In the delicate world of transboundary water diplomacy, few names resonate as strongly as Fekahmed Negash Nuru. A seasoned negotiator, strategist, and advocate for regional cooperation, Fekahmed has spent decades at the forefront of Ethiopia’s water management and diplomacy efforts. From his leadership as head of the Boundary and Transboundary Rivers Affairs Directorate at the Ministry of Water and Energy, to his tenure as Executive Director of the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (ENTRO), he has consistently demonstrated a blend of technical expertise and diplomatic finesse.
As a key negotiator for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), Fekahmed navigated one of the most complex and high-stakes regional discussions in East Africa, emphasizing equitable resource sharing and fostering collaboration among Nile Basin countries. Beyond the negotiating table, his work as a water resources management consultant and hydro-diplomacy expert has helped shape policies that balance development ambitions with sustainable management of shared waterways.
In this interview with The Reporter’s Nardos Yoseph, Fekahmed shares a firsthand account of the decades-long journey surrounding the GERD—from navigating opposition and skepticism from downstream neighbors to balancing international pressure while safeguarding Ethiopia’s sovereignty. He details the complex interplay of technical studies, international panels, ministerial meetings, and even attempts at proxy influence, offering a rare glimpse into the challenges of negotiating one of Africa’s largest infrastructure projects.
The conversation also explores the strategic importance of the GERD for Ethiopia’s energy security, regional cooperation, and economic growth. Fekahmed outlines how the dam, beyond its engineering marvel, represents a broader assertion of national agency in the face of historical inequities, geopolitical maneuvering, and the influence of international financial institutions. His reflections not only dive into the diplomatic intricacies of the Nile Basin but also into Ethiopia’s broader pursuit of self-reliance, regional integration, and sustainable development. EXCERPTS:
The Reporter : The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is scheduled for inauguration in a few days’ time. Ethiopia has faced intense diplomatic challenges over the dam since its inception. How would you describe the diplomatic process that accompanied GERD’s construction?
Fekahmed Negash: The story of the GERD is, in many ways, the story of Ethiopia’s transparent and principled diplomacy. The decision to build such a massive project was one of the most consequential in our nation’s modern history.
Naturally, the first major challenge came from downstream countries, particularly Egypt and Sudan. Their initial reaction was one of fear and alarm—claiming they had no information and worrying that the dam could harm them. Such concern is understandable; after all, this is a large-scale dam.
It’s important to note that the first response from Egypt was not a formal government approach, but rather a public diplomacy initiative. Around forty-six members of Egypt’s popular diplomacy delegation traveled first to Uganda, attempting to win over President Museveni—but they failed. They then came to Ethiopia and met with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, senior government officials, prominent figures, religious leaders, and members of the business community. Their message was clear: “We are not here to pressure you; we simply want access to information.”
At the time, Egypt was under the transitional government of Prime Minister Essam Sharaf. Ethiopia’s response was straightforward—we invited them to access information through the Nile Basin Initiative. But the Egyptians replied that, as a transitional government, they could not make such commitments and requested a separate platform. This eventually led to the creation of a new forum and the establishment of an International Panel of Experts.
Ethiopia’s decision to cooperate was critical. Had Ethiopia refused and insisted on secrecy, this could have escalated into confrontation. Instead, Ethiopia agreed, and after the Egyptians returned home, their transitional government entered office.
Some have asked why Egypt sent a public diplomacy delegation in the first place. The answer lies in history: when Egypt was building the Aswan High Dam in the 1960s, Ethiopia requested information but was flatly denied—Egypt said it was none of Ethiopia’s concern. In contrast, Ethiopia chose transparency to avoid conflict.
The Egyptian Prime Minister and other senior officials later came to Addis Ababa, held discussions with Ethiopian leadership, and returned to Cairo. This was in 2010. By September 2011, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi himself led a high-level delegation—including several ministers—to Cairo for the Ethio–Egypt Joint Commission meeting.
