters.

The new Multi-Annual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2021–2027 elevates Cairo as the EU’s primary partner in North Africa, linking European investment and migration policy to Egypt’s stability and energy infrastructure.

The updated programme, unveiled in Cairo earlier this week, includes additional billions of Euros in funding. Although it was presented as part of a broader regional vision linking North Africa and Europe through renewable energy, green hydrogen, and climate adaptation, its geographic scope has tilted heavily toward Egypt and touches sensitive Ethiopian interests, particularly water governance and energy trade.

A joint statement issued by Cairo and Brussels on October 24, 2025, echoed Egypt’s colonial and monopolistic claims on the Nile, with the EU appearing to take a clear position on the dispute with Ethiopia for the first time.

“Recognizing Egypt’s heavy reliance on the Nile River in a context of its water scarcity, the EU reiterates its support to Egypt’s water security and the compliance with international law, including concerning the Ethiopian Dam. The EU strongly encourages transboundary cooperation among riparian countries based on the principles of prior notification, cooperation and ‘do no harm,’” it reads.

The programme comes less than two months after Ethiopia inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and, according to the Ethiopian embassy in Brussels, “shows a complete disregard for the views and interests of other riparian countries.”

The embassy noted that the River Nile, shared by eleven riparian countries, cannot be treated through a bilateral framework that ignores nearly half a billion people in Sub-Saharan Africa.

“It is regrettable that the EU decided to undermine Ethiopia in a bilateral platform with Egypt,” reads the embassy’s response, accusing Brussels of adopting a “biased and hostile position” contrary to the spirit of its long-standing partnership with Addis Ababa.

Analysts speaking with The Reporter say the deal, while framed as development cooperation, carries strategic undertones that could tilt regional influence in favor of Cairo at a sensitive moment in the Horn and Nile Basin politics.

The Ethiopian statement marked one of the country’s sharpest diplomatic responses toward the European Union in recent years. It said the EU’s position contradicted international water law, particularly the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization enshrined in the UN Watercourses Convention (1997) and the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA).

 “The EU’s distorted take on international law is deplorable,” it reads, adding that the bloc’s statement runs counter to the very frameworks it has supported elsewhere in Africa.

The statement further noted that Europe’s approach ignored its own history as an observer in the African Union–facilitated negotiations on GERD—talks in which EU representatives had witnessed all parties’ concerns and interests firsthand.

A Horn affairs expert speaking with The Reporter anonymously echoed the country’s sentiments.

“What the bloc did last week was like shooting your own foot. The EU has long anchored itself as a strong ally of regional integration. How does siding with one and accusing the other about a matter of this magnitude cement its longstanding argument? It might not look like it from an outsider’s perspective but Ethiopia has many allies, especially in this continent,” the expert said.

Ethiopia’s government has spent more than a decade promoting its image as a driver of regional connectivity. GERD was marketed not merely as a national project, but as a continental one, a source of affordable electricity for the region and a symbol of African self-reliance.

The EU’s new deal with Egypt, however, pours fresh funds into Cairo’s National Water Resources Plan 2037 and irrigation modernization efforts, without reference to transboundary cooperation in the Nile Basin. For officials in Addis, this silence cuts deep.

“It is difficult to see how the EU can claim to support regional integration while financing projects that reinforce unilateral control of shared waters,” says an Ethiopian analyst who requested anonymity. “The same Europe that preaches partnership in Addis signs deals in Cairo that exclude upstream voices.”

This week, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed appeared before Parliament and delivered an address that resonated far beyond domestic politics. The PM reiterated his administration’s “Two Waters” policy, which revolves around GERD and the Nile, maritime access, and resource sovereignty.

Abiy’s words offered a window into the country’s growing frustration.

“Our demand is not new or emotional,” he told lawmakers. “It is a question of national existence, a matter of survival.”

On maritime access, the Prime Minister reiterated that “the manner in which Ethiopia lost its access to the sea was illegal and unjust,” adding that “Ethiopia can no longer remain in the status quo of being a ‘geographical prisoner.’”

He insisted, however, that any resolution would be peaceful.

”We don’t believe that war and conflict are necessary to achieve this. That is why we have been waiting patiently for five years,” said Abiy.

Experts argue that the timing of the EU–Egypt deal appears to sharpen Ethiopia’s frustration over what officials describe as “selective engagement” by external actors.

While Egypt is portrayed as a stable partner in the Mediterranean, Ethiopia’s broader development agenda, they argue, continues to be viewed through a crisis lens.

Under MIP 2021–2027, the EU commits hundreds of millions of Euros between 2021 and 2024 to projects in green transition, water management, and economic resilience.

The plan positions Egypt as Europe’s anchor state for investment and migration control — a gateway for renewable energy trade, digital connectivity, and climate cooperation across the southern Mediterranean.

Some analysts argue that the EU issued the joint statement in an attempt to sideline Ethiopia or other riparian countries from shared resources as a result of Europe’s apparent conviction that only Egypt can offer the predictability, scale, and access it desires in a turbulent region.

To Ethiopian observers, that logic is precisely the problem. By prioritizing predictability over partnership, the EU risks alienating countries that are equally vital to Africa’s integration but less convenient to manage.

The deal’s omission of Nile Basin cooperation, in particular, is glaring. Ethiopia’s USD five billion GERD remains Africa’s largest hydroelectric project, designed to serve multiple countries through power exports.

Yet, in the EU’s water-governance portfolio for North Africa, Ethiopia is nowhere to be found.

“This is not simply a funding decision,” argues an Ethiopian water policy expert. “It’s a diplomatic statement that Europe’s engagement on transboundary resources stops at Egypt’s borders.”

The EU–Egypt partnership also extends to migration control. This is another area where Ethiopia feels its leverage slipping. The joint statement on migration and security places Cairo at the center of Europe’s southern containment strategy, tasking Egypt with managing irregular flows toward the Mediterranean.

