As Executive Director of the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), Tesfaye Gemechu operates in one of the most polarized and perilous spaces in the country—a place where both the government and opposition accuse one another of committing grave abuses, and often accuse EHRCO itself of bias or selective silence. Since stepping into the top role in late 2024, after nearly four years as deputy executive director, Tesfaye has led the Council through an era marked by shrinking civic space, escalating conflicts, and growing risks for those who seek to document violations.
Although he began his career in grassroots public health work before shifting into rights advocacy, Tesfaye’s dedication has placed in charge of EHRCO’s nationwide monitoring and investigation operations. He works under increasingly difficult conditions, from navigating government permissions and security blockades to confronting donor-driven geographic priorities. Tesfaye, who did three masters degrees, has wide range of experiences leading employees’ rights body, as well as international program office coordinator; before joining EHRCO. In this conversation with The Reporter’s Nardos Yoseph, Tesfaye reflects on the meaning of neutrality in a polarized Ethiopia, the obstacles to independent investigation, the troubling effects of upcoming CSO legislation, and the difficulties of documenting abuses in conflict zones. EXCERPTS:
The Reporter: Given the increasing polarization in Ethiopia, how does the Ethiopian Human Rights Council maintain neutrality when both government and opposition accuse one another of rights violations—and accuse EHRCO of selective silence?
Tesfaye Gemechu: We do our investigations independently. The biggest challenge we face now is that, whether it’s from the government or other actors, unless what you say aligns with their interests, they don’t want to believe you are independent. We see this on our social media pages: if a report comes out about Oromia, some other organizations will write, “You’re on their side.”
Sometimes people comment without following our work closely. There are also cases where people confuse the Ethiopian Human Rights Council with the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission. And there are situations where remaining silent is seen as complicity. This is one of the problems polarization has created.
There are also times when our statements are interpreted in a way that makes it seem we are not independent—depending on how people want to interpret them. But from our side, for any human rights organization, one of the core principles of a human rights institution is to be free and independent; free from any faith, political ideology, or other influence. We believe in that, and there is no special bias on our part.
That said, I have to admit: the government also often feels the same way. In recent years, both the government and opposition groups have accused each other of committing human rights violations.
So, in the middle of that, how do we maintain neutrality? It’s difficult, honestly. Because what does neutrality mean? It depends on who defines it—everyone thinks their position is neutral.
For us, neutrality means standing on the issue itself. If a human rights violation occurred, you stand on that fact. You refer to the actor who committed it—you indicate the body responsible. That might be ‘A,’ it might be ‘B,’ it might be Abebe or Abebech. But by standing there, you’re not automatically siding with one party.
The real challenge is that the violating party wants to believe it has done nothing wrong, so when you point it out, they frame it as if you are siding with the other party. That process of reinterpreting the facts is what changes the perception. But from our side, there’s no other guiding agenda—we simply follow and uphold that principle.
Recent reports point to ongoing human rights abuses in parts of Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray. Has EHRCO been able to independently assess and verify these incidents? If not, who or what is obstructing your access?
In conflict-affected areas, our biggest challenge right now is security. There is also an issue of permission. The situations in which these violations occur vary—in some places, they are committed by government forces; in others, by local armed groups; and in some cases, by irregular actors. To properly distinguish these, being on the ground is essential.
Most of the time, however, our main difficulty is the inability to conduct full investigations, because we must adhere to the ‘No Harm’ principle—ensuring the safety of both our staff and our investigators. This limits our ability to collect the necessary and reliable data for confirmation. Nevertheless, we try to continue investigations through various alternatives. What we are finding is deeply concerning — serious violations affecting communities: children unable to attend school, farmers unable to harvest or eat, people unable to move freely from place to place.
As we noted in a report released some months ago, there have even been cases where humanitarian workers were attacked, their mobile app accounts hacked, and funds stolen. This is one of the specific challenges in conflict zones — people’s neutrality is not respected. For example, in some places, if someone is taken in by government forces, the opposing armed group accuses them of being a collaborator; if they are taken in by the armed group, the government accuses them in turn. In both cases, civilians bear the suffering, and human rights violations occur.