During that meeting, Egypt again requested information about the dam outside the framework of the Nile Basin Initiative. Ethiopia responded positively, and after returning home, we formally established the International Panel of Experts, including two experts from each of the three countries plus four international experts. This panel worked for about a year.
As work progressed, however, Egypt’s position began to shift. They even called for construction to be halted and repeatedly walked away from talks, raising new demands. Nevertheless, the panel eventually released its final report, covering dam safety, downstream social and environmental impacts, and identifying benefits for all three countries. The report was positive and was immediately accepted by Ethiopia and Sudan.
Egypt, however, reacted dramatically. Then-President Mohammed Morsi publicly declared—during a televised joint meeting with cabinet members and opposition party leaders—that Egypt would take every measure possible to stop or sabotage the dam. Their strategies ranged from attempting to bribe Ethiopian officials, to threats of airstrikes, to plans for proxy wars aimed at destabilizing Ethiopia.
Following this, Egypt’s Foreign Minister came to Addis Ababa and proposed joint implementation of the International Panel of Experts’ recommendations. This led to a series of four ministerial-level meetings, eventually producing a tripartite committee that began follow-up studies and technical consultations.
What did the research process look like?
They didn’t want the research to be completed. The reason was simple — once the study was finalized, the flawed data they relied on would have been exposed. So they deliberately stalled it. But on Ethiopia’s side, it was agreed that the matter should be properly investigated, and researchers were assigned.
Experts from the three countries — five from each — were brought together and carried out the study. The researchers completed their work and submitted the findings. Yet Egypt refused to accept the results, which was quite surprising given that five of the researchers were Egyptians themselves.
After that, during the continued negotiations and discussions, a demand was made for a third party to join the process. The World Bank and the US government were brought in. But there was no consensus on this. The observers — particularly the Americans — went so far as to try to steer the negotiations into a kind of mediation process. This created conditions that completely eroded trust, and ultimately Ethiopia walked away from the talks altogether.
What happened then?
After that, the issue was taken back to the African Union. At the highest level, the Arab League also tried to intervene. The leaders of the two countries met again and made another attempt to move the process forward. But it still didn’t succeed.
The main reason was that the two countries’ fundamental interests were simply different. When the basic interests of countries diverge and don’t align, reaching an agreement becomes impossible. What was being discussed at the AU wasn’t grounded in shared fundamental interests — it was more about defending positions.
So, even after five rounds of negotiations, no agreement was reached. Ethiopia continued building the dam without waiting for a deal — and now, the project is completed and will be inaugurated in the coming days .
In March 2024, you authored an article on the complicated ‘hydro-diplomacy’ surrounding GERD. In it, you highlighted delays relating to the Tripartite National Committee, stating “the devil is in the details.” Could you elaborate on what you meant?
At that time, the Egyptians were astonishingly eager to influence the project. From the very beginning, their engagement wasn’t about constructive participation — even when they came to meetings, it was rarely because they were interested in solutions. They would often come just to drag out the process rather than focus on outcomes.
The first major shift was during the International Panel of Experts’ assessment. After that, when the Tripartite National Committee was formed, they managed to cause disruptions — especially during the ministerial meetings. The first three meetings were actually held monthly with Sudan actively involved. But by the third meeting, Egypt refused to proceed, saying “we do not agree, so we are leaving.”
They withdrew, went back to Cairo, and announced that they would now handle the issue through politics and diplomacy instead. As a result, the process was suspended for about six months.
During that six-month break, there were political changes in Egypt—a presidential transition, a new cabinet, and new ministers. At the AU summit in Equatorial Guinea, the two leaders met and agreed to resume the process.
When the meetings resumed, they surprisingly accepted, one hundred percent, the very same document they had rejected six months earlier. In a way, this showed that the six-month pause was essentially on their terms—they got to reset the process.