Through this arrangement, the EU channels funding for border management, surveillance, and asylum-system development, which were priorities that once formed the core of EU cooperation with the Horn of Africa under the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa.

For Ethiopia, the reallocation is tangible. Between 2016 and 2021, EU migration funding helped support reintegration programs, job creation for returnees, and local development projects in migration-prone areas like Amhara and Tigray. Those channels have since dried up.

“Europe is outsourcing migration control northward,” said the Horn affairs expert. “We used to be part of the conversation. Now Egypt is the conversation.”

The shift has strategic consequences. With the EU’s attention fixed on North Africa, the Horn’s voice in shaping migration policy is fading, just as irregular flows from Ethiopia and Sudan to Libya are surging, analysts contend.

Energy cooperation is another pillar where Ethiopia’s ambitions collide with the EU’s Cairo-centric vision. Under the MIP, Europe plans to invest in Egypt’s Integrated Sustainable Energy Strategy, emphasizing renewables, hydrogen, and electricity interconnection with the Mediterranean.

Projects like the MEDUSA, a major high-capacity fiber optic initiative linking Southern Europe and North Africa, set to land in Port Said by 2027, epitomize this new alignment. Europe’s future energy corridor to Africa now runs through Egypt—not the Horn.

Ethiopia, meanwhile, has staked its economic future on becoming a renewable energy exporter, leveraging hydropower from the GERD and other dams. Officials had hoped the EU members would view the Horn as a key green-energy hub.

However, experts point out that the optics instead suggest that Europe is doubling down on existing trade corridors rather than building new ones across the continent.

“The EU talks about a green partnership with Africa, but its investments follow the same old geography, the Mediterranean first, Sub-Saharan Africa later,” said one analyst who spoke to The Reporter anonymously.

The irony is sharp. Ethiopia, whose entire development narrative rests on green growth and clean energy, now finds itself overlooked in favor of projects in Cairo.

Relations between Ethiopia and the European Union have been fragile since the northern conflict in 2020. Though ties improved after the Pretoria Agreement, tensions remain over humanitarian access, governance reforms, and accountability.

Following the peace agreement, there has been a “warming up” of relations, with high-level meetings between EU officials and the Ethiopian government. A significant development was the signing of a ‘Global Gateway’ Partnership Agreement in October 2025, which aims to boost cooperation and investment in key sectors.

While the EU suspended direct budget support to the Ethiopian government during the peak of the war, it continued humanitarian aid to the population. European aid to Ethiopia, once exceeding a billion Euros annually, has not fully recovered. Addis Ababa’s access to comparable funding mechanisms has diminished, particularly as the EU redirects attention to the Sahel and the southern Mediterranean.

Since the 2022 peace deal, the EU has gradually reinstated development financing, focusing on post-conflict reconstruction, health services, education, and food security. This includes a 240 million Euro grant under the 2024 Annual Action Programme (AAP-2024) in April 2025, and a 90 million Euro financing agreement for AAP-2025 in October 2025. These funds target development in areas such as agribusiness, digitalization, and the restoration of basic services in conflict-affected regions. 

Against this backdrop, the EU–Egypt partnership feels to many Ethiopians like a diplomatic downgrading. It contrasts sharply with the EU’s earlier role as a mediator and developmental ally during Ethiopia’s reform years between 2018 and 2020.

A senior foreign relations expert puts it bluntly: “Europe once said it wanted a strong, integrated Africa. Today, it is investing in a divided one.”

For many Ethiopians, at the heart of the matter also lies a contradiction between Europe’s rhetoric and its regional conduct. The EU’s New Agenda for the Mediterranean and its Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbourhood frame the Union as a partner for African integration, inclusive growth, and shared prosperity.

Yet, the geographic concentration of funding being overwhelmingly in North Africa reinforces rather than bridges Africa’s north–south divide, according to observers.

In Ethiopia, this is seen as hypocrisy. Officials recall how European diplomats routinely call for “African solutions to African problems.” But when it comes to the Nile, Europe funds one side’s adaptation and leaves the other’s aspirations unaddressed.

“The EU’s credibility as a promoter of regional integration is at stake,” says a political expert speaking anonymously. “If integration only means connecting North Africa to Europe, then what is Africa’s role?”

For Addis Ababa, the EU’s move comes at a delicate time. Ethiopia is reasserting its regional leadership, expanding ties with the Gulf, and seeking new maritime and trade outlets through the Red Sea.

Abiy Ahmed’s recent parliamentary remarks capture the urgency of that quest.

“We did not build our maritime [capacity] to put it in a glass of water,” said the Prime Minister, as he held up a glass half-full of water in front of lawmakers.

Analysts note that the Prime Minister’s insistence on peaceful means is both a reassurance and a warning: Ethiopia will not abandon its pursuit of access to the sea, but it prefers diplomacy over confrontation.

Still, they contend that Ethiopia’s room for maneuver is narrowing. With Eritrea unyielding, Djibouti heavily commercialized, and Somalia entangled in its own crises, Ethiopia needs credible partners.

Europe, once viewed as a bridge to consensus, now appears aligned elsewhere.

The EU’s partnership with Egypt is also reshaping continental diplomacy. Foreign relations experts note that Egypt’s dual identity as both Arab and African allows it to operate in two arenas at once, a flexibility that Addis Ababa, despite hosting the African Union, cannot easily replicate.

“If Europe channels more investment and policy coordination through Egypt, the African Union itself could feel the ripple. Egypt’s influence within continental institutions may rise, while the Horn’s strategic weight could diminish,” said one analyst.

This dynamic is not lost on Ethiopian policymakers. Despite the strong language, the Ethiopian statement concluded on a constructive note, saying the country “looks forward to engaging the EU and its member states to rectify the gross and wrongful positions reflected in the ‘Joint Statement.’”

In diplomatic terms, analysts say that this suggests Ethiopia is not seeking confrontation but recalibration, a signal that dialogue remains open, provided Europe acknowledges Ethiopia’s rights and contributions.

