Human Rights First Ethiopia is one of the thousands of civil society organizations (CSO) operating in Ethiopia. Although it appeared on the scene relatively recently, gaining its permit in August 2022, the organization’s membership is composed of licensed attorneys and former federal officials who have been supporting vulnerable communities for years.
Human Rights First primarily focuses on raising awareness and providing legal assistance to marginalized groups, particularly Tigrayans affected by conflict and systemic discrimination.
Tesfalem Berhe Masa, the organization’s Director, brings extensive experience to the role, having served as a judge in Tigray, a federal prosecutor, and, currently, as a practicing attorney in the federal court system.
In this interview with The Reporter’s Nardos Yoseph, Tesfalem speaks about Ethiopia’s worrying human rights landscape, the many challenges facing civil society organizations, the shortcomings of transitional justice mechanisms in the post-war context, and shares some of the successes Human Rights First has enjoyed over the years. EXCERPTS:
The Reporter: How would you assess the current state of human rights protection in Ethiopia, particularly in conflict-affected areas and regions experiencing political instability?
Tesfalem Berhe: It is difficult to describe the current human rights situation in Ethiopia as one that can be assessed freely or fairly. To measure it meaningfully, we must rely on specific indicators. Based on those, we’re witnessing what can only be described as systemic violations of human rights.
In regions like Oromia, Amhara, and Tigray, as well as other localities, there has been widespread and prolonged abuse—some cases stretching back six or seven years. The scale of violations is significant and deeply concerning.
Another major issue is the stifling of civil society organizations. While some have managed to recover, many others were shut down or pushed to the brink before they had a chance to make an impact. This tells its own story.
Discrimination has become another huge issue. Let me give a recent example: Ethiopian Airlines issued job vacancy announcements for multiple universities. However, they explicitly excluded universities in Tigray and in two other southern regional states. This is a policy decision. As a civil society organization, we reached out to Ethiopian Airlines via email to ask about the matter. They suggested an in-person meeting and set a date, but never followed up or responded. From this, we concluded that the airline was unwilling to provide a proper answer.
Another metric we use to assess the human rights environment is the lack of accountability. Many violations have been documented across different areas, but those responsible rarely face justice. This lack of consequences perpetuates a cycle of impunity, encouraging further abuse.
This is evident in the widespread displacement and return-related abuses. People displaced by war have returned home, only to be sent back to camps within a month. These reversals reflect a broader pattern of human rights backsliding.
Taken together, all these indicators paint a grim picture. Ethiopia’s human rights situation has reached a deeply troubling stage. Unless the government takes swift, serious, and corrective action to separate these issues and respond appropriately, the country risks descending further into a widespread and entrenched human rights crisis.
What has been your organization’s most impactful intervention or advocacy success to date? Can you elaborate on the context and outcome?
As a human rights advocate, the most important thing is getting your voice heard. Period. Even when everything is silent and people are being harmed, no one will speak unless someone dares to break the silence. Sometimes, even the government may not be aware of what’s happening unless it’s brought to light. So when human rights organizations make their voices heard, it allows the issue to move forward. That’s how solutions emerge, by helping people understand what’s actually happening.
Often, when people hear about human rights institutions, they think we are anti-government. But that’s not true. We actually consider ourselves as partners in the pursuit of justice and accountability.
Your organization has published numerous reports and statements on various issues. Is there a specific case where going public resulted in meaningful change?
Yes, we believe there are cases where our work has led to significant change. One of our broad initiatives came after the Pretoria Peace Agreement was signed to end the northern conflict. Following that, we took on several issues. For example, at one point, Ethiopian Airlines had imposed an age restriction on travelers from Tigray Region. We challenged this through legal action and advocacy, and as a result, the age ban was lifted. There was also discrimination in pricing—residents from that region were charged significantly higher fares. That, too, was corrected quickly after we raised the issue.
We also intervened in the cases of Tigrayan-origin police officers from Addis Ababa and federal forces who had been removed from their posts. Many of them have now been reinstated to their jobs as a result of our advocacy.
In addition, we worked on cases involving detained former military personnel. We brought their cases all the way to the Ministry of Justice and relevant security agencies. By amplifying their voices and drawing attention to their plight, we were able to get the government to focus on the matter. As a result, most of them have been released, though a few still remain in custody.
We’ve worked on many issues where our evidence-based reports have contributed directly to real change.
At present, CSOs like yours appear capable of carrying out their work. However, there are reports that many other CSOs are operating under increasingly constrained conditions—some even say they have been forced to halt operations in the past six months. How do you interpret this contrast? Would you say the civic space is expanding or shrinking?
From my perspective, CSOs are operating in an environment that is still largely detached from political affairs. For instance, the kind of work our organization has been able to accomplish since the peace agreement would have been unthinkable during the war in Tigray. That said, when you look at the current volatile situation across the country—especially the conflict in the Amhara region—you see activities being conducted in a way that increasingly intersects with politics. There have indeed been instances where CSOs were suppressed. However, in some cases, authorities later recognized those restrictions as inappropriate, allowing the organizations to resume their work.