Another key issue was the selection of international consultants. Ethiopia insisted that the consultants be chosen through an open, competitive international bidding process to ensure impartiality. Egypt initially pushed for a ‘shortlist approach’ where each country would nominate its own consultant, and the others would choose from that list, but Ethiopia rejected this as biased.
Eventually, through competitive bidding, three organizations were shortlisted, and the French company BRLi won the contract with the highest combined score from all three countries. However, even after agreeing to this result, Egypt later refused to recognize the consultant’s work. Resolving that dispute alone took nearly two years.
Can you explain the challenges and delays involved in completing the study and why it took much longer than initially planned?
The debate was on the time span or the consultative company work delivery. The Egyptians contend that the overall study, including the hiring of the consulting company, would only take six months. Fifteen days to hire a company, another 15 to establish the tripartite committee, and five months to conduct and conclude the research. Ethiopia maintained that the overall process would take at least two years.
We tried to actually form the tripartite committee and appoint the consultant, and what was supposed to take fifteen days dragged on for a year and a half. They had estimated the entire study would take only six months, but by the time the consultant was hired and everything was finalized, we were already in the eleventh month. In the end, we had to agree to stretch it to eleven months instead of five.
Even then, they couldn’t meet the eleven-month deadline. This delay made it impossible to keep the process moving smoothly. And then there was the negotiation. The negotiation had been prepared by the international panel of experts, and they told us: ‘This is the draft; later you will sit down with your own experts and revise it.’ But later, Egypt refused to make any revisions at all, insisting that the study must stand as it was.
When we raised this with the relevant institutions, they agreed that the study should take at least two years to complete. Yet they still said it could be finished in six months. This was simply unrealistic. For example, water quality must be measured for a full twelve months without interruption to capture monthly variations. That requires building proper gauging stations, upgrading measurement equipment, and collecting accurate data. After that, you still need another six months just to analyze the data.
They said: ‘We will complete this in six months.’ These kinds of unrealistic expectations were the main challenge of the process. And there were other problems too—when the consultant was selected, there were disagreements, delays, and complications with the contract. In the end, nearly thirty percent of the work was subcontracted outside of the main consultant’s control, which caused further delays.
Finally, after all these back-and-forth talks with different countries, the study process we agreed to was much weaker than what we had initially hoped for. And by the time the study actually began, we were already far behind schedule.
Negotiations surrounding the dam, particularly talks held in the US, were described publicly as being very difficult. Some observers even argued the process infringed on Ethiopia’s sovereignty. What was really happening behind the scenes, and how did Ethiopia navigate it?
What happened was this: On September 29, during the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Egypt formally requested the United States to intervene and mediate on the issue. Following that, in October, there was the Russia-Africa Summit, where Ethiopia’s Prime Minister and Egypt’s President met directly.
Even before that summit, a day earlier in fact, the US Treasury Secretary had written a letter inviting the foreign ministers, water ministers, and experts of all three countries to Washington. Within our side, there were three schools of thought. One group argued firmly that Ethiopia should not go at all. Another group said: ‘The U.S. is our friend, we can attend but not issue any statement.’ A third group proposed to participate, listen, and accept if the process seemed reasonable.
It was on this basis that Ethiopia eventually agreed, with the US and World Bank taking the role of observers.
Now, the difficulty arose with the declaration that followed. It stated that within two months four rounds of talks must be completed, with two of them taking place in Washington, and that the negotiations should conclude with a signed agreement. This was very difficult for us. The reason is simple: such a tight schedule meant decisions would be rushed, not deliberated. And the threat was clear—if no agreement was signed, the issue would be referred to international arbitration. That reference was embedded in what they called the ‘Declaration of Principles.’
For Ethiopia, this became a trap. Either we accepted Egypt’s position or we allowed the matter to be pushed into arbitration, something we rejected because we believed the global system was not neutral or fair. That was the real dilemma.