To return to your main point, yes, we are struggling to conduct adequate investigations. There are restrictions, but we use different approaches to work around them.
The restrictions include, first, security constraints on moving freely in affected areas; second, legal and informal limitations—for example, while our mandate comes from Proclamation No. 1113/2019 on civil society organizations, in practice, we often must get approval from local government bodies to investigate, and they are not always willing to grant it. We also have limited capacity in terms of personnel, and when situations are this volatile, we lack the means to conduct satellite-based or other highly modern investigative methods.
Transportation, security blockades, and other logistical barriers further complicate our work. The alternatives we use involve reaching victims from neighboring accessible areas, or interviewing them via phone or other safe, tamper-proof communication channels. In some cases, this allows us to verify at least part of the incidents through methods suitable to our circumstances.
Human rights reports in Ethiopia tend to focus on three regions—Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray. Is there a reason for this? There have been conflicts in southern Ethiopia, for example. Have you looked into those as well?
Yes. The main issue is that donors often have specific geographic priorities. Donor-driven funding is a reality. So, while there is high-profile attention on those well-known conflict areas, our mandate and coverage are broader. We work in any area we can reach.
For example, we have offices in Hawassa and Arba Minch. That means our geographic coverage in the South includes the Sidama region and surrounding districts. In Hawassa’s case, we mainly monitor the surrounding district; in Arba Minch’s case, we focus on the nearby areas, including broader Southern Ethiopia.
Within that scope, we have seen many different problems. For instance, during the conflicts in Konso and nearby areas—before the region was restructured—we did significant work in Ale, Derashe, Burji, and Amaro. The area was extremely dangerous at that time.
However, by engaging local communities, from grassroots to leadership, through a project called One Peace, One Chance for Peace, we were able to conduct investigations and develop recommendations. We then followed through on some of those recommendations with practical activities.
Even now, we continue to monitor other challenges and human rights violations in these areas, and we report on them over extended periods. We have been gathering and processing information for upcoming reports. So, if some of our work in certain areas hasn’t been publicly visible yet, it’s because we are still compiling the data, not because we are ignoring any region.
The expanded government oversight and registration hurdles proposed in a draft proclamation governing civil society organizations have caused alarm. Do you believe this law will enhance accountability—or is it a veiled attempt to reintroduce the restrictive environment we saw under the Charities and Societies Proclamation of 2009?
This draft proclamation on civil society organizations, in our view, would largely curtail the freedoms that CSOs previously enjoyed. The government says it is revising the law to make oversight more effective, but from our perspective, we have to look closely at what exactly is being changed. We do not oppose oversight; in fact, all operations should be legal, so we have no problem with legitimate monitoring.
However, we must examine the specific provisions being amended. For example, the composition of the CSO Board used to include 11 members, but now it has been reduced to seven. And it’s not just the reduction in number—there is now no representation for persons with disabilities, no representation for women, and none for other marginalized groups that should have a seat at the table. It was very inclusive. Making it less inclusive is, in our view, a major flaw.
The CSO voice in this body will now be very limited—only two people can represent CSOs in the executive organ. This is troubling. Under the new draft, if a CSO submits a complaint and the Board decides against it, that decision becomes final—it cannot be appealed in court. This is, in our view, unconstitutional.
The draft also grants the power to shut down an organization without evidence, even without due process, and even revoke its license without a proper hearing. These kinds of restrictive provisions could easily be used to prevent CSOs from operating freely. In many ways, it rolls back the rights granted under Proclamation 1113/2019.
Even though the draft has now been published, there are still concerning provisions—like the limits on CSO participation in political advocacy and the electoral process. While the text does not outright ban direct involvement, it could be interpreted to hold not only the CSO itself accountable but also any organization that supports or works with it. Given the lack of resources inside the country, such restrictions could effectively bar CSOs from monitoring elections or engaging in related activities.
From the oversight angle, one of the biggest issues for us is representation. Many conflicts in this country are rooted in equality and inclusion issues. So why deliberately exclude women, persons with disabilities, and marginalized groups from the Board? What is the justification? So far, no convincing reason has been given, and we are still discussing this.
