It is not uncommon for Ethiopians to lament Egypt’s centuries-long thirst for control over Ethiopia’s natural resources and spiritual values. History shows that Egypt repeatedly sought to occupy Ethiopian territories in order to secure direct control over the Abbay River. In doing so, Egypt attempted encroachments on Ethiopia’s western, eastern, and northern frontiers—only to suffer utter defeat at the hands of Ethiopia’s gallant defenders.
Throughout its long history, Ethiopia has never initiated war against any nation. Nor has any aggressor ever succeeded in conquering its territory. Time and again, invaders—including Egypt and later Italy—were repelled, learning through failure that Ethiopia could not be subdued. They should have understood by now that the only path to winning Ethiopia’s goodwill is through love and mutual respect. Yet Egypt seems to have lost sight of that truth.
Egypt also sought to control Ethiopia through spiritual channels, extending its influence over the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church. This effort, cloaked in the language of brotherhood and religious fraternity, was ultimately another strategy to dominate the Abbay River.
History provides striking parallels. When Europeans first arrived in much of Africa, they came carrying the Bible, claiming their mission was to spread the Gospel. In reality, colonization was in their hearts. As Jomo Kenyatta once said: “When the missionaries arrived, they had the Bible and we had the land. They taught us to pray with our eyes closed. When we opened them, they had the land and we had the Bible.” Religion, in this sense, became one of the first steps in the colonization of Africa, paving the way for armies and weapons.
Egypt, too, pursued its influence over Ethiopia through two primary strategies. The first was direct military intervention, a strategy that failed because of Ethiopia’s resilience and military strength. Unable to subdue Ethiopia by force, Egypt turned instead to religious influence, hoping to control Ethiopia’s spiritual and cultural life as a means to assert control over the Abbay River.
The Abbay is not a minor tributary; it is the source of more than 85 percent of the Nile’s waters. This immense gift flows from Ethiopia to downstream countries such as Sudan and Egypt, and ultimately to the Mediterranean. Ethiopia has never sought to deny this lifeline to its neighbors, nor acted against their survival. Yet Egypt has continually sought to sabotage the interests of upstream countries, attempting in different ways to secure exclusive control over the Nile waters.
The second strategic initiative undertaken by Egypt involved a religious approach, which, unlike its military campaigns, ultimately proved more effective. Beginning in 328 A.D., Egypt sent 111 bishops to Ethiopia. The relationship between the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC) and the Coptic Church of Egypt has always been marked by complexity, primarily because Egypt held exclusive authority to appoint bishops to Ethiopia. Given Egypt’s predominantly Muslim population, its control over Coptic Christian affairs—shared with Ethiopia and five other nations—can be interpreted as an effort to exert religious influence over Ethiopia. Historical evidence suggests this influence was, in part, a strategy to monitor and indirectly control the Abbay River.
In 328 A.D., Abba Frumentius (Aba Selama) was ordained as the inaugural Bishop of Ethiopia by the 20th Archbishop of Alexandria. From then on, Ethiopia repeatedly sought the right to appoint its own Patriarch and bishops, but Egypt consistently refused. This denial persisted for more than a millennium, beginning in the 16th century, and can be viewed as a calculated form of intervention—an attempt to weaken Ethiopia’s independence and exert control over the Abbay River through spiritual channels.
The Ethiopian government, however, made persistent efforts to end Egyptian dominance in the EOTC. This struggle reached a turning point in 1950, through the relentless diplomatic initiatives of Emperor Haile Selassie I. That year, for the first time, five Ethiopian church leaders were sent to Alexandria and ordained as archbishops. From among them, the Synod of the EOTC elected the first Patriarch of Ethiopia. One of those archbishops was my uncle, Abune Timotewos Kedamawi, who served in the then Sidamo province.
In the ecumenical sphere, the Pan-Orthodox meeting of 1961 deliberated on the relationship of the EOTC with other Oriental Orthodox Churches, including the Armenian, Syrian, and Indian Churches, with the Coptic Church of Egypt being only one among them. However, Egypt had long exploited its privileged position in this relationship to exert political and spiritual control over Ethiopia—seeking to keep the country weak, unable to develop its resources, and incapable of fully utilizing its fresh waters, particularly the Abbay River.