Observers note this balanced assertiveness could mark a turning point in Ethiopia’s diplomacy with the EU, combining principled firmness with an invitation to reset the relationship.

As the EU–Egypt partnership deepens through 2027, Europe’s engagement with Africa appears increasingly defined by geography, migration, and security interests rather than shared development vision.

For Ethiopia, the challenge will be to navigate this changing landscape—protecting its interests on the Nile, maintaining strategic partnerships, and asserting its leadership within the African Union.

The Ethiopian Railway Corporation (ERC) has unveiled plans for a USD 1.58 billion standard-gauge railway intended to connect northern Ethiopia with the Red Sea ports of Tadjourah, Assab, and Massawa.

‎The infrastructural ambitions were laid out in a 21-page company report presented on Tuesday, October 21, 2025, during the National Railway Business and Investment Summit held at the Skylight Hotel in Addis Ababa.

The document obtained by The Reporter describes the 216 kilometer, single-track Weldiya-Hara Gebeya-Mekelle standard-gauge rail project as ongoing and estimates its total cost at close to USD 1.6 billion.

‎“The railway connects Ethiopia with Tadjourah, Assab and Massawa ports,” the summary reads, situating the line squarely within the government’s broader campaign to regain maritime access.

‎When asked by The Reporter whether the Woldiya–Mekelle corridor includes the Kombolcha-Hara Gebeya section, ERC Chief Executive Officer Hilina Belachew (Eng.) clarified that the project is separate from an arbitration case involving the Awash–Kombolcha–Hara Gebeya railway (AKH) project.

‎”The Awash–Kombolcha-Hara Gebeya Project and the Woldiya–Mekelle Project are different projects. The arbitration pertaining to the former project has not yet been completed,” she said, noting that the arbitration for the AKH project with Turkish contractor Yapi Merkezi remains unresolved though most issues have reached preliminary decisions at the London Court of Arbitration.

‎Hilina added that rehabilitation programs and financing mobilization efforts are underway to resume stalled works, with new maintenance and wastewater system fixes planned for the fiscal year.

‎The dispute between the Corporation and the Turkish contractor involves the AKH railway project, launched in 2015 with financing from the Turkish Exim Bank. Construction was later suspended following the outbreak of conflict in northern Ethiopia, which made project sites unsafe and inaccessible.

‎Officials say the war caused severe damage to equipment, stations, and unfinished infrastructure along the corridor. The construction work was forced to a stop as fighting spread through the Amhara and Afar regions. The escalation compounded earlier challenges linked to foreign-currency shortages and cost adjustments.

‎ERC and Yapi Merkezi have since filed claims against each other at an international arbitration tribunal. The contractor argues that design changes and force-majeure conditions increased costs, while ERC accuses the company of contract breaches and performance lapses.

Hearings are still underway, with preliminary rulings issued in favor of ERC, while the case has yet to be concluded, officials told The Reporter.

‎The suspension left key sections, particularly between Kombolcha and Hara Gebeya, incomplete. ERC says it is now preparing rehabilitation and financing plans to resume the works.

The Corporation also aims to separate legacy disputes such as the Yapi Merkezi case from new projects, including the Woldiya–Mekelle line, to maintain investor confidence and continue the country’s railway expansion.

‎Asked about other operational ventures and whether cross-border links are advancing, the CEO told The Reporter that several associated projects are in early stages and aligned with the National Railway Master Plan.

“There are cooperative and joint regional studies related to those. These studies highlight the regional integration we are pursuing with various countries,” she explained, referring to initiatives aligned with African Union directives.

‎Hilina emphasized that financing such large-scale links would require “diversified mechanisms” and collaboration with regional partners to make the projects bankable.

The revelation of a railway directly connecting Tadjourah, Assab, and Massawa comes against a backdrop of Ethiopia’s renewed political drive for sea access.

‎Last year, Djibouti’s government formally offered Ethiopia full administrative control of Tadjourah Port, but as of December 2024, Addis Ababa had not responded to the offer.

At the time, ‎Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, former Djiboutian Foreign Minister and current Chairman of the African Union, told The Reporter that his country’s gesture was meant to “defuse tensions between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu” and to reaffirm that “landlocked countries should have free, predictable, and unhindered access” under international law.

‎“We have offered it, but we are still waiting for the response,” Youssouf said during a press briefing at Djibouti’s embassy in Addis Ababa last year.

He referenced the Türkiye-facilitated Ankara Declaration signed between Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, which sought to normalize relations following tensions over Ethiopia’s MoU with Somaliland.

Prime Minister Abiy reiterated Ethiopia’s long-term maritime ambition in a September 2025 interview with state media, declaring that the return of Assab is “a matter of time”.

‎Speaking beside the newly filled GERD reservoir, he said, “The Red Sea was part of Ethiopia thirty years ago. The mistake took place yesterday and will be corrected tomorrow.”

‎Officials have since framed sea access as a matter of “national survival.”

Brigadier General Teshome  Gemechu, director-general for international relations at the Ministry of Defense, described Ethiopia’s claim over Assab as “historical” and “irrevocable,” while State Minister of Finance Eyob Tekalign said access to the Red Sea now forms part of the country’s geopolitical strategic agenda.

‎Eritrea, however, has rejected these assertions.

In a September 3 post, Eritrean Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel dismissed Addis Ababa’s remarks as “reckless saber-rattling” and “political hogwash,”reiterating Eritrea’s 1993 referendum as an independent act of decolonization.

Nonetheless, ‎ERC’s plan to link directly to Red Sea ports follows years of technical groundwork. Back in October 2018, the Ethiopian Maritime Affairs Authority (EMAA) announced completion of a study specifying port usage rates and logistics services for Eritrean ports.

‎The study envisioned equipping Massawa Port with new infrastructure and coordinated tariff frameworks, in line with bilateral normalization between Ethiopia and Eritrea that year.