As the negotiations proceeded, the US and the World Bank, though only ‘observers,’ began to act more like participants—pressuring, drafting, and presenting their own texts. Ethiopian positions were often sidelined. This was what created the sense of guardianship over Ethiopia’s sovereignty.
At the first meeting, the pressure was not so visible—it was framed as technical discussions. But gradually, the pressure intensified. And when the two-month deadline passed without consensus, another meeting was convened in Washington. It was at that stage that Ethiopia firmly expressed its objection, stating: first, the process infringed on our sovereignty; and second, the proposed deal severely restricted Ethiopia’s right to utilize its own water resources.
In truth, what was being pushed was not negotiation but an arrangement designed to tie Ethiopia’s hands. Egypt and Sudan signed the draft agreement. Ethiopia, however, did not. We chose instead to walk away, making clear that no external political directive could dictate our rights. That was the situation we faced.
Now that Ethiopia has completed the dam and is preparing to begin full operation, some argue this may intensify diplomatic tensions with Egypt. Their concern is that Egypt continues to demand involvement in operational activities and insists that its water share must be safeguarded. Others, however, suggest the issue may simmer down. What is your perspective?
The key question is this: what exactly is Egypt’s goal? Egypt’s concern is not directly tied to the dam, and much of it is built on long-standing narratives. For decades, they claimed that if Ethiopia were to store even one billion cubic meters of water, a million of Egyptian farmers would be displaced. They presented this argument to the international community.
Today, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam holds 74 billion cubic meters. By their earlier reasoning, 56 million Egyptian farmers should have already been displaced. Yet to this day, not a single farmer has been uprooted. Why? Because that fear was manufactured. They even warned that millions would be forced to migrate to Europe and America, or become refugees. That, too, never happened. The purpose of these claims was to alarm Western countries—who worry about migration and instability—so that they would pressure Ethiopia.
Another claim was that once the Renaissance Dam filled, the Aswan High Dam would dry up and become a desert. But what has happened now? The GERD is on the brink of being fully operational, and Aswan remains intact, the Nile still continues to flow. In fact, water that would otherwise have been lost to evaporation in the desert or discharged into the Mediterranean is now stored in Ethiopia—where it contributes positively, even helping climate resilience. For Egypt, in many ways, this is an advantage, not a loss. Yet they opposed it.
Why? Because at the heart of their concern is not the dam itself, but recognition of what they call their ‘water share.’ Ethiopia has never recognized this—neither in the past, nor now. What Egypt wants is to tie Ethiopia down through negotiations, to extract some form of acknowledgment that such a ‘share’ dubbed in colonial era agreement exists.
So when they insist on being part of operational decisions, or demand binding agreements, their aim is not to protect themselves from actual harm—because the dam has shown it causes none—but to secure that recognition. That is why tensions will remain, because Ethiopia refuses to compromise its sovereignty.
From here on, disputes may arise particularly around dam operations—when and how much water is released, and under what conditions. But this is not about the dam endangering Egypt. It is about political leverage, about compelling Ethiopia to say: Yes, you have a share as embedded in a colonial era agreement Ethiopia was never part of to begin with. That recognition is what they seek.
Earlier, when we discussed the dam’s construction, you mentioned that Egypt sought to use proxies and outlined six different methods of destabilization. Some actors were even caught in the act. Given that Ethiopia has long faced attempts to fuel internal discord through such proxy measures—testing the country’s security mechanisms—do you think Cairo might still attempt to use this strategy today?
When it comes to safeguarding internal peace, that is fundamentally the responsibility of the government. As the Prime Minister himself has said, Ethiopia must be prepared for every option, because the challenges they set before us are real. Of the six options Egypt once tabled, five have already been attempted. Only one remains.
