Ethiopian Review

መለስ የቆፈሩት ጉድጓድ…

Negash — Wed, 22 May 2013 14:26:32 +0000

By Goolgule.com May 20, 2013 ይህንን ቃለምልልስ ያደረግነው ለበርካታ ዓመታት ለኢህአዴግ ሲሰራ ከነበረና በአሁኑ ወቅት ለከፍተኛ ትምህርት ውጪ አገር ከሚገኝ ኢትዮጵያዊ ጋር ነው፡፡ ለደኅንነት ሲባል ስሙን ከመጥቀስ ተቆጥበናል፡፡ ጎልጉል ፦ የጠ/ሚኒስትር መለስ መታመም ድንገተኛ ነው የሚሉ አሉ፤ አሟሟታቸውም ድንገት ነው የሚሉ አሉ፤ በሌላ በኩል ደግሞ አጋጣሚው መልካም እንደሆነ የሚጠቁሙ አሉ አንተ ከየትኛው ወገን [...]

[Source: Ethiopian Review]

ENTC Sweden chapter public meeting preparation finalized

EthiopianReview.com — Wed, 22 May 2013 04:15:27 +0000

The Ethiopian National Transitional Council (ENTC) will host town hall meeting in Stockholm, Sweden on May 26 2013, to discuss the process of forming an all-inclusive transitional government in Ethiopia. The meeting is part of the series of meetings throughout the world over the next months to discuss the need for removing the dictatorship in Ethiopia and [...]

[Source: Ethiopian Review]

Bahr Dar and the wonderful art of silence.

Yilma Bekele — Wed, 22 May 2013 02:37:52 +0000

Bahr Dar and the wonderful art of silence. By Yilma Bekele Last Sunday May 12 a Federal police officer opened fire and murdered twelve or eighteen people depending on who is doing the counting in the City of Bahr Dar by the shores of Lake Tana. It was a random killing and the only reason [...]

[Source: Ethiopian Review]

Which Way Ethiopia: Revolution, Civil War, or National Reconciliation?

Mesay Kebede — Tue, 21 May 2013 20:12:08 +0000

By Messay Kebede

Since the death of Prime Minister Meles, the political situation of Ethiopia has entered a phase of uncertainty with no clear momentum toward stabilization. Despite predictions of the imminent collapse of the EPRDF, either under the pressure of a popular uprising or splits within its ranks, the political situation shows no sign of heightened challenge to the regime. In fact, it remains a mystery that no political upheavals of any importance occurred following the death of Meles, who was after all the center and the driving force of the whole system. On the other hand, however, notwithstanding an orderly succession, the uncertainty has not been removed and symptoms of unresolved internal conflicts transpire occasionally. Above all, the extent to which the new prime minister is really in charge being anything but assured, the vacillation of the system lingers, given that the entire government was designed to function under the leadership of a strong and unchallenged prime minister.

One thing is sure: the uncertainty cannot go on indefinitely and nothing can be done to improve the political climate and the economic conditions of the country without some reforms. This is to say that change is inevitable and that it will come sooner or later. The question is: which direction is the change likely to take? For my part, I have no desire to play the game of predictions. Instead, I want to present some possible scenarios and invite political leaders and activists who care about Ethiopia to reflect on them so as to be ready for various eventualities instead of being fixated on the outcome that they long for.

Given the amplifying state of frustration of the county, the only way of avoiding ominous developments is not only that the prime minister really exercises power, but that he uses this power to correct some of the glaring derailments of Meles, especially by easing the repressive policy adopted by him. Meles effected the reversal of democratization because he could count on the complete obedience of the repressive machine of the state. Haile Mariam does not have the same control and cannot have it without further empowering the very men who command the repressive apparatuses. In other words, failure to promote reform is for Haile Mariam to give more power to the TPLF instead of reducing it. By contrast, the political choice of easing repression, better still, of initiating reforms reduces the importance of the repressive forces and creates momentum toward the gathering of the popular support and legitimacy that Haile Mariam needs to prevail over Meles’s old clique.

The dilemma of the prime minister is thus clear enough: in order to assert himself, he has to correct Meles’s policy, but in so doing he runs the risk of antagonizing the TPLF and hence of losing his position altogether. Conversely, if he upholds the policy of his predecessor, he simply feeds on the image of a puppet of the TPLF, which image underlines his irrelevance, thereby instigating his removal. Surely, since the longer the policy of Meles continues, the more repressive the state must become, the TPLF will be better off to do the job on its own than to use the cumbersome mediation of a puppet. The dilemma shows that Haile Mariam’s best bet is to go in the direction of easing repression, which at least promises the prospect of him becoming his own man.