‎“Works were underway to equip the Port of Massawa with the necessary facilities, including renovation of roads,” EMAA communications head Yeshi Fekade said then, confirming that Eritrea was conducting its own tariff study.

The peace thaw that year also opened prospects for the state-owned Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Service Enterprise (ESLSE) to operate out of Massawa. Then-CEO Roba Megerssa told The Reporter in September 2018 that the Enterprise was “optimistic of winning a tough competition to take over the Eritrean Port of Massawa”.

‎He added that ESLSE was examining new cargo opportunities, including livestock carriers, and viewed the opening of the logistics sector to foreign partners as “a blessing rather than a threat.”

‎The latest ERC disclosure effectively places Ethiopia’s railway investments within a strategic Red Sea corridor plan that meshes physical infrastructure with diplomatic overtures.

‎While Djibouti’s Tadjourah offer remains unanswered, Ethiopia’s leadership continues to frame maritime access as both a developmental and sovereign priority. The planned Woldiya–Mekelle line, explicitly described as a port-linking route, signals that the government is pressing ahead through domestic institutions even as regional politics remain unsettled.

‎However, analysts contend that with financing needs exceeding USD 1.5 billion, execution will hinge on foreign partnership and multilateral funding, aligning with ERC’s own reference to “diversified financing mechanisms.”

During a presentation of the Ministry’s performance report on Thursday, October 23, 2025, lawmakers questioned the Ministry’s resolve in recovering misused public funds, ensuring accountability for rights violations, and protecting vulnerable groups in detention — warning that systemic failures risk undermining the rule of law and public trust.

The Legal and Justice Affairs Committee asked pointedly how officials were ensuring that “misused public and government financial resources” identified by the Federal Auditor General are being recovered and that those responsible face legal or administrative measures.

An MP warned that remarkable economic gains risk being undermined by the misuse of funds.

The representative cited audit findings that suggest limited public and government finances—which are expected to support development—have been increasingly misappropriated by individuals within various government institutions.

“This was revealed as the [Auditor General] presented its consolidated report to the House of Peoples’ Representatives for the fourth consecutive year. The Ministry of Justice, in collaboration with other relevant offices, should provide an explanation regarding what measures have been taken to ensure that this money is recovered and what challenges have been encountered in the process,” said the MP.

Furthermore, the Committee demanded clarification on whether administrative actions have been taken against  entities accused of misusing resources, and whether there exists a legal mechanism that holds them accountable, as indicated in the Ministry’s fiscal plan.

Another member of the Committee raised concerns that anti-trafficking measures “remain insufficient compared to the scale and complexity of the problem.”

“It is evident that anti-human trafficking activities being carried out both by the Ministry and through national coordination efforts have been expanding over time. However, compared to the magnitude and complexity of the problem, the ongoing efforts are not yet at a level that can provide an adequate and proportionate solution,” he asserted.

The Committee demanded officials explain what the Ministry’s quarterly plan incorporates and whether or not it has a distinct and innovative approach that would enable stronger and more effective action. It also inquired who will actually be responsible in leading anti trafficking efforts at  regional level.

“Even if it may not be possible to create a completely free zone that prevents human trafficking, it is still possible to establish areas with a reduced level of risk through proper leadership and coordination. Discussing this and finding ways to make it happen is important,” noted an MP.

The MP also pressed Ministry officials to explain how they intend to “ensure accountability for extremists and insurgents implicated in human-rights violations, killings, and hate speech.”

Lawmakers further questioned the handling of confiscated properties under special asset-recovery procedures, asking what safeguards exist to prevent closure of cases without due process and to guarantee that recovered assets are returned appropriately.

The Committee relayed public questions from Maji constituency in South West Ethiopia, reporting that members of a neighboring region attacked Siyali Kebele, killing about ten peaceful residents, but have yet to face justice.

One MP cited complaints that gold jewelry and over twenty legally registered firearms seized during police operations “have not been returned,” calling for restitution “through lawful means.”

In the East Gojjam Zone, she said, citizens “harassed, robbed, or detained amid insecurity cannot even move or trade,” urging the Ministry to act with partners “to ensure accountability and restore justice.”

MPs also cited serious gaps in correctional facilities, particularly for children living with their mothers in detention, noting that no specific budget allocation exists to cover their needs. The Committee urged “targeted measures to protect these children’s rights.”

Senior Justice Ministry officials acknowledged the scrutiny but defended their results.

One official said a first-quarter client-satisfaction survey showed 93.7 percent positive feedback across eight service areas.

“Our reform is delivering,” he said. “Digitization, coordination with police and correctional institutions, and improved prosecution quality are our priorities.”

While officials from the Ministry of Justice did not provide direct answers to questions raised by the public and presented by Committee members, they offered general explanations addressing the concerns.

Ermias Yemaneberhan (PhD), state minister for institutional building and reform at the Ministry, said his office would work with regional administrations to deliver organized and lawful responses through proper channels. He also outlined the Ministry’s cooperation with regional administrations and its engagement in legal and prosecutorial matters.

On the other hand, Belayhun Yirga, state minister in charge of the legal and justice division, stated that there would be no immediate responses to the issues raised by the public but noted that the Ministry would take the concerns into consideration.

“There will be no specific responses given here today,” he said, “but we will take the concerns raised by the public and address them through follow-up action.”

The Committee urged Ministry officials to ensure that investigations are carried out into violations of human rights in all areas where there is relative peace.

“Responsible bodies must be held accountable. We must be able to raise public trust,” noted a member of the Committee.

“We are seeing, in different areas, conflicts being stirred up, while criminals work behind the scenes to cover up their crimes. There are groups who, from time to time, instigate unrest for the purpose of hiding their wrongdoing,” he said. “It is important that we thoroughly investigate the crimes behind such disturbances. In relatively peaceful areas, we must go in and show the public that accountability exists — that our people can see justice being done. We must create a situation where we can visibly demonstrate this to the public.”