Which five? To list them plainly: supporting opposition groups, spreading disinformation, encouraging uprisings at different levels, using intimidation tactics, and fueling internal unrest. All of these have already been put into practice. For instance, Egypt even raised the idea of using air power, suggesting that from Cairo they could launch planes toward Ethiopia to cause destruction. Another option they once mentioned was deploying commando operations against the dam. Out of the six, only that last one has not yet been tried.
Does that mean they will never attempt it? Not necessarily. If circumstances allow, they could still consider it. However, I am confident that the government is adequately prepared. In terms of security and readiness, there is a strong protective system in place. So while one option remains untested, Ethiopia is not standing idly by.
Global diplomatic relations appear to have made a shift towards transactional politics, particularly following President Trump’s return to the White House. Some foreign analysts argue this transactional environment favors Egypt, which they say has certain things of strategic value to offer the US while Ethiopia does not hold the same level of leverage. They also claim Washington continues to apply pressure on Ethiopia, keeping the issue alive. How do you view this?
The reality is that when the United States engages in this matter, it does so for reasons of its own—it is not a neutral actor. The first reason dates back to 1978, when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israel’s Prime Minister signed the Camp David Accords. Alongside those accords were a bunch of related agreements, including key bilateral deals: one between the US and Egypt, and another between the US and Israel.
Under the US-Egypt agreement, Washington committed to providing Egypt with 1.3 billion dollars’ worth of military aid annually. In return, Egypt accepted recognition of what it calls its ‘historic water share’ of the Nile. In effect, the agreement gave political acknowledgment to Egypt’s claim over the Nile. Since then, the US, as far as it can, has supported that position—not out of neutrality, but because of the binding commitments it undertook.
The second factor is economic. Egyptian investment in the United States is among the largest from the region. Their trade ties are also deep, far exceeding those between Ethiopia and the US. This creates a different kind of weight in bilateral relations.
The third factor is the Egyptian diaspora in America. Egyptians in the US are well-organized, exerting lobbying pressure and influencing political processes. A telling example from not long ago is an American senator named Robert Menendez who was lobbied heavily by Egyptian-American groups. He was pressed to take up three demands: first, to open the US market to halal meat exports from Egypt; second, to facilitate Egypt’s requests for US military purchases; and third, to pressure Ethiopia over the Grand Renaissance Dam. Reports indicated that more than USD 1.8 million, luxury vehicles, gold, and even salaried contracts to his wife were used to secure such influence.
Beyond that, during President Trump’s tenure, his personal friendship with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is reportedly very strong. It is also reported that Egypt contributed up to USD 10 million to support Trump’s first election campaign. All these factors explain why America’s stance has consistently leaned toward Egypt.
Western powers more broadly share another perspective: they tend to see Ethiopia as a fragile state in the Horn, prone to instability. That perception reinforces their inclination to side with Egypt. For that reason, I do not believe the pressure will disappear. To some degree, it will continue.
How should Ethiopia navigate this pressure? As an expert, can you clearly explain the options and tools the country can rely on at this moment?
What they are really pushing for is a binding agreement. The first of these is what’s called the Declaration of Principles. That document contains ten principles in total. Out of those, Egypt mainly wants to enforce only one—Article Five, which deals with the filling of the dam, rights to oversight of operational activities and coordination with downstream states.
But it cannot work that way. If Ethiopia is asked to treat Article Five as binding, then Egypt must also accept all ten principles, not just the one that serves its interests. A binding agreement cannot be selective.
From Ethiopia’s side, we have to be extremely cautious. On the issue of water, we cannot and should not sign any agreement that sets fixed numerical allocations. Accepting quotas would permanently limit Ethiopia’s rights. What can be considered, however, is an agreement based on the electricity generated. The Declaration of Principles itself recognizes the right of downstream states to purchase power as a priority. That is something workable—we can commit to saying, ‘This is the amount of power we generate daily, and this much can be made available for purchase.’
From there, downstream countries can infer how much water continues to flow. If that’s their interest, then fine. But the fundamental position for Ethiopia is clear: no binding agreement that imposes water quotas, and any binding arrangement must apply to all ten principles equally, not just to Article Five.