We are pushing for changes—not because we have seen a clear and fixed government position, but because we believe these provisions must be corrected. The Civil Society Council is also working on this agenda, and as the Consortium of Human Rights Organizations, we are engaging with the Ministry of Justice to make the law more inclusive. Representation is a fundamental matter—without it, the work of the Board will be compromised.
We also question the initial motivation for these changes. What was the first challenge that supposedly made this amendment necessary? From a rights perspective, what was the original problem? We do not believe the justifications are convincing. But since it’s still under discussion and not yet finalized, we are hopeful—just as we saw with the election-related provisions—that such restrictive clauses can still be revised in a positive way.
Was EHRCO or any major human rights CSO meaningfully consulted during the drafting of the new law? What recommendations did you submit—and were they taken seriously?
To be clear, we haven’t had direct one-on-one discussions with the Ministry of Justice or the Authority for Civil Society Organizations (ACSO) on this issue. However, as I mentioned earlier, there is the Consortium of Ethiopian Human Rights Organizations [ESHRDC or CERO], and through that platform, we have been submitting our concerns. Through ACSO as well, we’ve been raising questions; consultations and meetings have been organized in various formats. But there has been no direct engagement between us and the Ministry of Justice.
That said, we are making efforts through the channels available to us, with two main objectives: first, to ensure that there is proper representation, and second, to prevent these kinds of restrictions from gradually shrinking civic space over time. That’s the perspective we have, and we believe that by engaging now, we can make timely changes.
On the oversight side, for example, if there is a legitimate need to monitor an organization, we agree that monitoring should be done in a legal and proper manner. If the work is not in line with the law, then yes, oversight is necessary—and strengthening that aspect is not inherently a bad thing.
However, beyond that, certain provisions could restrict our ability to freely conduct advocacy work or carry out investigations. If our ability to operate freely is curtailed, then over time organizations will weaken, and this will have a significant impact on the overall health of civil society organizations in the country. That is our concern.
The overarching goal of EHRCO is to uphold human rights, protect democratic freedoms, and defend the rule of law. These proposed restrictions could gradually diminish civic space and intimidate active citizens.
Journalists, political commentators, and civil society actors continue to face arbitrary detention and intimidation. Is EHRCO documenting these instances? How many cases have you verified in the past 12 months?
Over the past year, we have consistently released reports on journalists’ arrests and related restrictions. There are documented cases where individuals were disciplined for carrying out legitimate work, and in some instances, due process has been followed—but the broader context is highly polarized, and interpretation of the rules is often inconsistent.
Our reporting shows that while legal monitoring of organizations can be legitimate if done properly, excessive restrictions risk undermining the freedom of advocacy and investigative work. In practical terms, the government’s influence is significant, and some freedoms that existed previously are now curtailed. The intention behind these proposed regulations may not be malicious, but their effect could unintentionally—or intentionally—restrict civic freedoms.
Thus, our approach has been to document, caution, and informally engage where possible to preserve the vitality of civil society. Any action to suspend or dissolve organizations must be guided by proper legal procedures; we do not see this as inherently harmful if the law is followed, but arbitrary application could create significant challenges for rights-based work.
Ethiopia now hosts one of Africa’s largest internally displaced populations. In regions like Benishangul, Oromia, and Amhara, are you seeing patterns of ethnic profiling or state-sanctioned evictions?
In regions like Benishangul, Oromia, and Amhara, there are indeed concerns about ethnic profiling and state-influenced displacement. To assess such issues properly, one must rely on clear, evidence-based documentation. For instance, people who left Oromia after residing there for a long period are, in many cases, Amhara. So this does suggest a pattern that warrants attention.
In Benishangul, the situation is more mixed; people from different ethnic backgrounds, including Oromo and Amhara, are affected. Some displacements may be incidental, others may be intentional. Overall, people are moving from one area to another, often in difficult circumstances that affect their ability to live and integrate safely. Some communities have relocated over long distances, and in some cases, their ethnic identity has been a factor in how they were treated.
Language and local knowledge can also play a role: individuals who do not speak the local language may find it difficult to integrate, creating additional vulnerabilities. These dynamics sometimes make it challenging for families to communicate or access support in new locations.