The huge unknown is whether Haile Mariam has the right political ambition to want to stand by himself and the political skill to outmaneuver the TPLF and other challengers. I must admit that I have no a ready answer for this question. I also confess my pessimism, even though I recognize that more time is needed before one makes a final judgment. True, I am encouraged by his open condemnation of the displacement of the Amhara settlers, but remain skeptical because of the lack of any practical follow-up to correct the injustice. Moreover, the appalling dismissal of the appeals of Eskinder Nega, Andualem Arage, and other political prisoners by the higher court did nothing to reduce my skepticism. To sum up my position, in light of the time needed for consolidation, I say that Haile Mariam still deserves the benefit of the doubt even if the performances of his government are not, so far, promising.

In case Haile Mariam remains submerged by the TPLF, the scenario of an increasingly repressive government that could only further aggrieve the Ethiopian masses presents itself. My contention is that unless the TPLF takes the rightful place of being a party among others within the coalition of the EPRDF, it cannot maintain the hegemonic role it has played so far without pushing repression to a point far exceeding that of Meles. By force of habit and because of his political shrewdness, Meles was able to rise as the unquestioned leader of the EPRDF. After successive purges of all those who could threaten him, none among the remaining leaders of the TPLF has the stature or even the capacity to command the same authority. Various competitors both within the TPLF and the EPRDF are likely to emerge with the consequence that only through increased repression can one of them prevail.

Needless to say, the pursuit and continuation of the hegemony of the TPLF can only exasperate popular frustration and multiply opposition. Though arrogance inspires the TPLF to think that repression is enough to protect its supremacy, the history of all countries teaches us that a time comes when people rise and confront what repressive them, regardless of the apparent strength of the repressive state. Ethiopia is not going to be an exception to the rule. Hence, my belief that the continuation of the hegemony of the TPLF will inevitably lead to an uprising. The burning question is: will the uprising take the form of a revolution or of an outright civil war?

All those Ethiopians who still hope that Ethiopia will be galvanized by the Arab spring have in mind an uprising leading to revolution, which would essentially consist in the overthrow of the TPLF state and the dismantling of its repressive apparatuses. This outcome appears even more likely in light of the fact that Ethiopia has already gone through a similar process in 1974. For many activists, revolution is the best prospect for Ethiopia and its people, with the hope that this time the mistakes of the 70s will not be committed and the revolution will establish a democratic state.

Here I hasten to express my reservation, which originates from the simple observation that the situation in 1974 was quite different from what Ethiopia is facing today. Indeed, if a reference to the Arab spring is of some use, I will say that what lies ahead is a development that is similar neither to Egypt nor Tunisia. The model we should refer to is that of Libya or, even more correctly, that of Syria. In other words, the likely outcome of a total uprising in Ethiopia is civil war rather than revolution.

What this means is that conflicts and violent clashes will develop, not between a dictatorial state and everybody else, but between a majority and a dictatorial state identifying with the interests of a minority ethnic group. For one of the detrimental results of the ethnicization of the Ethiopian society and the creation of ethnic regions is the clear divide between ethnic groups and the subsequent subsumption of these groups to the privileges and special treatments of local elites. In a situation of wide uprising, the point is easily reached when it becomes difficult to distinguish between the elites and the ethnic groups, which is then a recipe for ethnic confrontations, that is, for civil war.

Though I never endorse the idea that similar conditions entail similar historical outcomes, it would be foolish to think that regularities in history do not operate in some degree. Among the Arab countries that went through a political turmoil, Syria is the one that comes close to the situation of Ethiopia under the TPLF. The bloody conflict in Syria is between the Alawi minority, which controls economic and military apparatuses, and a frustrated majority that is politically and economically marginalized by a dictatorial state serving the interests of the minority. The uprising against Assad and the state failed to be revolution and turned into a civil war because of the fear of the minority that the overthrow of Assad will mean the loss of its political and economic upper hand, not to mention the fear of physical victimization. Even if many in the minority resent the dictatorial rule of Assad, they prefer to stick with him to avoid the likelihood of revengeful treatments.