According to the report, the federal government began the 2024/25 fiscal year with slow capital spending and uneven budget execution, despite stronger revenue performance and renewed inflows of donor grants.

EEA’s macroeconomic update shows that capital expenditure rose by 68.9 percent year-on-year, reaching 44.5 billion Birr. However, compared to the preceding quarter it plunged by 41.8 percent, indicating significant delays in project execution or disbursement of development funds at the start of the fiscal year.

“The quarterly declines across all components point to either front-loading of spending in the previous quarter or a slower rollout of capital projects at the start of the fiscal year,” it reads.

Overall, the breakdown of capital expenditure and its components comparing the first quarter of last fiscal year with the current one shows that “the volatility and cyclical nature of capital expenditure, with strong year-on-year growth tempered by notable quarter-on-quarter contraction.

The document also noted the presence of budget execution falling below 25 percent.

According to EEA, the federal government executed only 22.7 percent of its annual budget during the first quarter.

Experts say this signals weaker performance in development spending compared to recurrent outlays. Current expenditure including salaries, debt service, and administrative costs reached a 24.7 percent execution rate, while regional transfers accounted for 23.7 percent.

By contrast, capital expenditure lagged at 18.3 percent, reflecting bottlenecks in procurement and project rollout.

“Capital expenditure had the lowest execution rate at 18.3 percent, highlighting continued implementation challenges in development spending. This underperformance could stem from delays in procurement processes, project planning, or disbursement bottlenecks, all of which are common in large-scale public investment programs,” reads the macroeconomic update.

The EEA underlined that the early fiscal quarter was characterized by imbalanced spending patterns as well.

‘Economic services’ overshot targets with 181.8 percent execution, whereas ‘Other Expenditures’ reached only 3.6 percent, revealing “the need for better in-year budget monitoring and realignment”

According to the report, capital expenditure was most constrained across general and economic development categories, where implementation rates were among the lowest recorded.

Social development, which includes sectors like education, health, and housing infrastructure, registered the highest execution rate at 25 percent, while economic development which often includes investments in transport, agriculture, and energy, had a lower execution rate of just under 19 percent.

The report notes persistent difficulties in project implementation including project planning, procurement, and fund disbursement.

The EEA warned that the underperformance in capital execution could “compromise quality and effectiveness” of government investments if not addressed early in the fiscal year.

On the revenue side, the report highlights a solid start to the fiscal year. Government revenue and grants totaled 177.2 billion Birr, a 77 percent nominal and 50.3 percent real increase compared to the same period in the preceding year.

Overall, the government achieved 31 percent of its annual revenue and grants target, buoyed by indirect tax collections, particularly trade and personal income taxes.

However, direct business tax and non-tax revenues underperformed, pointing to lingering compliance and administrative gaps.

The EEA’s “most striking observation” is that grants performed exceptionally, reaching 161.4 percent of the annual target, likely due to early or unanticipated disbursements from donors.

Despite revenue gains, Ethiopia continued to face a wide fiscal gap. The report places the quarterly fiscal deficit at 20.97 billion Birr with grants, and 32.74 billion Birr without grants.

The Association underscored the government’s dependence on external support to balance its finances.

“Grants helped offset nearly ETB 11.77 billion of the financing gap during the quarter, highlighting their continued importance in supporting fiscal operations,” the report reads.

After a full year with no donor inflows, 11.77 billion Birr in grants and relief were recorded in the first quarter, indicating renewed “donor engagement, emergency relief funding, or budgetary assistance from bilateral or multilateral partners.”

The report concludes that the fiscal stance in the early 2024/25 budget year demonstrates “a strong revenue start but uneven spending execution,” warning that continued underperformance in capital projects could delay Ethiopia’s development goals unless project readiness, procurement, and budget oversight improve.

A gathering held earlier this week in Bole Sub-City called for immediate action from the federal government, the interim Tigray administration (TIA), and the international community.

A statement issued following the meeting, which includes a list of 10 resolutions, said the people of Raya—renowned for their “deep-rooted cultural values, peaceful coexistence, and industrious nature”—are now facing “systemic marginalization, repression, and violence.”

It accused the current interim administration and members of  the Tigray People Liberation Front  (TPLF) leadership of committing “arbitrary detentions, disappearances, killings, and mass displacement” in the region.

“Education must not be militarized,” one participant said during the discussion. He referred to reports that more than a dozen schools and vocational training centers in the area have been turned into military camps.

“Our children deserve classrooms, not barracks,” he added. The attendee underscored that the community demands for the immediate withdrawal of security forces from educational facilities.

The resolutions echoed the participants’ voices. The statement called for the “urgent and unconditional reinstatement of self-administration for the Rayan community,” describing it as a right guaranteed under both the Tigray and Ethiopian constitutions.

Another participant said the community’s peaceful call for self-rule had been met “not with dialogue, but with violence and repression.”

The gathering urged authorities to hold accountable all those responsible for alleged crimes against civilians.

“Those responsible, whether members of the interim administration, military elites, or the former ruling party, must face justice,” reads the statement.

The participants further called on security forces in Tigray to “uphold the principles of protection and service to the people” and to reject political manipulation.

“We do not oppose the security apparatus,” a community member clarified. “But we demand that it serves all Tigrayans equally and distances itself from those who incite conflict.”

Concerns about migration were also raised, with several speakers noting that young people from Raya were leaving the country due to insecurity and lack of opportunity.

“Our youth are risking their lives in the Mediterranean because they see no future at home,” an elderly man said, urging the international community to address the crisis and invest in youth-centered development programs.

The meeting reaffirmed support for the full implementation of the 2022 Pretoria Agreement, lamenting that “three years have passed without meaningful repatriation of IDPs or restoration of Tigray’s territorial integrity.”

The community also expressed solidarity with political parties operating in Tigray, encouraging them to continue peaceful and democratic efforts despite “challenging and repressive conditions.”

