The political situation in Tigray remains complex following the 2020-2022 conflict, with ongoing governance and humanitarian challenges. Tensions persist within the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), with reported factions differing over engagement with Ethiopia’s federal government. In addition, relations between Tigray and Eritrea remain strained, with allegations of continued Eritrean military presence near border areas despite the Pretoria Agreement.
Ethiopia’s pursuit of maritime access has reportedly heightened tensions with Eritrea. The issue has regional implications, with concerns about worsened instability in the Horn of Africa. Third-party involvement, including from the UAE and Turkey, further complicates matters as geopolitical interests shape diplomatic engagements.
Getachew Assefa is a professor at the School of Architecture, Planning, and Landscape at the University of Calgary in Canada. He holds a degree in chemical engineering from Addis Ababa University in 1995, but specializes in sustainable design, which led to his current professorship in architecture.
Before moving to Sweden in 1998 for graduate studies, he worked at Bahir Dar University. Getachew also operates UMD Media, a multilingual platform that broadcasts diverse content—including cultural stories, societal challenges, and regional perspectives—via satellite to the Horn of Africa.
In an interview with The Reporter’s Abraham Tekle, Getachew discussed Tigray’s political situation, the Pretoria Agreement, tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea over sea access, third-party involvement in the region, and international efforts to address escalating tensions, among other critical issues.
Getachew, a close observer of Tigray’s political situation and regional geopolitics, stated that developments in the region remain fluid, tied to third-party interests. EXCERPTS:
The Reporter: Tigray is still recovering from the devastating 2020-2022 war, with unresolved displacement, famine-like conditions, political disputes, and a lack of full federal support adding to the problems. How do you assess the current humanitarian crisis and political situation in the region? What are the major obstacles to lasting peace and recovery?
Getachew Assefa (Prof.): It’s a very tough question. Not only in terms of what the way out is, but also even assessing the current situation, given that it changes every day and is complicated by a number of factors. You mentioned recovery, but I don’t think Tigray has a steady recovery of sorts because, as you know, immediately after the Pretoria Agreement, the internal politics in Tigray went into a downward spiral in terms of a power struggle, and in terms of not knowing, at least from what I see from outside, how to prioritize the issues related to what the people had gone through during the genocidal war.
On top of that, we still have a large number—maybe now close to a million—internally displaced people [IDPs], and 40 percent of the constitutional territory is still outside the administration. All that only highlights that the leaders—whether within the TPLF factions or outside them, even the broader political elite, I would say—they never, in my assessment, focus on what is important.
What we are seeing now is not only the problems and suffering related to the past war, which are still unresolved, but also that a new war is on the horizon. And again, I don’t even see—although naturally I’m an optimistic person—I don’t see how Tigray and the entire region would be out of what is coming, in terms of this looming regional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
The TPLF has faced internal divisions and weakening influence since the Pretoria Agreement. How are these internal dynamics affecting Tigray’s political cohesion?
The TPLF has failed to act as a party, even though it is a political party. It at times acts as if it’s a government, sometimes as if it’s a state, and even at times it acts as if it’s a people. So there has been some confusion, I would say, unintentional confusion between party and government, party and state, and party and people. That has led to the current situation where internal factionalism within the party—which shouldn’t have affected the entire region or the entire people—has in fact significantly impacted them, because the party controls the narrative. It used to control the media; it even controls the structure, the flow, the social fabric. That nature and history of the party have led to the current situation where nobody seems able to come up with a way out or a solution.
You mentioned the Pretoria Agreement. I mean, the biggest blame, in terms of not fulfilling it lies with the federal government. But of course, if there were internal clarity, if there were no internal power struggle, one could argue that there would have been a stronger and more coordinated push on the federal government through the existing mechanisms—through the guarantors of the agreement, and so on and so forth.
But again, outside of lip service and PR, I don’t think the TPLF, the factions within it, or the interim state government have done enough to push the federal government to fulfill its part.
Building on that, could you provide your reflections on the present state of the relationship between TPLF and the federal government?
The National Election Board has deregistered the TPLF, so I don’t even know if we can legally talk about the party, given that its party status has been revoked by the Board. That, I think, complicates a lot of things.
At the same time, as we speak today—as you might have followed—we’ve seen that the US Ambassador to Addis went to Shire to meet the party leaders. I’m sure he is addressing them as party leaders, though we haven’t had access to the details; we were not privy to what they really discussed, what he told them, or what they told him. He also met the army leaders, so that, I think, may give us some indication in the next few hours or days about where things are heading.
I think the relationship between the TPLF and Addis has been deteriorating for months, but now we are talking about it at a point where it’s really a lost point.