Seen from this perspective, Egypt’s current stance on the GERD is not a new development but rather a continuation of its centuries-old policy of sabotage. It is further reinforced by colonial-era agreements that enshrined Egypt’s so-called “right” to the Nile’s waters—agreements Ethiopia never signed, and which were imposed during an age of foreign domination. Ethiopia was never a party to those colonial treaties, and it cannot be bound by them.
Contemporary Egypt and Ethiopian water politics: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)
The recent escalation of tensions—particularly over the last 14 years, since 2011—among Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia regarding the GERD is far more complex than it appears. At its core, it is a question of justice long denied. Egypt seeks to preserve its historical dominance and near-exclusive use of the Abbay’s waters. The real source of controversy, therefore, is not the GERD itself, but Egypt’s insistence on maintaining its monopoly over the Nile.
The situation has been further complicated by the involvement of global powers and regional actors with direct or indirect interests in the Nile’s fresh water. Israel has a well-documented interest in securing access to the river’s resources, while several Arab states also see the Nile as critical to their future. The United States and other superpowers, though not direct beneficiaries of the river’s waters, have consistently aligned with Egypt and its allies due to longstanding strategic ties.
Egypt’s call for international intervention in the GERD issue has also served as a political cover. Ethiopia has faced systematic obstruction from the outset. Global financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF refused to provide funding or loans for the construction of the GERD. Even after Ethiopians themselves financed and built the dam, these same institutions, along with influential states, withheld support. Instead, they reinforced Egypt’s position, insisting that Ethiopia must reach an agreement with Egypt before international recognition or normalization could occur.
This pattern is not accidental. It reflects a continuation of Egypt’s long-standing strategy—what it could not achieve through military aggression or religious domination, it now seeks to accomplish through diplomacy, international pressure, and coercion, leveraging its ties with the United States, Arab countries, and the UN Security Council.
Ethiopia, however, has remained steadfast. It has always stood on the side of truth, and while the path has been difficult, truth has a way of ultimately prevailing.
The Source of Conflict over the Abbay River
Conflicts over the allocation of Nile waters have existed for centuries, particularly between Egypt and Ethiopia. These tensions significantly escalated in 2011 when Ethiopia began constructing the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Abbay River (“Blue Nile”).
Although the GERD dispute is often presented as a recent development, it is rooted in a much older struggle between upstream and downstream countries. Egypt and Sudan, as downstream nations, have long sought to preserve their dominance, while upstream countries—including Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, the DRC, Eritrea, Kenya, and South Sudan—have consistently demanded justice and equitable access to the Nile’s waters.
At the heart of the conflict is Egypt’s determination to monopolize the Nile, despite the fact that its waters originate largely from the highlands of Ethiopia and the White Nile Basin. Ethiopia has long argued for its right to use its natural resources to fight poverty, generate electricity, and improve the livelihoods of its people. Ethiopia’s position is not to deprive others but to claim a fair share of a resource that originates within its borders.
Egypt, however, interprets Ethiopia’s rightful use of the Abbay River as a direct threat to its so-called “water security.” In practice, this means Egypt resists any agreement that would recognize the equitable rights of upstream nations. By clinging to outdated colonial-era privileges, Egypt—backed by sympathetic superpowers—makes genuine, cooperative solutions difficult. This entrenched refusal to recognize fairness is the real source of the ongoing conflict.
The Nile is a lifeline for millions of people in Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, and the other upstream countries. For Ethiopia, however, the GERD is not merely a hydroelectric project—it is a matter of national survival. With more than 130 million citizens, Ethiopia cannot afford to leave its most vital natural resource untapped while it struggles with poverty and limited access to electricity.
Ethiopia has never been part of the colonial-era agreements that shaped the use of the Nile’s waters. Yet Egypt, leveraging its vast diplomatic networks and the colonial contracts of 1929 and 1959, has for decades obstructed the development of any major project on the Nile’s tributaries—even small springs and rivers that local Ethiopian farmers depend on for their daily lives.
Egypt and Sudan continue to insist that the legal framework for the use of the Nile’s waters should be anchored in the 1959 agreement signed exclusively between them. But which “Nile” do they mean? The Abbay River—the Blue Nile—within Ethiopia’s own borders? Or the river renamed “the Nile” only after the White and Blue Niles meet at Khartoum? The 1959 agreement allocated nothing to Ethiopia or any other upstream African state. It effectively prevented Ethiopia from using its own water—its own Abbay River—for any purpose other than letting it flow downstream.