No one can honestly say that Ethiopia under the TPLF does not show a deepening rift between the majority and the minority ethnic group allegedly represented by the existing regime. Doubtless, some supporters of the regime will argue that the EPRDF is a coalition of different ethnic groups so that Ethiopia is not under a minority rule. But the image of the EPRDF as a coalition of equals fools no one anymore and members of the EPRDF know perfectly well that they are clients of the TPLF, not to say hired mercenaries. The TPLF federation is a smoke screen: not only the major economic assets and the governments of ethnic regions are controlled by the TPLF, but most importantly, the repressive apparatuses, including the higher echelons of the army, are entirely dominated by officers of Tigrean origin.

One condition for a popular uprising to avoid a descent into a civil war is when the army is either paralyzed by divisions or stays neutral. This precipitates the fall of the regime and hence precludes the transformation of revolution into civil war. This was clearly the case in Egypt and Tunisia. But when the army supports the regime against the people in order to perpetuate ethnic domination, the fight is prolonged with the risk of turning into a civil war. In the case of Ethiopia, to maintain that the army will remain neutral if an uprising occurs is little credible. In the 1974 revolution, the regime was overthrown easily because the army did not support it. It was a multiethnic army and as such was not committed to the defense of any particular ethnic group. What Ethiopia has now is not so much a national as an ethnic army, which is then most likely to defend the ruling ethnic elite, thereby pushing the uprising toward a civil war.

While agreeing that the worst outcome would be the beginning of a civil war, most Ethiopians comfort themselves by believing that it is very unlikely. But who said that the worst scenario is unlikely to happen? Accordingly, what we need is realism, that is, a clear and unbiased assessment of the situation so that we can work toward making the worst scenario improbable. Stated otherwise, we should develop a policy of prevention, which is none other than the framing of a government of national reconciliation. Such a government requires crucial concessions from those who control power as well as from those who oppose them. When a country is beset with political problems that are deep and potentially liable to degenerate into armed confrontations, the solution cannot come from the organization of democratic elections. The latter require some degree of consensus and a minimum of impartial arbitration that are inexistent in ethnically polarized countries.

As shown by elections since 2005, the minimum conditions for a democratically elected government do not exist in Ethiopia and are not likely to appear any time soon. The ruling party will do everything to win, including the use of violence and fraudulent manipulations of votes; the opposition will continue to complain without any notable change. Let us admit it, in countries deeply polarized by ethnic or religious issues, where therefore the rule of the minority abiding by the verdict of the majority is not recognized, elections are just powerless to bring about political change.

This does not mean that democratic elections should be abandoned altogether. It simply means that a transitional period, during which mutual confidence, consensus, and healing can be worked out, is necessary. The purpose of a government of national reconciliation is to create the conditions for the establishment of a political system emanating from democratic elections. As a precondition for democracy, such a government is not itself ruled by democratic principles. Rather, its ruling principle is pragmatism: it takes measures from the sole perspective of reconstructing national harmony and consensus, without being disturbed by questions of principles and morality. Its main goal is the provision of incentives for political opponents to come together and establish consensus on some basic issues.

Such reconciliation is based on the premise that a civil war would benefit nobody. From this shared agreement follows the need to take decisive actions to avoid what everybody wants to avoid, the whole purpose being to reach a working mechanism assuring a win-win solution for everybody. Concessions from all competing parties are the ingredients driving the whole process. As such, the process abhors extremisms of all kinds so as to bring about the rule of moderation. Just as the ruling party agrees to share power with the opponents, so too the opponents give up all political vendetta and victimization. This is an important provision: since what prevents members of the ruling party from playing by the rule of democracy is the fear of reprisal against their person and their economic assets, offering an amnesty and a guarantee against economic dispossession is alone liable to institute confidence and reciprocity. For those who argue, in the name of justice, that crimes must be exposed and punished, my answer is that forgiveness and amnesty are morally justified if they allow us to reach the greater good of reconciliation, national unity, and peace.

Some such process of transition could be undertaken under the leadership of Prime Minister Haile Mariam. His weak political position, combined with the lack of extremism and the fact that he represents a minority ethnic group that can serve as a buffer between larger competing groups, gives him a strategic political role. It is to this go-between role that he owes his position as prime minister. To complete his mediating role, which is then his calling, he must now call upon the opposition and place himself between the EPRDF and the opposition and promote the idea of a government of national reconciliation. In so doing, he turns his strategic importance into the legitimacy of a nation-builder.

May wisdom fall on all Ethiopians!