How does this development align with the Pretoria Agreement? What potential consequences could arise for the peace process?
It’s anybody’s guess. I think it’s very hard to articulate what might arise, given that it’s not only about the TPLF. When it comes to the federal government, it’s difficult to assess what its next move might be, especially since what’s on its table is not limited to the TPLF or the Tigray issue.
There are a lot of other pressing concerns. We’ve talked about a potential war with Eritrea, the extremely devastating conflict in the Amhara region in terms of civilian casualties, the ongoing conflict in Oromia that has persisted for years, and other issues.
There’s a lot for the federal government to deal with. But in my view, the issue is not a lack of capacity—it’s a lack of willingness to handle these issues in the right way and with the necessary courage. That’s on the federal government’s side.
As for the TPLF, since it is legally a signatory to the Pretoria Agreement, that has been their argument as well. I had a chance to speak on UMD Media with one of the TPLF’s political members, and that interview was recorded at least two days before the decision of the National Election Board came out.
My question was: how would they deal with things after the revocation of their registration or legal status? His answer was interesting—he said there would not be any difference before or after the revocation, because, according to him, it’s not a legal matter but a political one. So, they intend to continue struggling politically.
How that will be seen and dealt with by the federal government is, I think, anybody’s guess.
With Eritrean forces maintaining control over sizable areas of Tigray, what are the key regional dynamics stemming from Asmara’s current posture towards Tigray and the Ethiopian federal structure?
That’s true, and actually, we did a study on this. For example, if you remember, there was a claim made by the Prime Minister when he was asked by representatives of Tigray—I believe this was around March 2023. He said that if Eritrea is occupying lands that were not awarded to it under the Algiers Agreement, he would see to it.
Following that, we conducted a study and were able to determine that over 67 percent—at least 67 percent—of the land currently occupied by Eritrea was not even awarded to it by the Algiers Agreement, which is a significant portion.
On top of that, Eritrea’s actions—particularly in areas like Irob—have led to ongoing suffering dating back to the 1998–2001 period. The regime in Eritrea has been taking people, especially youngsters, from different parts of Tigray bordering Eritrea, and after they were taken, many were never heard from again.
So, that relationship has long been sore and bitter. But, as you may have seen in the media, there’s a reported faction within the TPLF and a segment of the army that are allegedly engaging with the regime in Asmara.
This has further complicated the situation. At UMD Media, we’ve reported on some of these engagements—especially at the media and PR level, and in some cases, reportedly at the level of army commanders.
How has Eritrea’s presence influenced Tigray’s security and political landscape?
As known by many, in the genocidal war, Eritrea, I would argue, played a major role. Of course, some people argue—an argument that has some merit—that Eritrea was invited by Ethiopia, and so the blame should fall on Addis, not Asmara.
But my argument is that the Eritrean regime, from an ideological perspective, views the presence of people who speak the same language on the southern side of its border as a threat to whatever ideology it upholds.
Its military presence—for example, in the Zalambessa area, along a significant portion of the Irob border, and also in some parts of western Tigray—has directly affected the people living in those areas. Not only are they unable to access proper services, but in some cases, people have been forced to change their identification—from Ethiopian to Eritrean, and so on.
This has been reported for a long time, yet no one seems to be hearing their cries.
Given Ethiopia’s recent and repeated expressions of interest in direct sea access potentially through Somalia, Somaliland, and now Eritrea, how is the Eritrean government responding, and what are the potential consequences of this pursuit?
I think the Eritrean government has now—or rather, for months—made the decision that Ethiopia is not going to sit idle and will eventually attack it, at least on the Assab front. This assessment has significantly shifted its approach, particularly in relation to Tigray. The level of engagement with Tigrayan leaders—both political and military—has increased significantly from zero to its current level, precisely because Eritrea has concluded that an attack from Ethiopia is inevitable.
In my assessment, this is no longer an ‘if’ scenario—it’s a matter of ‘when.’ Eritrea’s reaction to this calculation has changed the dynamics significantly.
But this is not just an Ethiopia–Eritrea issue. As you know, Sudan has been in a state of war for over two years now, and we’re seeing new developments, such as in the Port Sudan area—which had previously been relatively peaceful—now coming under heavy drone attacks. All of this has implications and ramifications for the Ethiopia–Eritrea dynamic.
We also know that many have been closely watching what Trump might do in the Middle East, particularly in terms of whether he would back Saudi Arabia over the UAE. That matters because it affects the strategic calculations of Ethiopia’s growth and assertiveness. The UAE supports Ethiopia in the Ethiopia–Eritrea dynamic, while it is opposed to Burhan in Sudan. Eritrea, on the other hand, is supported by Saudi Arabia and is aligned with Burhan in Sudan.