Meanwhile, Egypt and Sudan have built dams, irrigation schemes, and power projects without ever consulting upstream nations—the very sources of the Nile’s waters. The result is a gross injustice: countries like Ethiopia, which contribute the overwhelming majority of the Nile’s flow, are denied the right to use it, while Egypt, which contributes almost nothing, claims veto power over every new project. This is not simply unfair; it is absurd. Whether the blame lies with colonial powers or with Egypt itself, which now justifies its dominance through those old agreements, one fact is clear: justice has been denied for far too long.
But times have changed. Ethiopians at home and abroad rallied together to finance the GERD themselves, raising the funds to launch construction without a single cent from foreign governments or international financial institutions. No country on earth can claim credit for this achievement. The GERD belongs entirely to the Ethiopian people. It is their project, their sacrifice, and their determination—and it is a symbol of their right to live with dignity. Every Ethiopian understands this, and every citizen is ready to defend that right if necessary. Such conviction cannot be ignored, and it must be respected.
Issues at Hand
Many presume that Egypt initially sought to prevent the construction of the GERD on the Abbay River because it feared any disruption to its access to the Nile’s waters. Egypt has repeatedly described the construction and filling of the GERD as an “existential threat” to its freshwater supply. Yet Ethiopia has consistently affirmed that the GERD would never harm downstream countries and that the Abbay River would be utilized in a responsible and judicial manner. Despite these assurances, Egypt’s grievances have persisted. In reality, nothing in Ethiopia’s actions has caused any freshwater shortage in either Sudan or Egypt; their dams remain full, contrary to what they anticipated.
Initially, Khartoum expressed concern that the operation of the GERD might endanger Sudan’s dams and complicate Ethiopia’s management of its development projects. However, the truth is that Sudan has benefited from the GERD. The Tekeze Dam, for instance, has helped prevent flooding in Sudan, and Sudanese authorities have publicly thanked Ethiopia multiple times for its contribution.
In my view, Egypt’s fear is not genuinely about disruptions to its dams or water supply. Rather, Egypt seeks to maintain the veto power granted to it under the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement and to monopolize the river in perpetuity. The GERD challenges the regional water and power arrangements that favored Egypt due to colonial-era agreements. As a result, Cairo feels its long-standing “water superpower” is being threatened.
The reality is that the colonial-era dominance over the Nile is shifting to its rightful owners—the upstream and downstream countries, including Ethiopia, which contributes a major share of the Nile’s waters. Khartoum, under the 1959 agreement, has some entitlement to the water, while Ethiopia had none. This imbalance is clear to Ethiopians, yet the international community seems slow to recognize it. Why this fundamental injustice is not widely acknowledged remains a pressing question.
At this point, the GERD has been completed and inaugurated. In response, Egypt has shifted its position, now seeking a political agreement on how the GERD should be managed—particularly during droughts. A recurring question is: Will Ethiopia release enough water from the reservoir to help mitigate drought conditions in downstream countries? This is an unfair question for Ethiopia.
Drought in Ethiopia is a well-documented and recurring phenomenon, occurring historically every 5 to 10 years. Yet this reality raises many questions: Which countries are most affected by drought? What happens if a drought affects all countries along the Nile simultaneously, both upstream and downstream? What drought mitigation measures do Egypt and Sudan have in place? How do these countries manage the Nile’s waters, considering factors such as excessive irrigation, lakes, dams, and evaporation? Why, then, is Ethiopia expected to shoulder the entire burden?
The focus should not be solely on the GERD when addressing drought. The management of all existing dams, water reservoirs, and new dams in both upstream and downstream countries is equally critical. If drought occurs, it is fundamentally a humanitarian issue. The GERD is being managed responsibly to benefit both upstream and downstream countries, and Ethiopia is fulfilling that responsibility.
Ethiopia is a sovereign nation and should be free to cooperate with downstream countries without being unfairly constrained. Downstream countries, in turn, should ensure the responsible use of their own water reserves before drought strikes. Simply defining drought as a situation where Nile inflows to downstream dams fall below 35–40 bcm annually is insufficient. Mandating Ethiopia to release water from the GERD during droughts reproduces the inequities of the 1929 colonial agreement, which granted Egypt veto power over the Nile.