In our case, it’s not that the civic space is particularly open—it’s that we’ve managed to work despite the odds, due to high levels of personal commitment. The notion that we are operating freely because the environment is enabling is simply not true. We haven’t faced significant obstruction ourselves, but that does not mean the space is broad or conducive. We’re not just speaking from our own experience; we’re observing the broader reality.
You mentioned that being apolitical has presented its own challenges. Reports also highlight growing pressure on CSOs working in conflict-affected areas. What are the main challenges you face when trying to monitor and report on human rights violations in places with restricted access or ongoing conflict?
There are two major challenges here. First, effective monitoring requires a real-time presence and the capacity to follow developments as they happen. This demands resources—and right now, financial constraints are a serious barrier. After the US government, through USAID, suspended funding, support has dwindled significantly.
Second, you need people on the ground to track these developments. Finding and retaining such personnel is becoming increasingly difficult. As a result, real-time monitoring is not happening. This is a common problem across CSOs. Collecting evidence about daily human rights violations has become extremely challenging.
Another issue is the political context. Even when individuals attempt to speak out on rights violations, they can face various forms of retaliation. Some actors, either affiliated with the government or operating without its knowledge, are engaging in intimidation tactics—detaining individuals or silencing them under the guise of political neutrality. In such a fragmented conflict environment, with so many competing actors, civil society activity is severely constrained.
In particular, there’s growing concern about efforts to prevent reporting on violations. When abuses occur, there’s a need to present evidence. But in today’s climate, if someone is caught with a camera or monitoring tool, they can be accused of aiding the enemy—regardless of their political neutrality. Arbitrary detention and other forms of repression are becoming more common in these situations.
Has the legal and regulatory environment for CSOs in Ethiopia improved or worsened since the reform of the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation?
As I’ve previously noted, the situation is mixed. In some ways, we’ve seen improvements, but when political considerations dominate, authorities have taken measures to shut down organizations without following the proper legal procedures outlined in the revised law. This indicates a failure to adhere to the law. If one puts aside political biases, there is indeed civic space and activity. But the selective enforcement of the law remains a concern.
How would you assess the federal government’s commitment to accountability and transitional justice in the aftermath of the Tigray war?
From the beginning, our position has been that transitional justice must be implemented by an independent and impartial body. This is because some of the institutions and actors implicated in grave human rights violations during the war—including, notably, the federal government—are now the same entities overseeing the process. It’s not reasonable to expect a government to investigate and hold itself accountable.
Accountability requires identifying all responsible parties and bringing perpetrators to justice, but so far, that has not happened. For instance, in the case of Tigray, no one has been held accountable for the well-documented human rights abuses committed there. Perhaps some low-level action has occurred without public knowledge, but broadly speaking, there has been no meaningful legal or institutional response. Neither justice nor the principle of rule of law has been upheld.
This is a glaring contradiction. The government speaks of transitional justice, yet no tangible steps have been taken. In fact, some of the very institutions allegedly involved in the violations—such as the Ministry of Justice and the federal police—are now playing a role in shaping the transitional justice process. For many victims, these are not neutral actors.
That’s why we have consistently argued that only a truly independent mechanism, potentially with international and domestic collaboration, can credibly deliver justice. Without such a transition—without genuine change in the way these processes are conducted—we cannot believe that justice will be served. The current framework does not inspire confidence.
In Amhara, Oromia, and several other parts of the country, the government frames the National Dialogue Commission as a primary solution to end the ongoing conflicts between state forces and various armed groups. However, many analysts and political commentators argue that dialogue should be preceded by negotiations with all armed actors. As a civil society organization, which should come first in your view: negotiation or dialogue?
There can indeed be dialogue with the wider public. But when it comes to the conflicting parties, what’s needed is negotiation. Without prior negotiations, they simply cannot participate in dialogue. Right now, the core issue stems from human rights violations rooted in these conflicts. That’s why entering a dialogue process without first negotiating with the actors involved in the hostilities is extremely problematic. The two are interrelated.
We can’t pretend this issue doesn’t exist—there are still communities that support these armed actors, even when they’re engaged in low-intensity insurgencies. So it’s essential to meaningfully address the demands of these groups as well. The Commission should be the main platform for that.
At present, however, the real question is whether the Commission has legitimacy. Ideally, it could have served as a forum to engage with armed groups. But it lacks credibility—it’s widely viewed as an extension of the government.
When neither the public nor the combatants see the Commission as legitimate, pushing ahead with it is already a flawed approach. The proper path would be to first conduct negotiations, then restructure the Commission in a way that it earns broad-based trust, and only then proceed to national dialogue. That’s why, under the current setup, we don’t believe the dialogue process can lead to a fundamental and sustainable solution. Still, the need for a real solution remains urgent and should not be overlooked.