Analysts have been closely following these regional and international dynamics to see how they might shift under a potential Trump administration. The current information suggests that Trump might not stop Ethiopia from going after Assab—and that would definitely have consequences for the people of Tigray and for civilians beyond Tigray as well.
This is not just an Ethiopia–Eritrea issue—or even an Ethiopia–Tigray–Eritrea issue. A large-scale war of this nature would negatively affect civilian populations on all sides of the equation.
Considering the involvement of third parties, what political stakes do you see ahead?
These middle-power countries—like the UAE, Turkey, and others—see themselves as key players in controlling the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region. All of that would determine who benefits from whatever economic world order might emerge at this time.
For example, when it comes to the flow of minerals and resources, it’s not just about how much or what kind of resources, but more importantly, who controls them and who decides that control. I think that’s at the heart of all this.
Of course, there’s a lot of shifting happening as well. So, what I’m describing reflects what we know today. If you were to ask me again a month from now, we might be looking at a completely different alignment of alliances. But what doesn’t change is the core interest and focus of these countries. What they want is control—control over how to control.
Whether they ally with Ethiopia now or with Eritrea, those alliances may shift depending on the circumstances. For instance, during the Tigray war, as you might remember, the UAE had a base in Assab. Now, the UAE is against Eritrea, and Saudi Arabia is the one that has a base there. So, these things change.
And of course, the Israel–Hamas–Palestine conflict is also closely related to all of this. There was a notable article recently in the Jerusalem Post, co-written by an Emirati and an Israeli author, where they discussed Sudan as potentially the next Hamas front. They were framing Al-Burhan as the “Hamas of Africa.”
We cannot take such articles lightly because they often signal what may unfold in the next few weeks or months.
Could this potential tension lead to a renewal of conflict between the two nations? What role would Tigray, TPLF, and the security forces play?
That’s a question that I asked on UMD Media, and there is a poll that’s currently ongoing. Like I said, my assessment is—given my experience of war and these kinds of things from early childhood—I pray and hope that there will not be more war. But that’s only my prayer and hope. <y assessment is that there will be war, sooner rather than later. And what I see as well is that where Tigray stands is a very complicated matter.
I asked this exact question to our viewers on UMD Media: If there were to be a war, should the interim government and the military—the army—stand with Ethiopia, with Eritrea, or remain neutral? The fifth option was: I don’t know. So far, as I speak to you—just 18 hours since the poll was posted—521 people have voted. And what I see is: out of these 521 people, 57 percent say Tigray should remain neutral. Those who say it should stand with Ethiopia against Eritrea are 27 percent. Those who say it should stand with Eritrea against Ethiopia are 11 percent, and only five percent say they don’t know.
What’s interesting for me is that on social media, there are, as I mentioned, some factions—especially among media operatives—advocating for siding with Eritrea. But you can see that in this vote, more than double—27 percent—say no, we should stand with Ethiopia. That’s an interesting dynamic.
Because, for me, staying neutral—I’m not sure how Tigray can actually do that. I’m sure both sides, especially the Eritrean regime, would want the war to be fought on Tigray’s soil, not Eritrea’s. That’s why they are clearly engaging in PR and other efforts—because they want the war to happen in Tigray. As Getachew Reda recently mentioned on UMD Media, Eritrea sees Tigray as a ‘strategic depth’ for their defense—from, or against, Ethiopia.
You once indicated that it was preferable to fight against “Shabia” (Eritrean regime) rather than Ethiopia. What is your current position on this comparison?
It’s the same. I mean, like I said in that interview, my stance is clear—as I’ve said before—not just for our region but for anyone, anywhere in the world. I don’t, and I have never, advocated for war. I will never advocate for war.
My preference would be for all efforts—by everyone—to go toward avoiding war. But if it has to happen, if Tigray is forced to make a choice or take a position, then of course, Shabia should be dismantled. And that’s not only for the sake of Tigray or Ethiopia—but also for the sake of the Eritrean civilian population.
Given the federal government’s centralization efforts and Tigray’s historical autonomy demands, what are the likely scenarios for Tigray’s political and economic future?
Well, again, if you had asked me this before, I might have given you a different answer. But now, we’re not in a position where such scenarios can be articulated easily. One thing I can say, though, is that among the youth, the demand for independence—the desire to establish their own state and country—is strong and clear.
At the same time, there is also a significant concern: this should not happen under the current leadership of the TPLF and its affiliates. Why? Because people are not seeking independence just for the sake of creating another country. They don’t want to see a repetition of the Eritrean or South Sudanese experience in Tigray.