In its closing remarks, the community statement appealed to the federal government to exercise its “constitutional responsibility and authority” to protect the people of Raya from what it called “systematic atrocities” committed by regional actors.

“This is not a declaration of hostility,” one community member in his mid-thirties emphasized. “It is a call for justice, accountability, and inclusive governance.”

“The suffering of our people cannot be ignored any longer,” the statement concluded, portraying the growing frustration among the Raya community in Addis Ababa as tensions continue to mount in southern Tigray.

The Commission’s October 2025 report on freedom of movement published under the title ‘Urgent Actions Required to Ensure Full Exercise of Freedom of Movement’ documents a nationwide pattern of human rights violations — from arbitrary restrictions and road blockades to targeted violence by both state and non-state actors.

The report, released just months before the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) is expected to open voter registration, warns that continued restrictions on civilian mobility directly undermines people’s rights to freedom, protection, and property.

Political figures who spoke with The Reporter on the other hand state that failure to protect the right to free movement extends well beyond its territory and directly impacts their rights to political participation and raises questions about the credibility of the upcoming polls.

The EHRC statement, spanning multiple regions including Amhara, Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella, documents severe impediments to free movement that “threaten citizens’ constitutional rights to security, livelihoods, and participation in national life”.

The findings included in the statement highlight widespread attacks and kidnapping of civilians, unlawful road closures and checkpoint controls, and curfews.

Among the most notable incidents verified by the Commission occurred in the Amhara region’s Central Gondar Zone. On July 19, 2025, in Chilga Woreda, armed Qemant groups reportedly intercepted a convoy of vehicles traveling with a government security escort. The assailants targeted the vehicles positioned at the rear of the convoy, stopping those en route from Gondar City toward Genda Wuha. According to the EHRC report, the attackers halted several cars near Wali Daba Kebele and abducted ten individuals — five drivers and five passengers. All abducted persons were later released following mediation efforts by local elders.

In Oromia, the Commission noted repeated attacks on civilians traveling along major routes. On June 4, 2025, in Arsi Zone, a passenger bus was ambushed by armed groups believed to be linked to the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), leaving four civilians dead and one severely injured.

Through its on-site monitoring and investigation missions — particularly in the Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and Oromia regions — the Commission has observed that the imposition of frequent and prolonged curfews, the presence of multiple armed actors, and the establishment of numerous checkpoints by both government security forces and non-state armed groups have severely restricted civilians’ freedom of movement.

These restrictions, coupled with recurring road closures, ambushes, property destruction, and displacement caused by clashes and security operations, have placed the right to free movement and personal security under significant threat.

The EHRC has also documented the continued disruption of civilian movement and transport networks in several parts of the Amhara region. It stated that the road linking Mekane Selam in South Wollo Zone with Merto Le-Mariam town in East Gojjam Zone has remained closed since March 2025, following government security orders related to ongoing instability.

Similarly, the Adet–Mota–Bichena route has been shut down since early July, with restrictions still in place at the time the report was published. These closures, EHRC said, have severely constrained the daily activities and mobility of residents.

The report further noted that between August 7 and 11, the Bahir Dar–Debre Markos highway was also blocked by armed local groups commonly referred to as Fano. The Commission reports that the disruption paralyzed transport and commerce in the area, effectively cutting off movement between the two major urban centers. It described how ordinary people faced travel interruptions and shortages of essential goods as a result of the road closures.

In its findings from Benishangul-Gumuz, the Commission reported that government security forces had detained individuals traveling from the Amhara region for work in and around Assosa town.

According to the report, ethnic Amhara travelers were stopped at checkpoints, while some were  taken to local police stations, and others were reportedly ordered to return to their places of origin.

The Commission argues these actions violated freedom of movement and equal treatment provisions, though local officials defended them as temporary security measures to prevent “illegal land encroachments” and to limit infiltration by armed groups associated with Fano but contend that these mechanisms are no longer being utilized.

The report also detailed a violent confrontation in Metemma Woreda of West Gondar Zone, where government security forces clashed with an armed Qemant group at a checkpoint in Meqa Kebele on June 23. The Commission reported that the fighting began after the armed group stopped vehicles carrying fuel, goods, and passengers in an attempt to collect tolls.

The ensuing clash resulted in several deaths among drivers and passengers, and at least three people were injured.

The Commission’s call is unequivocal: the government must “ensure full accountability for human rights violations and provide justice to victims.” The statement emphasizes that despite repeated commitments to peace and reform, regional and federal security institutions have failed to prevent or respond to abuses, allowing impunity to take root.

EHRC urged authorities at all levels — from federal to woreda administrations — to verify and halt unlawful detentions, checkpoints, and collective punishments.

“Authorities must ensure that movement restrictions are strictly necessary, proportionate, and time-bound,” the Commission warned, adding that many such measures have instead become tools of control that “intensify political tensions.”

The report cited an incident that took place in the Oromia Special Zone within the Amhara region, where a supposedly temporary curfew was imposed following the murder of an individual by unknown actors. Authorities in the area have prohibited the movement of people and vehicles after 4:00 PM, and the curfew has yet to be lifted.

The EHRC confirmed that the restrictions “negatively affected pregnant women, patients, and daily laborers,” causing what it described as “an unacceptable humanitarian and social impact.”

Observers note that the EHRC’s findings arrive at a politically sensitive moment. Ethiopia is expected to hold general elections in mid-2026 — the first since the end of the northern conflict and the reorganization of the Tigray regional interim administration (TIA).

Analysts warn that the patterns of movement restriction, arbitrary arrests, and ongoing insecurity could make free campaigning and voter registration nearly impossible in several regions.

“Freedom of movement is a prerequisite for any credible election,” said a political analyst who spoke to The Reporter anonymously. “If citizens cannot travel safely to polling stations or if political candidates cannot reach communities, then the integrity of the vote is compromised from the start.”

