Ethiopia’s national security strategy has faced challenges in keeping pace with the complex and evolving dynamics of the Horn of Africa. Given the region’s instability, a more adaptive and forward-looking foreign policy is essential to safeguard Ethiopia’s interests. Persistent threats—both military and non-military—have emerged from neighboring nations, often rooted in unresolved border disputes with Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan. While successive governments have emphasized diplomatic and fraternal ties, a more proactive and innovative approach to security policy is needed to counterbalance adversarial actions.
Historical efforts to address border demarcation have been hampered by domestic political instability, abrupt leadership transitions, and shifting policy priorities. Moving forward, a cohesive, long-term strategy that prioritizes regional stability while firmly protecting Ethiopia’s sovereignty could help mitigate these risks. Strengthening institutional continuity in foreign policy and security planning will be crucial in navigating the Horn of Africa’s volatile landscape.
In the early 1990s, Sudan shifted from its previous support for the EPRDF’s struggle against the Derg to adopting anti-Ethiopian rhetoric and fostering destabilization efforts, despite Ethiopia’s declared ‘good neighborliness’ policy. The EPRDF, having once relied on Sudanese backing during its guerrilla campaign, was acutely aware of the emerging threats from Sudan—yet struggled to counter them effectively. Similarly, Eritrea, despite initial post-independence cooperation, began asserting aggressive postures along the border, culminating in the 1998 war. Ethiopia’s delayed response to these provocations highlighted a reactive rather than preemptive security approach.
Somalia, meanwhile, remained fragmented by clan conflicts and warlordism, creating a security vacuum that endangered Ethiopia. While the EPRDF monitored developments closely and engaged in peace efforts, its policy leaned toward containment rather than long-term strategic solutions. Engagement with Somaliland, though economically and diplomatically beneficial, did not offset the broader instability emanating from Somalia.
In each case—whether Sudan’s hostility, Eritrea’s aggression, or Somalia’s collapse—Ethiopia’s responses were often reactive. The post-2000 containment of Eritrea and Somali reconciliation initiatives were damage-control measures rather than proactive strategies. Even the post-2018 foreign policy revisions, though well-intentioned, appeared driven more by political goodwill than by an articulated, long-term policy planning for regional stability and national security.
Ethiopia’s foreign policy has often been constrained by a lack of long-term strategic vision and a lack of clear prioritization of national objectives. Facing complex challenges—from internal instability to shifting regional dynamics—the country has struggled to craft and implement cohesive foreign and security policies. Decision-making has historically been highly centralized, with leaders exerting predominant influence over foreign policy directions, often at the expense of institutional expertise and professional input.
At times, foreign policy has been shaped more by short-term political considerations than by a structured framework to safeguard national security and advance Ethiopia’s long-term interests. The formulation process, typically centered in the prime minister’s office, has sometimes been hindered by limited perspectives or ad hoc interpretations of regional developments, leading to inconsistencies in implementation.
Since 2018, foreign policy-making has become increasingly concentrated, with minimal institutional checks or broad-based deliberation. This centralization has contributed to the current challenges in navigating Ethiopia’s complex geopolitical landscape effectively.
Ethiopia’s recent past engagements with Eritrea, Somalia, and other regional actors have often lacked a cohesive long-term strategy, resulting in inconsistent policy outcomes. While the rapprochement with Eritrea and outreach to Somalia signaled a shift toward regional cooperation, these initiatives were not always grounded in durable strategic calculations. For instance, the initial vision of an economic alliance between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia—though rhetorically promising—yielded limited tangible benefits and eventually gave way to renewed tensions.
Similarly, Ethiopia’s diplomatic recalibration, including its strained ties with longstanding partners like Kenya, has introduced new uncertainties in favor of more unpredictable relationships. Previous administrations, such as the EPRDF, had cultivated pragmatic ties with Somaliland—albeit short of formal recognition—which provided a degree of stability. However, the current approach has struggled to establish clear, sustainable frameworks for engagement, leaving Ethiopia’s regional posture vulnerable to shifting political dynamics.
Many of these challenges stem from an absence of strategic foresight and institutionalized policymaking. Had Ethiopia pursued a more deliberative, interest-based foreign policy—one that balances immediate diplomatic openings with long-term regional stability—some of the current tensions might have been mitigated. Moving forward, a more structured and analytically grounded approach will be essential to safeguarding Ethiopia’s interests in an increasingly complex regional and global environment.
Ethiopia’s persistent internal conflicts have created vulnerabilities that external actors frequently exploit, with armed groups often serving as conduits for foreign interference. Unless resolved, these domestic instabilities risk escalating into a full-scale foreign policy emergency a pattern we’ve already witnessed unfolding. The 2018 political transition demonstrated how poorly managed internal crises can compound strategic challenges.
A nation’s external influence fundamentally depends on domestic stability. This isn’t to suggest domestic policy should overshadow foreign engagement, but rather to emphasize their intrinsic connection. Both must work in tandem to serve national interests, with domestic cohesion forming the foundation for effective international relations.
Ethiopia’s fragility often manifests through seemingly minor triggers that rapidly escalate into major conflicts. These breakdowns in social order create openings for external manipulation, particularly when disaffected groups resort to armed resistance. The consequences extend beyond borders, damaging Ethiopia’s international standing while constraining its ability to pursue independent foreign policy objectives.
As the Horn of Africa navigates increasingly complex geopolitical currents, Ethiopia faces mounting security challenges that demand strategic foresight. While current leadership has demonstrated responsiveness to immediate crises, this reactive approach reveals deeper deficiencies in long-term regional strategy and contingency planning. The evolving stark situation with Egypt exemplifies how policy gaps in regional engagement can create vulnerabilities.
Since 2018, Ethiopia’s diplomatic approach has been characterized by ad hoc personal diplomacy rather than institutionalized strategy. This over-reliance on leader-centric relations, while occasionally productive in the short term, fails to establish sustainable frameworks for advancing core national interests. True diplomatic effectiveness requires more than engagement; it demands clear policy architecture grounded in strategic vision.
The foundation of effective foreign policy lies in coherent planning: ideas must first crystallize into policy, which then guides diplomatic execution.As Ethiopia confronts regional uncertainties, developing this strategic clarity with defined short and long-term objectives becomes imperative to navigate the Horn’s shifting dynamics while safeguarding national security interests.
AbdurahmanEdao, holding an MA in International Relations and Diplomacy from Addis Ababa University, is a foreign policy researcher. His work includes “Ethiopian Foreign Policy in the post 2018: Understanding Drivers and Challenges,” published by the Institute for Foreign Affairs (IFA). He can be reached at: [email protected]
Contributed by Abdurahman Edao