What’s driving the call for independence is not some claim of being fundamentally different from others, but the absence of any guarantee that a war of this scale—a genocidal war—won’t happen again. The general understanding, based on international norms and scholarship, is that governments are supposed to protect their own citizens from external threats—not invite outsiders to attack their own people, as the federal government did.
The demand for independence is understandable and deeply felt. But there is also a clear sense of pragmatism. People see how internal power struggles within the TPLF have undermined vital interests—issues like IDPs, territorial integrity, and political coherence. So, there’s a sort of ‘wait and see’ mood right now.
People want to avoid turning Tigray’s aspirations into another Eritrean scenario. That’s what they’re cautious about. And as we’ve seen in many conflicts—especially large-scale ones—wars tend to bring reconfiguration of ideas, ideologies, alliances, and even territories. So, I wouldn’t be surprised if we witness such reconfigurations.
In the end, this isn’t just a Tigray issue—or even a Tigray-Ethiopia or Tigray-Eritrea issue. It’s a regional crisis, and sadly, one that continues to unfold.
What role should the international community play in addressing the looming danger in the region, particularly, as you mentioned, to Tigray and civilians in the region?
Unfortunately, I am not optimistic when it comes to the role of the international community, because their calculus has always been driven by their own interests. Now, that in itself is not necessarily a bad thing—every nation naturally pursues its interests—but this should not come at the expense of devastating and ongoing human rights abuses in the region.
If you look at what has happened to the women and children in Tigray, the suffering didn’t end when the war formally ceased. The impacts are still present—and long-lasting. For the children, the war has left serious consequences on their health and future. For women and the elderly, the damage is equally severe. What we’re witnessing is a generational impact, not a temporary crisis.
As for the global powers—Washington, Brussels, London—they actually do have leverage, if they’re willing to use it. But as is often the case, the missing factor is political will. For example, when there were concerns about potential internal fighting within the Tigray army, I know that military attachés from embassies in Addis Ababa went to Mekelle and engaged with commanders. So, it shows that they can act when they choose to. I don’t know what the US Ambassador did during the recent visit to Shire, but there’s clearly a lot they could do if they chose to be proactive.
The first priority must be avoiding war at all costs—regardless of the issues at hand. Take the matter of sea access, for instance. Ethiopia does have a legitimate question when it comes to access to the sea. But war is not the answer. There has long been academic and policy debate about non-military approaches to this issue. Personally, this is not a new concern for me. Over 22 years ago, I created a Yahoo group called “Coalition for Assab,” which was entirely non-military in its vision. It aimed to compile historical records and legal arguments supporting Ethiopia’s claim for sea access.
When I look at the Eritrean map, I’m reminded of a moment when I was in Bosnia to teach a summer course. We visited the town of Neum—a tiny coastal strip carved out specifically to give Bosnia access to the sea. It’s a narrow corridor, but it serves the purpose. This shows that access agreements are possible through peaceful means.
So, yes, the international community can help solve this without pushing for war. But even more urgently, they must stop offering only lip service when it comes to those still suffering from the last war. For many in Tigray, this will be the fifth rainy season they endure in dire conditions—without proper support, with deteriorating mental and physical health, and with devastated livelihoods. The international response needs to go far beyond PR and statements. They can—and must—do better.
Do you have any final recommendations?
I know it might not seem directly related, but to me, everything is interconnected. What I’m observing right now with the actions of Ethiopia’s health professionals is something significant. They are organizing in a very civilized, informed, and legally grounded way to make their voices heard. That kind of rule-based and peaceful pressure is something everyone should learn from.
Citizens—from Mekelle to Bahir Dar, from Addis Ababa to Jigjiga, and everywhere in between—should stand up and say no to war. Say no to abuse. Say no to silence. I remember during the genocidal war in Tigray, there were protests around the world. People mobilized under slogans like “No More,” often directed at the US and the international community. But unfortunately, many of those efforts turned into models for conflict rhetoric instead of peacebuilding.
Now, imagine if just half of that energy—no, even a small fraction of that energy—were redirected inward. Imagine if people in Mekelle raised their voices to pressure the TPLF, the interim government, or the military. If people in Bahir Dar and Addis Ababa did the same toward their respective authorities. And of course, if the same kind of pressure was applied in Washington and Brussels. I believe real change could happen.
What I saw from the health professionals was a model—peaceful, ethical, civic engagement. It shows us how to demand justice and reform without resorting to violence or extremism. That’s a lesson for all of us, especially as we face the threat of renewed war and ongoing human suffering in the region.
