The escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, marked by Ethiopia’s recent formal accusation that Eritrea is preparing for war, threaten to plunge the Horn of Africa into another round of devastating conflict—a return to the bloody strife that has characterized the region’s past. This crisis is not an isolated diplomatic spat; it is a tinderbox of historical grievances, geopolitical ambition, and fragile internal politics. Understanding its roots and potential consequences is essential to forging a path away from the brink. The immediate trigger for the latest crisis was Ethiopia’s recent formal letter to the United Nations, accusing the Eritrean government of “clear collusion” with a hardline faction of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) to wage war. Ethiopia alleges this alliance is “funding, mobilizing and directing armed groups” within Ethiopia’s turbulent Amhara region, representing a direct and coordinated threat to its sovereignty. It has warned that its “defensive posture” and “maximum restraint” are not indefinite. Eritrea has dismissed previous Ethiopian rhetoric as “too crass and pathetic,” firmly rejecting the premise of Ethiopia’s sea access ambitions. This exchange of accusations reveals a complete breakdown of trust, with both nations viewing the other’s actions as existential threats.
Beneath the immediate accusations lies a complex web of deeper causes. Central to the tension is landlocked Ethiopia’s fervent quest for direct sea access. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (PhD) has consistently argued that access to the Red Sea is an economic and strategic imperative for his nation. Eritrea, however, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 and with it control of the coastline, views this ambition as a direct threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Analysts suggest that Ethiopia’s determination to acquire a port, potentially even the Eritrean port of Assab, is a driving force behind its foreign policy. The current animosity is particularly striking given the recent past. Just years ago, Eritrea fought alongside the Ethiopian federal army against the TPLF during the devastating Tigray War (2020-2022). However, Eritrea’s exclusion from the 2022 Pretoria Agreement that ended the war was seen as a sharp rebuke in Asmara and shattered that fragile alliance. The peace deal intended to end one conflict has inadvertently sown the seeds for another.
The threat also reflect the resurgence of interference in the internal affairs of each other. Both nations are now accused of leveraging proxy forces. Ethiopia alleges Eritrea is collaborating with TPLF factions and Fano militias in Amhara. Conversely, Ethiopia itself has been reported to support Eritrean rebel groups like the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organisation (RSADO). This proxy warfare destabilizes the entire region, turning internal Ethiopian conflicts into a theater for a wider interstate rivalry. The nature of the Eritrean state, under the lifelong rule of President Isaias Afwerki, further exacerbates the crisis. Described as one of the world’s most secretive dictatorships, Eritrea maintains an iron grip on its population through indefinite military conscription and severe repression of basic freedoms. This internal control makes the regime unpredictable in its external relations and highly resistant to international pressure.
The ramifications of this brewing crisis are wide and dangerous. At the most immediate level, renewed hostilities would risk reigniting large-scale violence, displacement, and humanitarian fallout. The Tigray conflict already exposed the high costs of war: broken institutions, fractured trust, and mass suffering. The conflict would inevitably spill over borders. It could draw in neighboring states like Sudan, which has its own territorial disputes with Ethiopia, and Egypt, which has strained relations with Addis Ababa over the Nile River and has recently strengthened ties with Eritrea. Moreover, any escalation could derail fragile peace processes, including those tied to the Ethiopia–Tigray Pretoria Agreement, which remains precarious.
Given both Ethiopia and Eritrea are economically vulnerable war is certain to be ruinous and shatter their economies. Military mobilization and defense expenditures consume public resources needed for development. Investor confidence would expire overnight. Trade routes, infrastructure projects, cross-border commerce would be disrupted. Regions near the border would be especially vulnerable to disruption, losing access to markets or falling into insecurity. Ethiopia’s attempts to diversify its economy through agriculture, mining, and energy depend on peace; conflict would set back those ambitions drastically. Human rights violations and impunity are of further concern as well. Eritrea and Ethiopia both carry legacies of brutal conduct, including documented violations in Tigray and Amhara involving both Eritrean and Ethiopian forces. Increased conflict would almost certainly reopen those scars: violations, civilian casualties, forced displacement, and renewed trauma.
Going forward averting the looming catastrophe requires a concerted and urgent effort. Amid the tensions, there is still a narrow window for preventive action. First and foremost, diplomatic channels must be reopened immediately. Ethiopia and Eritrea should suspend accusatory rhetoric and commit to mediated dialogue—a neutral third party, such as the African Union or the United Nations, could help ensure a ceasefire or de-escalation mechanism. Ethiopia’s own foreign minister has said Addis is ready for “good faith negotiations” and seeks institutionalized integration that respects sovereignty. Chief among the measures that needs to be taken to lower the temperature is to address Ethiopia’s legitimate desire for sea access in a manner that is decoupled from the immediate war footing. As such the international community should facilitate good-faith, multilateral negotiations involving Djibouti, Somaliland, and other regional actors to find a peaceful, legal, and mutually beneficial solution for port access, rather than allowing it to be a casus belli. In the meantime it’s also incumbent on other entities like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union, the East African Community, and external partners (EU, U.S., China) to collectively press for restraint, monitor troop movements, and offer guarantees.
The people of the Horn of Africa have endured generations of war. The brewing conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a crisis born of failed diplomacy and unchecked ambition, but it is not yet an inevitability. Through relentless diplomacy, a commitment to addressing underlying grievances peacefully, and a unified international response, the drive to war can still be halted. The alternative—a return to widespread slaughter and regional chaos—is a price the world cannot afford to pay.