The Threats
According to the media site Global Lens, Egypt announced the construction of the “Sisi Dam” on August 1, 2025. Although the launch took place only a month ago, reports suggest that the project had been planned in “total secrecy” over several years. This decision raises immediate concerns, particularly because Egypt appears to have proceeded without the consultation or approval of either upstream or downstream African countries—especially Sudan.
The dam’s projected capacity is said to cut Sudan’s water share by as much as 60 percent. If true, this raises a critical question: does Sudan then have the right to construct its own dam on the Nile in response?
The stated purpose of the “Sisi Dam” is to regulate the Nile’s flow before it leaves Egypt’s borders on its way to the Mediterranean. Effectively, Egypt seeks to control, if not block, the river’s entry into the sea. But can Egypt legally do that? Does international law permit such unilateral action over a transboundary river? These are questions best answered by legal and water experts.
While some upstream and downstream states may remain indifferent to whether Egypt blocks the Nile from reaching the Mediterranean, the upstream countries in particular cannot ignore the implications. If Egypt can deny them their natural rights to use Nile waters, then their sovereignty and development prospects are at risk. Sudan has already described the project as a betrayal. What about other Middle Eastern actors, such as Israel and the Arab states—do they view Egypt’s move with the same alarm that Egypt has shown toward Ethiopia’s GERD?
Several questions demand urgent reflection. Why is the “Sisi Dam” emerging as a regional threat? Which country will feel the pressure first, and why? Are Nile Basin states now reassessing their strategies and alliances? Should Ethiopia view the “Sisi Dam” as a direct challenge to its GERD project? Who has truly broken the regional water consensus—Egypt, or the upstream states? Is the announcement of the “Sisi Dam” simply a way to pressure Ethiopia into a binding water-sharing agreement? Why is the project being portrayed as fueling fears of an escalating water war in the region?
Finally, there is the question of alternatives. Did Egypt fully consider its immense underground water reserves before embarking on the construction of the “Sisi Dam”? Could these resources have offered a more sustainable path to self-sufficiency without destabilizing the region? Or has Egypt chosen instead to begin a more dangerous chapter in the politics of the Nile, one that risks drawing its neighbors into an escalating conflict over water, the region’s most vital resource?
The Way Forward
Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan are not the only countries that should be concerned about the management of the Nile’s waters. While the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is currently the most contentious issue, others will inevitably follow. Addressing the GERD first is therefore indispensable.
All eleven Nile Basin countries must be included in the discussions. A broad-based, long-term agreement on resource sharing and water management must be placed on the table. Importantly, the Abbay is not the Nile; the waters are called the “Nile” only after the White Nile and the Blue Nile meet in Khartoum, Sudan.
Given that the Nile is a regional watercourse, its management must also be approached from a regional perspective. This is where the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) plays a critical role. A comprehensive agreement should resolve disputes over water-use rights among the countries and ensure equitable and reasonable use of resources. It should also address the obstruction posed by downstream countries—particularly Egypt and Sudan—who oppose the GERD and other future projects along the Nile tributaries.
Poverty reduction is a shared priority for all Nile Basin states. Cooperation is a far more productive path than unnecessary conflict. Egypt’s claims over the Nile waters are not entirely accurate, and Cairo must recognize this and refrain from undermining the rights of upstream countries.
The way forward requires all eleven countries to commit to a meaningful resource-sharing framework, one that recognizes the Nile as a regional watercourse. Success will only be possible under a legally binding regime that ensures mutually beneficial rights for both upstream and downstream nations.
Ethiopia does not intend to harm any country; rather, it seeks to lift its economy and alleviate poverty for its more than 130 million citizens. Ethiopia should not be reduced to the target of Egypt’s propaganda or its centuries-long attempts to destabilize the country. Ethiopians should not have to plead with Egypt to stop interfering in their internal affairs or to cease its sabotage of Ethiopia’s development through wars and threats of punitive measures. Ethiopians aspire to live in peace, building prosperity while celebrating the GERD and cooperating with downstream nations to secure shared development.
Egypt must be confronted with the truth. For centuries, under the pretext of protecting its population from water shortages, Egypt has repeatedly sought to drag Ethiopia into wars and poverty. This must come to an end. A new chapter of mutual understanding must be forged for the benefit of both nations.
The international community, including global powers, should stand on the side of truth and help correct the injustices Ethiopia has endured.
Contributed by Sentayehu Gebregiorgis