From my perspective, the key question is: who is affected and why? While some relocations may be accidental, others are influenced by ethnicity, creating deeper social and political tensions. These issues are particularly significant where historical settlement and movement patterns intersect with ongoing ethnic tensions.
Methodologically, investigating these matters requires careful, professional study. It is not something that can be resolved with casual observation. This is a highly complex situation, and addressing it effectively demands specialized expertise and sustained effort. The challenge is immense, and even with the best intentions, accurately documenting these dynamics is difficult under current conditions.
There have been repeated reports, especially in Tigray and parts of Oromia, of humanitarian aid being diverted, blocked, or politicized. Has EHRCO been able to investigate these claims independently?
Yes, we are able to monitor these situations to some extent, but conducting a fully independent investigation is very challenging. Our findings show that humanitarian support reaches the intended recipients only in limited ways, and often there are obstacles that prevent aid from reaching those in need.
In some cases, aid is diverted, blocked, or otherwise politicized, but it is not always clear whether this is intentional or the result of logistical and security challenges. Evidence collected through our investigations indicates that multiple actors are involved in these disruptions.
The situation is particularly difficult in areas like Tigray and parts of Oromia, where access is limited and security risks are high. Humanitarian organizations, even if willing, face serious challenges in reaching affected populations.
Historically, government interventions and bureaucratic hurdles have complicated aid delivery, and current conditions remain precarious. The practical effect is that aid may not reach some people at all, or arrive with significant delays. It is a sensitive and complex matter that requires careful documentation and professional investigation to fully understand.
We are preparing a full report that will provide a detailed account of the situation at every location. Monitoring and documentation work is ongoing.
For example, repeated visits to temporary shelters reveal extremely concerning conditions. Many people are crammed into overcrowded spaces, with inadequate facilities and little protection. Even before legal processes or formal complaints begin, detainees or displaced persons often endure long periods under stress, and their basic needs are neglected.
In some cases, the lack of oversight leads to repeated violations, including shortages of sleeping spaces and essential services. People are sometimes forced to sleep in overcrowded conditions, with their belongings piled on top of each other. These situations persist for extended periods, and our fieldwork has documented numerous related problems across different areas.
What is the status of EHRCO’s prison monitoring work? Are there specific institutions or regions that raise red flags?
One of the key areas of our work is monitoring detention centers and prisons. We conduct visits to these facilities at different times, even when officials are not always cooperative. In some facilities, people are held for extended periods—sometimes weeks—without being brought before a court. Overcrowding is widespread, and men and women detainees are sometimes kept together in ways that are unsafe or compromise their personal security. There are also situations where children are held with their parents, without dedicated spaces suitable for minors.
Food provision and other basic services are often inadequate. In some prisons, the allocation of food is so limited that it barely meets needs, especially when small numbers of detainees are concentrated in a single facility. Reports tell us the food rationing is better when the prison is full. This overcrowding can also limit access to education or skills training programs.
Psychological and mental health effects are serious, particularly for children and vulnerable detainees. Our recommendations include ensuring that children are not held with adult detainees and that detention spaces are adapted to meet their specific needs. Wherever possible, detention conditions should be separated by age and gender and provide adequate access to basic necessities.
We also recommend that government and humanitarian organizations expand or improve detention facilities to meet these minimum standards. Our monitoring confirms that, in many locations, serious human rights concerns persist, including violations of fundamental rights, inadequate oversight, and unsafe conditions.
The Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission claims to be inclusive. But many groups—including opposition parties and armed actors—remain excluded. What’s EHRCO’s assessment of the dialogue’s legitimacy from a human rights standpoint?
The national dialogue is very important for Ethiopia. We believe it is necessary and timely. In principle, it should be inclusive, involving all domestic actors and even relevant actors abroad who have stakes in the country’s affairs. When we look at the process, there are sometimes encouraging signs, but there are also setbacks. For instance, some political parties may participate actively at first but later withdraw, which undermines the practical effectiveness of the dialogue.
From a human rights perspective, the dialogue cannot fully resolve the country’s challenges if key groups are excluded. Therefore, it is critical that the Commission provides opportunities for all actors to participate meaningfully. This includes both domestic participants and members of the diaspora. The Commission should also ensure that dialogue is conducted freely and independently, and that necessary support is provided to participants, even if they face pressure or conflict.