For opposition political voices, the EHRC’s documentation of arbitrary checkpoints, curfews, and militarization of civilian zones echoes past election-year crackdowns. The Commission explicitly calls for “urgent corrective measures” to restore mobility, warning that excessive restrictions “disproportionately affect civic and political rights.”

The NEBE, meanwhile, has yet to release a detailed security assessment ahead of voter registration, and opposition political figures who spoke to The Reporter observe that  coordination with regional administrations remains one of the election’s biggest logistical hurdles.

Opposition parties across the country share a deep sense of uncertainty over whether the next elections can be held under current conditions.

Mulatu Gemechu, deputy chairman of the Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC), told The Reporter that the atmosphere remains far from conducive for democratic participation.

“We have said this many times before — the issue of elections is still uncertain,” Mulatu said. “There is a security problem; there is no peace. That is why, for now, we have not made a decision on whether to participate in the coming election or not.”

He added that freedom of movement — a key element of any credible campaign — has effectively collapsed.

 “Right now, freedom of movement is restricted — not only for individuals to travel freely or campaign, but even the government cannot access certain areas where various armed groups are active and people are being detained,” he noted. “In such conditions, how can the voices of the people be heard properly?”

According to Mulatu, the continuation of armed conflict in multiple regions makes any notion of a national election “impractical and unjust.”

“Elections cannot take place in a situation of war. Lives are being lost, property destroyed — that is not right,” he said. “What should be done, therefore, is for both the government and the opposition to work toward peace and discuss what can bring lasting stability to this country.”

The OFC, he explained, has been unable to reopen its offices or conduct basic political training because of the restrictions.

“Our members are required to train and prepare — to educate the public about our political program, our policies, especially our political, economic, and social policies. People must know how we differ from the ruling party — what our alternative is. That requires an office, organization, and the ability to gather people in public spaces. None of that is currently possible,” said Mulatu.

In the north, similar frustrations are echoed by Salsay Woyane Tigray (SaWeT), an opposition political party that operates in Tigray Regional State.

Berhane Atsbeha, head of communications for the party, told The Reporter that mobility across and within Tigray remains perilous, raising serious doubts about the feasibility of fair elections.

 “You see, entering or leaving Tigray by car is still very difficult — there are risks in every direction,” Berhane said. “Even to move around or to campaign freely, there are many restrictions. Crimes are being committed; what we are witnessing are continuous violations of human rights. So, if these issues are not addressed in time, how can an election be held under such circumstances? That’s what this whole issue essentially points to.”

He added that within the region itself, communities remain physically isolated.

“For example, one cannot travel from the northwest to western Tigray. Within Tigray, movement from one district to another — say, from Endabaguna to May Tsebri — is impossible,” said Berhane.

He also stressed that the situation in the neighboring Afar and Amhara regions also remains unstable.

“Armed groups in the Amhara region, for instance, are still in conflict with the federal army, and that has its own implications. In this context, there is no free ground — soldiers are still stationed across Tigray, making freedom of movement, the right to work, and even the right to live safely uncertain. People’s very existence is at risk,” Berhane told The Reporter.

He noted that federal and Eritrean forces continue to control parts of Tigray, restricting civilians’ access to their land and livelihoods.

“Inside Tigray too, political activity is limited. The federal government and even the Eritrean forces, who continue to occupy parts of Tigray’s territory, make it impossible for people to move or work freely,” said Berhane.

He brought up the Irob community as an example.

“The Irob community — which lives not far from Adigrat — has not yet returned home. People can’t even enter Irob. Adigrat, one of the main zonal towns, is itself heavily restricted,” said Berhane. “So, under such conditions, when people are deprived of their natural and constitutional rights — freedom of movement, the right to work, and property ownership — how can we talk about fair elections? To claim that the country is stable or that it is ready for peaceful elections is unrealistic.”

Berhane and his party believe the Commission’s findings should be “taken seriously and strengthened,” arguing that the government’s reports of stability “do not reflect the lived reality on the ground.”

“Unless the government intends to repeat what happened in the sixth national election — when it ran alone and declared itself the winner — it is difficult to imagine how a genuine, credible election can be held. We want that to be strengthened and to create conditions where people can truly move, work, and vote freely,” said Berhane.

The EHRC report portrays a nation fragmented by mistrust and competing interests, often manifesting in violence.

In the Amhara region, Fano militias continue to exert de facto control over several areas, imposing illegal levies and disrupting transport. In Oromia Regional State, OLA insurgencies have created no-go zones where administrative control has collapsed.

These divisions have intensified ethnic profiling, with reports of passengers being targeted at checkpoints based on identity.

“The right to move freely within one’s country is foundational,” the report stresses.

Politicians have expressed their fear that continued insecurity will discourage voter turnout and deepen public cynicism about whether elections can produce change.

Beyond political implications, the report paints a disturbing picture of everyday life disrupted by insecurity. Farmers unable to transport goods, patients stranded en route to hospitals, and teachers prevented from reaching schools — all represent a silent erosion of normalcy.

The EHRC statement linked these violations to worsening economic conditions, warning that disrupted mobility exacerbates food insecurity, displacement, and unemployment, all of which may negatively impact people’s daily livelihood.

In its final recommendations, the EHRC urged federal and regional authorities to lift unlawful movement restrictions and curfews, investigate and prosecute those responsible for rights violations, guarantee unimpeded access for humanitarian actors, strengthen oversight of local security forces and reaffirm Ethiopia’s commitment to constitutional freedoms.

“Prompt and coordinated action is essential to prohibit the occurrences of rights violations and ensure justice for victims,” the Commission concluded.

Experts and political figures agree that with less than a year before Ethiopia heads to the polls, the EHRC findings underscore a nation still struggling to reconcile its democratic aspirations with the realities of insecurity and division.

If unaddressed, the restrictions documented in the report risk reducing the 2026 elections to a symbolic event, devoid of genuine competition or participation, warn political figures who spoke to The Reporter.