Ethiopia is now close to operationalizing the Grand Renaissance Dam. Beyond meeting domestic demand, this also creates the potential to expand electricity exports to neighboring countries and deepen regional integration. Yet, some suggest this very opportunity is seen as a source of concern by Egypt. How do you see Ethiopia’s diplomatic relations in the region evolving after the GERD becomes fully operational?
The Horn and Africa as a whole face a significant power deficit. And when there is an energy shortage, everything suffers: industries stall, services are disrupted, agriculture weakens. Most importantly, from a social perspective, millions of people remain in darkness, just like our citizens once did.
On our borders, many towns in neighboring countries sit side by side with Ethiopian towns. On our side, the lights are on; on theirs, they are not. That imbalance does not create good neighborly relations. Supplying power across borders can change that. For Ethiopia, it means earning valuable foreign exchange. For the region, it builds lasting cooperation and upgrades relations to a higher level.
Energy is one of the sectors where cross-border integration is both necessary and possible. Already, some countries—Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania—are linked, and others are requesting connections. Providing power to them strengthens Ethiopia’s long-term partnerships. These relationships are peaceful by nature, and if nurtured, they can grow into deeper cooperation.
The benefits go beyond electricity itself. As these countries experience the advantages, they will be more inclined to align with Ethiopia on broader regional interests. In the future, when Ethiopia embarks on building additional large-scale dams, these same countries may well support our efforts because they know their interests and Ethiopia’s interests are closely tied.
In short, energy exports can transform Ethiopia’s neighborhood relations. They not only ease today’s shortages but also lay the foundation for stronger alliances that will help Ethiopia withstand future pressures.
On one side, international financial institutions say that developing countries must have electricity supply, development, and expansion. On the other hand, when countries like Ethiopia attempt to build a dam of this stature, they begin to consider issues unrelated to development needs. Ethiopia went ahead and built it anyway, and in doing so exposed the injustice. Do you think they will learn from the experience?
These financial institutions, of course, have their own complications. Perhaps most notably, when we look at the World Bank, the issue almost always circles back to Egypt. During the time of Sadat’s government, an Egyptian national served as vice president of the World Bank. Under his leadership, the Bank introduced a lending policy framework that made it a requirement for upstream countries to obtain the consent of downstream states before receiving loans or grants for cross-border water projects. That became embedded in what is known as ‘Operational Policy 7.5’.
Although later they modified its name and structure, the principle remains. According to that policy, Ethiopia, before accessing World Bank loans or grants, must obtain the consent of downstream states. The same policy framework is also followed by the IMF, the African Development Bank, and other multilateral lenders. As long as this policy stands, there is essentially no way for us to secure development financing or aid for grand projects like the Renaissance Dam.
Adding to this, within the World Bank’s leadership, one out of the five vice presidents is consistently Egyptian. Most of the time, the official responsible for African affairs in continental and international financial institutions is also usually an Egyptian. The same applies to the Nile desk—it is often headed by an Egyptian. And at the African Development Bank, Egyptians have held senior leadership positions for decades. Their main role has been to align the institutions’ policies with their government’s interests, systematically blocking projects they do not want to see materialize.
This is where the real gap lies: we do not have Ethiopian nationals positioned inside these institutions to defend our national interest. Unless they change these policies, we cannot expect real development support from them.
That is why we started building with our own capacity. We mobilized resources, constructed with what we had, and established a model. And in my view, that must continue—strengthening our capacity, building more dams with our own means, and carrying the people along. Ultimately, the Renaissance Dam is about more than electricity—it is about waking the economy and unlocking our broader potential.
So, at this stage, the real task is to consolidate what we started, expand on it with more self-financed projects, and eventually make it impossible for international finance institutions to ignore Ethiopia’s dams and keep them outside the global financing framework.