Some parts of the process are concerning. For example, certain groups remain excluded, and in some areas, the agenda is too rigid, which limits meaningful discussion. The country has been through prolonged crises, and a strong, flexible agenda is needed to address longstanding problems. We have recently issued statements emphasizing that human rights principles, such as those enshrined in the Pretoria Agreement, must be implemented.
Tigray’s exclusion is particularly troubling. The dialogue lacks legitimacy if regions like Tigray do not participate, as their involvement is essential for any nationally accepted solution. Meaningful participation remains limited. Without such inclusion, the dialogue cannot achieve peace, and it will fail to provide the country with the conditions needed for lasting stability. Our belief is that the commission must do everything within its power to create an environment that enables all actors to participate and helps the country move toward peace and reconciliation.
There have been persistent allegations of extrajudicial killings by federal and regional forces. What steps has EHRCO taken to investigate and publicize these cases—and how do you respond to accusations of timidity when it comes to naming perpetrators?
It is true that we have had opportunities to follow up on these cases, but sometimes our work has been constrained. We operate under certain limitations, and it is important to recognize those boundaries. Within those limits, we record and document extrajudicial killings as thoroughly as possible.
We maintain careful records of incidents, aiming to preserve evidence that could later support transitional justice processes. Our intention is to ensure accountability for those responsible, even if immediate identification of the perpetrators is not always feasible. The constraints we face—such as access challenges and security risks—sometimes prevent us from naming individuals directly, but we document the incidents in a way that can be useful in the future.
It is also important to note that human rights violations are often complex, with multiple layers of harm. For example, a case of gender-based violence may have long-term generational impacts beyond the immediate act. We take such factors into consideration, documenting both the immediate violation and its broader consequences.
Ultimately, our approach is cautious but deliberate. We aim to balance the need for accurate documentation with the practical realities of the environment we operate in. Our work ensures that, when conditions allow, these documented violations can serve as a foundation for holding perpetrators accountable through transitional justice or other mechanisms.
EHRCO is expected to play a key role in Ethiopia’s transitional justice process. But victims and advocacy groups say there’s a lack of political will and judicial independence. Is genuine accountability possible?
In our view, a positive approach to transitional justice is possible, but it depends on how much leverage we ourselves can exercise. Even if a process can bring some accountability, under the current conditions it has limited value. Our work focuses on documenting data and preserving evidence so that accountability can be possible when the process begins.
The people who will implement transitional justice are professionals with experience, and inclusivity is essential. For example, methods used in other countries, such as in South Africa, can provide useful lessons. The process must be inclusive to produce meaningful accountability; without that, mere reconciliation or declared peace cannot achieve justice.
We believe that a well-designed logic for transitional justice can indeed bring accountability. However, the exact percentage of accountability it will achieve is uncertain—it depends on multiple factors. What we can do is ensure that when the process starts, evidence is ready, and all relevant actors are positioned to be held accountable.
Even under a new government, transitional justice will have its own character, but the ultimate goal remains the same: to ensure that all perpetrators can be held accountable once sufficient evidence is collected. This objective, overall, is achievable if the process is properly documented.
Regional officials have repeatedly denied or delayed access for EHRCO investigations. What does this say about federal-regional coordination on rights issues? Have you documented cases of obstruction?
In different areas, repeatedly or otherwise, there have been instances where access is hindered. Essentially, when regional authorities are approached, we submit formal letters and follow up to ensure they are aware of our requests. Sometimes, when regions receive these requests, they may want to cooperate, but in practice, freedom of operation is limited. Our aim is to enable investigators to work freely, but there are obstacles.
We try to maintain records of these obstructions to the extent possible. For example, when we send personnel to certain locations, officials often refuse permission, or they only partially cooperate. Even when we attempt direct engagement—through offices, fieldwork, or meetings with local authorities—sometimes our efforts are blocked or delayed. This recently happened in Borena, Oromia. Nonetheless, we continue to document and pursue access, as these efforts are necessary to uphold accountability.