But if the government acts decisively and moves to restore mobility, protect civilians, and ensure accountability, it could mark a turning point toward credible governance.

“The right to move freely is inseparable from the right to vote freely,” Berhane said.

Whether Ethiopia’s leaders heed that warning may determine not just the legitimacy of the next election, but the direction of the nation’s fragile democracy itself.

At Golden Tulip, Thursday nights transform into an oasis

On Thursday nights in Addis Ababa, as the city’s traffic dissolves into the evening haze, a quieter rhythm begins to pulse. Inside the Golden Tulip lounge, the lights dim to a soft amber and the first piano chords drift into the air — tender, deliberate, almost conversational. The music moves through the room like a shared breath.

It isn’t simply a performance. It’s a ritual — a gentle reclaiming of what music once meant in this city: intimacy, expression, connection.

These Thursday Piano Nights are quickly becoming one of Addis Ababa’s most understated yet essential musical gatherings. They remind audiences — and perhaps the musicians themselves — that live music doesn’t always need spectacle. Sometimes, all it needs is a piano, a voice, and a room willing to listen.

The evening begins without fanfare. No announcements, no spotlight, no demand for attention. The pianist starts quietly, easing into melodies that live in the nation’s collective memory: faint jazz improvisations, timeless Amharic ballads, fragments of songs that feel older than the walls themselves. Conversations soften; the mood shifts.

Soon, the singers join in — two voices trading interpretations of love, longing, and light. One lingers on the melancholy of Tilahun Gessesse’s classics; another glides through Mehamud Ahmed’s modern phrasing. Their voices do not compete but converse, weaving harmonies that suggest both respect and restraint.

There is humility here. No theatrics, no amplifiers straining for dominance — just craftsmanship. The kind of musicianship that grows from years of playing, listening, and trusting the silence between notes. In a city that rewards volume, these Thursday nights celebrate quiet mastery.

But what happens here is more than entertainment; it is a subtle cultural correction. In Addis Ababa’s evolving art scene, live music has often tilted toward the loud, the social, the easily consumed. Yet here, the audience listens. They do not talk over the pianist or scroll through their phones. They listen — fully. And in that collective stillness, something beautiful unfolds: a shared quiet that feels both rare and necessary in the capital’s restless tempo.

For older guests, the experience recalls the golden days of hotel lounges and orchestral cafés — when musicians played from the heart, not the playlist. For younger listeners, it is a revelation: that music can be intimate without being private, emotional without being extravagant.

That, in essence, is what Thursday Piano Nights have revived — a culture of attentive listening.

The repertoire bridges generations. The pianist moves fluidly between jazz standards and Ethiopian classics: a reimagined “Yene Konjo” one moment, a delicate “Autumn Leaves” the next. The blend feels seamless, but more importantly, intentional.

These nights are not curated to impress; they are curated to connect. Each piece carries a memory — of dance halls and smoky cafés, of afternoons when a record player anchored the living room. The musicians seem aware of this lineage. They play not only for the audience before them, but for the generations that built Ethiopia’s musical identity: the keyboardists of the 1960s, the vocalists who shaped Amharic pop, the jazz bands that once filled city hotels with improvisational fire.

There is reverence in their sound, a quiet recognition that music, like memory, survives only when played aloud.

What makes these evenings remarkable is not merely the skill of the players, but the intimacy of their exchange. You see it in the way the pianist nods before shifting key, or how the singer closes his eyes at the peak of a verse — not for drama, but to hold the moment steady. Every gesture feels deliberate; every note lands with quiet significance.

There is no barrier between musician and listener. No stage, no elevation, no distance. The piano sits in one corner of the room, yet the music feels central — an anchor around which everything else orbits. Conversations hush when the first few measures of a beloved tune begin. Couples lean closer, not to whisper, but to listen. That shared silence, that collective pause, becomes a kind of music itself.

Addis Ababa has always been a city in motion — cranes rising, traffic swelling, nights filled with amplified sound. But amid that constant acceleration, spaces like this remind the city of its craving for softness.

The Thursday Piano Nights have become a refuge for that softness — a weekly reprieve from the city’s intensity. A place where an artist can linger on a melody, and an audience, for once, allows time to slow with it.

It isn’t nostalgia driving this revival of quieter performance; it’s recognition — recognition that live music is not just entertainment, but emotion, communication, and care.

“You don’t just hear the piano here,” one regular attendee said. “You feel what the city has been missing.”

Though the piano is the evening’s heart, it rarely beats alone. Spontaneous collaborations often emerge: a singer joins a fellow musician, an amateur steps in for a song or two, a guest performer blends languages and styles. These moments blur the line between planned and improvised, echoing the soul of Ethiopian jazz and its instinct for improvisation.

The result is a kind of fluid artistry — alive, unrepeatable, never rehearsed the same way twice. Perhaps that’s what gives these nights their quiet power. In an age of digital playlists and studio perfection, they offer imperfection — the human kind.

But the rebirth of piano-led evenings is about more than art. It signals a broader shift within the city’s creative community — a renewed respect for craftsmanship and connection. As Addis transforms, its art is finding new homes in familiar spaces: cafés, bars, and hotel lounges where the line between performer and listener dissolves.

Each Thursday performance at the Golden Tulip is a reminder that the piano remains one of the city’s most eloquent storytellers. It has accompanied generations — through revolution, romance, and rebirth — and still speaks, without words, to what Addis feels like at its most sincere.

When the final song fades, the applause rises — not loud, but genuine. The pianist nods. The singers smile. And for a brief moment, everything — the sound, the silence, even the city outside — seems suspended.

Then the spell gently breaks. People return to their tables; conversations resume. But something lingers — an afterglow only live music can leave behind.

These Thursday nights are not grand. They are not crowded. But they are necessary. They give Addis Ababa something beyond entertainment — they give it reflection, rhythm, and tenderness. And as long as there’s a piano willing to play, and a few people willing to listen, the city will always have its softer pulse.