(I can be reached at mkebede1@udayton.edu)

ESAT Ethiopian News – 20 May 2013 (DC)

Zegabi Video — Tue, 21 May 2013 16:30:26 +0000

ESAT Ethiopian News - 20 May 2013 (DC)

Obama is turning the U.S. into a banana republic

Elias Kifle — Tue, 21 May 2013 06:05:25 +0000

The scandals inside the Obama Administration that have recently surfaced are shocking. The scariest them all is Obama justice department's secret access to the private emails of journalists. When I saw Obama bowed down to the scumbag dictator who call...

የህወሃት ማበስበሱ ቁማርና የደኅንነቱ ሚና

Negash — Mon, 20 May 2013 16:13:24 +0000

የቀዩ መስመር ሰላባዎች? By Goolgule.com May 20, 2013 መለስ ህይወታቸው እንዳለፈ ከተሰጡት አስተያየቶችና ትንቢቶች መካከል ቀዳሚው የመለስ ሞት ለህወሃት ጊዜውን ጠብቆ የሚፈነዳ ፈንጂ መሆኑ ነበር። በዚሁ በጎልጉል የድረገጽ ጋዜጣ በስልጣን ላይ ያሉ የኢህአዴግ ዲፕሎማት “መለስ የቆፈሩት ጉድጓድ” በሚል ርዕስ በሰጡት ቃለ ምልልስ ይህ እንደሚከሰት ቁልጭ አድርገው ተናግረው ነበር። መለስ አፍነው የያዟቸው የፖለቲካ ችግሮች ጊዜያቸውን [...]

[Source: Ethiopian Review]

ESAT Week in Review – 19 May 2013

Zegabi Video — Mon, 20 May 2013 06:42:08 +0000

ESAT Week in Review - 19 May 2013

Ethiopia: The Corruption Game

Alemayehu G. Mariam — Mon, 20 May 2013 04:56:22 +0000

House cleaning or window dressing? Are they playing us like a cheap fiddle again? For a while, it was all about the Meles Dam and how to collect nickels and dimes to build it. That kind of played itself out. (Not to worry. That circus will be back in town. The public has the attention [...]

[Source: Ethiopian Review]

ENTC supports peaceful demonstration called by Semayawi Party

EthiopianReview.com — Mon, 20 May 2013 04:43:42 +0000

ENTC issued a statement supporting the peaceful demonstration called by Semayawi Party in Ethiopia. In its statement, it urged all Ethiopians to support the move and voice their questions and concerns using the platform. Read the statement here (pdf) [Source: Ethiopian Review]

[Source: Ethiopian Review]

Ethiopia’s regime moves 20 political prisoners to a remote location ahead of U.S. Secretary of State arrival in Addis Ababa

Elias Kifle — Sun, 19 May 2013 06:39:14 +0000

The Woyanne junta has moved 20 prominent political prisoners, including journalist Woubshet Taye, to a remote prison camp in southern Ethiopia yesterday. The families of the political prisoners were not notified before the prisoners were taken to a pr...

What can we do to contribute to the success of the May 25 protest?

Elias Kifle — Sun, 19 May 2013 00:49:18 +0000

The May 25 peaceful protest that is called by Semayawi Party is a success even before it is held. The call for the protest itself is exposing the savage nature of the Woyanne junta. Instead of acting like spectators, what can Ethiopians in the Diaspor...

EYNM supports the peaceful protest called by Semayawi Party in Addis Ababa on 25 may 2013

Elias Kifle — Sat, 18 May 2013 20:00:22 +0000

Ethiopian Youth National Movement (EYNM) expresses support for the peaceful protest called by Semayawi Party in Addis Ababa on 25 may 2013. Click here for the details

Millions of dollars found at the residence of late dictator Meles Zenawi’s close friend and confidant (video)

Elias Kifle — Fri, 17 May 2013 07:26:52 +0000

Police seized millions of dollars from the private residence of Gebrewahid Woldegiorgis, a close friend and confidant of the late Ethiopian dictator Meles Zenawi this week. If Gebrewahid has kept this much money in his residence, one can imagine how m...

