A Flawed Foundation
Ethiopia’s quest for sovereign access to the Red Sea is a defining issue for the Horn of Africa. It is not a new ambition, but a call to correct a profound historical and legal injustice. This injustice is rooted in two fundamental flaws: first, the rigid, unthinking application of a colonial boundary that defies economic, human, and geographic logic; and second, a 1993 separation process that was overseen by a temporary government with no popular or legal mandate to sign away the nation’s permanent access to the sea.
For millennia, Ethiopian civilizations were maritime powers. The Axumite Empire, for example, built its global influence from its Red Sea ports like Adulis. This ancient status was undone by a modern process that lacked legitimacy. The result is the world’s most populous landlocked nation, a status that acts as an “economic straitjacket” and a source of permanent instability for the region.
This quest is therefore about more than economics. It is about correcting a historical wrong. It is about challenging a flawed colonial line that arbitrarily divides a people—the Afar—across a border they do not recognize. And it is about appealing to a higher principle of international equity, one that prioritizes a just and lasting solution over the precarious foundations of a temporary government’s overreach.
A Decision Without a Mandate: The Illegitimacy of 1993
The process that led to Ethiopia’s current landlocked status in 1993 was profoundly illegitimate from the Ethiopian perspective. The decision to allow Eritrea’s separation without securing Ethiopia’s coastal rights was presided over by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE).
This government was, by definition, a temporary, unelected coalition of rebel fronts formed after the fall of the Derg regime in 1991. Its primary purpose was to stabilize the country and pave the way for a new constitution and democratic elections. The TGE was never given a mandate by the Ethiopian people to decide on the permanent redrawing of the nation’s borders or the surrender of its sovereign access to the sea.
Such a foundational, irreversible decision should have been reserved for a democratically elected government and subjected to a national referendum within Ethiopia. Instead, it was a permanent decision made by a temporary government.
Compounding this failure of mandate was a clear conflict of interest. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), the very group seeking independence, was simultaneously a key and powerful actor within the Ethiopian transitional process. This meant one party was essentially helping to dictate the terms of its own separation from a state whose long-term national interests were not being legitimately represented.
This was a legal and moral failure. For a provisional government to authorize the permanent economic strangulation of its nation is a dereliction of its custodial duty. The process lacked constitutional legitimacy. It was a political arrangement between victorious rebel leaders, not a sustainable legal settlement between sovereign peoples. A decision of this magnitude, made without the consent of the Ethiopian populace, cannot be considered the final, just, or legitimate word on the nation’s destiny.
The Price of a Line: Economic Strangulation and a People Divided
The consequences of this illegitimate decision are felt every day. Geographically, it created the “world’s most populous landlocked country”. Economically, it put Ethiopia in an “economic straitjacket”, forcing it to pay over a billion and a half dollars annually to use foreign ports. This crippling cost drains national resources and subordinates Ethiopia’s economic destiny to its neighbours.
Nowhere is this illogic more visible than the Port of Assab. The Ethiopian case for Assab is not just about a historical claim, but about its inseparable link to the Afar people. The current border is an artificial administrative convenience from the colonial era. It arbitrarily split the Afar people, severing their cultural and economic ties.
The Afar homeland is not confined by this modern border; it stretches from Djibouti, through Assab, and deep into Ethiopia. Assab’s natural hinterland is Afar territory within Ethiopia, not the Eritrean highlands. Therefore, to deny Ethiopia access to Assab is also to deny the Afar people their most logical and historical connection to the sea and violates the rights of an indigenous people whose land was divided without their consent.
This port, which Ethiopia’s claim centres on, has a distinct history. It was developed by and for Ethiopia. The majority of investment in the port, the refinery, and the vital road infrastructure connecting it to the heartland was driven by Ethiopia. For the entire second half of the 20th century, Assab functioned as Ethiopia’s primary commercial and naval port. Today, this port– developed with Ethiopian resources to serve the Ethiopian economy – now lies largely dormant. It stands as a stark symbol of a separation that was not only illogical but was enacted without legitimate authority.
A Tale of Two Laws: Why Pragmatism Must Supersede Rigidity
The main obstacle to correcting this historical flaw is the rigid application of colonial boundaries, often defended by the legal principle of uti possidetis juris (the sanctity of colonial borders) and the “final and binding” 2002 ruling of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC).
However, the legal history of this very region offers a wiser, more pragmatic precedent.
When the United Nations decided the fate of the former Italian colonies after World War II, the principle of uti possidetis juris was neither applied nor mentioned. The international community at the time understood that forcing a flawed colonial map onto a complex region was a recipe for instability. The UN’s mandate was political and pragmatic, not based on a pre-existing legal rule on borders.
In fact, the most prominent solutions considered were the very antithesis of uti possidetis juris, including partitioning Eritrea between Ethiopia and Sudan or a full “Union of Eritrea… with Ethiopia”. The final solution, UN Resolution 390 (V) in 1950, which federated the two, was a “political compromise”. Its preamble explicitly recognized “Ethiopia’s legitimate need for adequate access to the sea”. This was a successful model” that prioritized regional economic viability and security over an arbitrary line.
In stark contrast, the 2002 EEBC ruling represents a blind application of those same colonial-era boundaries. This legal rigidity ignored the successful 1950s precedent and created a manifest injustice. The Ethiopian argument holds that international law must be flexible enough to correct historical errors and appeal to broader principles of equity. When a strict legal ruling leads to a grossly inequitable and unworkable outcome – like the economic and security strangulation of a major nation – principles of justice must allow for its modification. The survival and stability of the Ethiopian state is a more fundamental principle than the permanent enforcement of a flawed colonial line.
A Way Forward
The current call for sea access must not be perceived as invalidating Eritrean sovereignty or a prelude to war. It is an urgent call to rectify the profound flaws of the 1993 separation and an appeal for a rational, 21st Century dialogue based on mutual benefit. The goal is a new, creative, and legitimate arrangement – a lease, a special economic corridor, a port ownership stake or, perhaps, land swap – that finally and justly addresses Ethiopia’s fundamental need for the sea. The peoples of the region deserve a future based on sustainable agreements, not on the unworkable rigidity of a colonial line.
A secure and economically vibrant Ethiopia with its own port is a benefit to the entire Horn of Africa. It would de-escalate regional tensions, boost trade, and create a more balanced and stable power dynamic. An economically constrained and “geographically imprisoned” Ethiopia, on the other hand, will always remain a source of potential instability. For the sake of lasting peace and shared prosperity, it is time for the region and the world to seriously consider Ethiopia’s enduring and just quest for a return to the Red Sea.
Yonas Tesfa Sisay (PhD) is an attorney-at-law and legal consultant.
Contributed by Yonas Tesfa Sisay (PhD)