ESAT Ethiopian News – 15 May 2013 (Amsterdam )

Zegabi Video — Thu, 16 May 2013 18:26:52 +0000

ESAT Ethiopian News - 15 May 2013 (Amsterdam )

ESAT Ethiopian News – 15 May 2013 (DC)

Zegabi Video — Thu, 16 May 2013 18:26:51 +0000

ESAT Ethiopian News - 15 May 2013 (DC)

John Kerry’s Ethiopia Opportunity

Martin — Wed, 15 May 2013 21:45:02 +0000

By MARTIN SCHIBBYE AND PATRICK GRIFFITHThis month, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry will travel to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to attend the 21st African Union (AU) summit. The message he brings will speak volumes about the future of American engagement ...

Keep your eyes on the prize.

Yilma Bekele — Wed, 15 May 2013 16:10:34 +0000

Keep your eyes on the prize. By Yilma Bekele We are witnessing a flurry of news from the TPLF party that calls itself the Ethiopian government. Why is the Woyane party so busy and why is the party pushing its cadres to be super active is a good question. That is what piqued my interest [...]

[Source: Ethiopian Review]

በኢንቨስትመንት ስም የሚፈጸም የመሬት ነጠቃ በኢትዮጵያ

Negash — Wed, 15 May 2013 10:59:10 +0000

የኦክላንድ ተቋምና ለአዲሲቷ ኢትዮጵያ የጋራ ንቅናቄ ለአዲሲቷ ኢትዮጵያ የጋራ ንቅናቄ May 14, 2013 በኢንቨስትመንት ስም የአገር ሃብትና ትውልድን እየበላ ስላለው የመሬት ነጠቃ አስመልክቶ የኦክላንድ ተቋምና ድርጅታችን ለአዲሲቷ ኢትዮጵያ የጋራ ንቅናቄ በጋራ ያዘጋጁት ጥናታዊ ዘገባ ይፋ ሆነ። የጋራ ንቅናቄያችን ዋና ዳይሬክተር ጥናቱ በትክክለኛ ጭብጥ ላይ ተመስርቶ እንዲዘጋጅ ለህይወታቸው ሳይሳሱ መረጃ በመስጠት ለተባበሩ ዜጎች “ታላቅ ክብር [...]

[Source: Ethiopian Review]

Ethiopian Federal Police trooper who gunned down 12 civilians in Bahr Dar found dead (video)

Zegabi Video — Wed, 15 May 2013 05:56:07 +0000

Woyanne policeman who gunned down 12 civilians in the northwestern Ethiopian city of Bahr Dar found dead in a river on 14 May 2013.

Massive number of soldiers pour in to Addis Ababa in preparation for AU meeting

Elias Kifle — Tue, 14 May 2013 20:24:19 +0000

The Woyannes are always fearful and nervous because they know that they are hated by the people, but this year they are taking their fear to the extreme. They are amassing tanks and heavily armed troops near and inside Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa i...

Federal police trooper killed 18 civilians in northwestern Ethiopia

Zegabi Video — Mon, 13 May 2013 19:04:03 +0000

Federal police trooper killed 18 civilians in northwestern Ethiopia

40 people arrested in Gondar, nothern Ethiopia

ESAT — Mon, 13 May 2013 18:49:46 +0000

ESAT News May 12, 2013

Over 40 people have been arrested in a mass arrest spreeby the Ethiopian Defense Forces after people protested in the Bona Woredaof North Gonder on May 8, 2013. Eight people have been injured due to beating by the Defense Forces.

The protest began after the residents learnt that an investor in the area nicknamed Bedele was planning to fence a stream that the people of the area use as drinking water and turn it into a pond for his cattle. As people started to protest, the investor called the Defense Forces from the Sereba area barrack to take action on the people.

Forty people have been taken to an undisclosed location. The investor who is also said to be a government official has also reportedly invited some members of the Defense Forces to lunch and dined with him.

Bona is a town located 40 Kms from Gonder city. ESAT’s effort to speak to officials of the town was unsuccessful.

http://ethsat.com/2013/05/13/mass-arres ... th-gonder/

Edu-corruption and Mis-education in Ethiopia

Alemayehu G. Mariam — Mon, 13 May 2013 05:16:44 +0000

Educorruption and the miseducation of Ethiopian youth “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world,” said Nelson Mandela. For the late Meles Zenawi and his apostles (the Melesistas) in Ethiopia, the reverse is true: Ignorance is the most powerful weapon you can use to prevent change and cling to [...]

[Source: Ethiopian Review]

ESAT Week in Review – 10 May 2013

Zegabi Video — Mon, 13 May 2013 04:54:38 +0000

ESAT Week in Review - 10 May 2013